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Executive Summary 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Aims and objectives 
 
This study represents the first sustained quantitative and qualitative attempt to involve 
both Republicans and Loyalists in an investigation of the impact of imprisonment and 
the role of politically motivated former prisoners in the process of conflict 
transformation in Northern Ireland.  
 
The overall aim of the project is to examine the ways in which groups of former 
prisoners are involved in peace-building and conflict transformation work and to 
evaluate the constraints and impediments placed upon their activities by the effects of 
the imprisonment process, politically motivated release and residual criminalisation.  
 
In pursuing the evaluation of the role of politically motivated former prisoners 
working within and without their own communities, the research has six specific 
objectives: 
 
• To trace the evolution and development of former prisoner groups; 
 
• To evaluate the impacts of imprisonment and release on the personal lives of 
former prisoners; 
 
• To assess the constraints imposed on former prisoners as agents of change by 
the residual criminalisation arising from their status; 
 
• To determine the potential of the former prisoner community in challenging 
intra-community tensions and evaluate their potential and actual contribution 
to conflict transformation at the inter-community level; 
 
• To compare and contrast the effectiveness of Loyalist and Republican former 
prisoners as agents of change within their own communities; 
 
• To explore the notion of former prisoners as agents of social and communal 
transformation within broader political processes through grounding the 
knowledge and practical experience of the former prisoner community within 
the broader conceptual context of conflict transformation. 
 
Conflict transformation 
 
For former prisoner groups, conflict transformation operates both within and between 
the respective communities. At the inner scale, it is concerned with the cultural, social 
and economic dimensions to community development, including:  
 
• attitudes to the other community;  
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• specific law and order issues and restorative justice;  
 
• negotiations on paramilitary flags and murals and other forms of display 
pertaining to absolute territorial control;  
 
• social problems such as deprivation of communities and drug-dealing.  
 
In its external form, conflict transformation can involve:  
 
• dialogue between former combatants;  
 
• attempts at understanding each other’s perceptions and histories (as in the 
North Belfast Conflict Transformation Forum);  
 
• practical forms of dialogue such as mobile telephone networks at interfaces; 
 
• and even political tourism in interface areas. 
 
Politically motivated former prisoner groups 
 
Politically motivated former prisoner groups are a relatively recent phenomenon. The 
impetus for such groups arose from several issues: 
 
• because former prisoners do not regard themselves as either criminals or 
offenders, accessing existing services provided by statutory agencies would 
constitute an admission of criminality;  
 
• former prisoners generally embraced the concept of self-help, seeing 
themselves as possessing the necessary expertise to assist others in similar 
circumstances, while believing that the existing service providers lacked the 
experience or empathy to deal with politically motivated former prisoners.  
 
Most funding for politically motivated former prisoner groups comes from European 
Union (EU) schemes. Between 1995-2003, funding of some £9.2 million from the 
Community Foundation for Northern Ireland and the European Special Support 
Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace I and II) supported the establishment 
of 61 groups and a further 29 projects for those working with politically motivated 
former prisoners and their families. 
 
This research has been facilitated by two politically motivated former prisoner groups 
The Loyalist Former Prisoners Interpretive Centre (EPIC) was established on 
Belfast’s Shankill Road in 1995 while Tar Isteach (meaning ‘come in’) was launched 
in 1999 and is based in New Lodge. It is part of a larger network of Republican 
former prisoner groups that come under the umbrella organisation, Coiste na n-
larchimí, which functions at an all-island of Ireland level. 
 
Methodology 
 
There are four principal elements to the project’s research methodology: 
 
 5
• A Questionnaire Survey of former prisoners and their relatives;  
 
• two Focus Group meetings held with Loyalist and Republican former 
prisoners; 
 
• A one-day Workshop involving both Republican and Loyalist former 
prisoners; 
 
• Semi-structured Interviews conducted with key former prisoners, 
representatives of former prisoner groups and also members of ‘civil society’.  
 
Survey Findings 
 
Impacts of imprisonment 
 
The survey conducted among 300 former prisoners and family members highlighted 
the reality that incarceration and post-imprisonment has presented prisoners and their 
families with a series of complex problems and difficulties. This report isolates the 
centrality of factors such as loss of income, marital breakdown and emotional and 
psychological stress.  
 
Imprisonment had a series of effects on both the prisoners and their families. Those 
effects did not necessarily disappear, however, with the end of incarceration and, for 
many respondents, the effects of imprisonment upon post-release outcomes was not 
directly linked to the period of time spent in jail or the nature of the imprisonment 
regime when incarcerated. The effects of imprisonment included: 
 
• problems with physical and psychological health; 
 
• relationship problems; 
 
• difficulties in obtaining and maintaining long-term employment; 
 
• problems centred around coping with life on the outside.  
 
More Republican (38.7%) than Loyalist (28%) relatives felt that imprisonment had 
had a negative impact on their relationship with the prisoners.  
 
Small majorities of both Republican (54.1%) and Loyalist (54.7%) former prisoners 
stated that they had found it easier to cope on a day-to-day basis while in prison. This 
reflected a lack of worries over personal finances and strong and durable senses of the 
defined comradeship developed during imprisonment.  
 
Equally, 37.3% of Republican and 38.7% of Loyalist former prisoners found it 
difficult to adapt to a post-imprisonment environment. The vast majority of both 
Republicans (93%) and Loyalists (84%) had experienced financial problems when 
first released and nearly two thirds of Republicans and just under a half of Loyalists 
(48%) were currently experiencing financial difficulties.  
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More than half of the Republican former prisoners (54.7%) and 48% of their relatives 
had lost a relative, compared to 42.7% of Loyalist former prisoners and their 
relatives.  
 
A highly significant 94.7% of Republican former prisoners and 78.7% of Loyalist 
former prisoners had lost a friend, as had 58.7% of Republican relatives and 45.9% of 
Loyalist relatives.  
 
The unemployment rate among Republican former prisoners in the survey was 40%, a 
higher rate than that of their Loyalist counterparts (29.3%).  
 
After excluding those in employment and pensioners, the observed levels of 
economic inactivity were 58.2% and 44% respectively for Republican and Loyalist 
former prisoners.  
 
Victimhood 
 
The issue of victimhood constitutes another important actual or potential constraint 
on the capabilities of former prisoner groups to work effectively within and without 
their communities. While impacting on the acceptability of those groups as agents of 
conflict transformation, attitudes to victimhood also help shape the ideologies of the 
groups. A large majority of respondents agreed that civilians were victims as were 
members of their own communities.  
 
With the exception of Loyalist former prisoners, over 80% of respondents stated that 
their families had been victims. Eighty percent of Republican former prisoners and 
77.3% of Republican relatives agreed that Republicans were victims compared to 
48% of Loyalist former prisoners and 66.7% of Loyalist relatives.  
 
Loyalists were more likely than Republicans to see members of the security forces as 
victims but Republican fewer Republican relatives than former prisoners were 
prepared to identify ‘victims’ in all categories.  
 
Respondents were asked to consider the impact of harm with regard to conflict related 
issues. Harm was defined as ‘inflicting physical, psychological or emotional trauma’. 
Unsurprisingly, given the findings regarding victimhood, the majority of respondents 
agreed that harm was caused to all sides in the conflict.  
 
No Republicans disagreed with the statement that ‘harm caused includes inequality 
and/or discrimination’, compared to 10.6% and 6.7% of Loyalist former prisoners and 
relatives respectively. There were also significantly positive responses to the 
propositions: ‘harm caused to my community and to others should be 
commemorated’; and that ‘understanding the causes of ‘harm’ can contribute to 
building a new society’.  
 
Over three-quarters of all respondents noted that ‘harm caused remains an 
impediment to building a new society’, with at least 60% from the Republican groups 
and Loyalist prisoner group agreed that ‘issues of harm caused may not have been 
resolved but wider peace building initiatives should continue.’ Just over half of 
Loyalist relatives agreed within this latter proposition.  
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Residual criminalisation 
 
The Belfast Agreement went some way to recognising the importance of resettlement 
as well as release of politically motivated former prisoners to the overall conflict 
resolution process as have funding initiatives. Neither British nor Irish governments 
have been prepared, however, to remove all the barriers to full citizenship or 
inclusion in society facing former prisoners and this residual criminalisation has 
emerged as a key impediment to the effectiveness of politically motivated former 
prisoner groups. Without doubt criminalisation constrains former prisoner behaviour 
and leads to stereotyping and stigmatisation. 
 
The representation of former prisoners in the media was also an issue of concern. 
Nearly a quarter of Republican former prisoners said they had experienced harassment 
at the hands of the media and a third said they had been treated unfairly.  
 
A majority of both Republican former prisoners (93.3%) and relatives (92%) believed 
that the media’s representation of former prisoners undermined the Peace Process. 
Three quarters of Loyalist former prisoners and two-thirds of Loyalist relatives 
concurred.   
 
Moving Onwards: Politically Motivated Former Prisoners and Conflict 
Transformation 
 
Many prisoners felt that their experience of the conflict and prison could be used to 
help others particularly as a ‘deterrent to young people’ and to ‘show the motivations 
and help explain the cause’ of the conflict. The sentiment of numerous comments was 
that lessons should be learnt from those involved in the conflict so as not to repeat 
them. Clearly, however, the same experiences have produced impediments to the role 
of former prisoners in the transition from conflict to conflict transformation. These 
are: 
 
• the ‘disabling’ and alienation of former prisoners through their personal 
responses to imprisonment and release; 
 
• criminalisation; 
 
• the differing attitudes of their own communities which have the cumulative 
effect of making Republicans more effective in the former prisoner role; 
 
• the legacy of the conflict and the contested nature of victimhood. 
 
Within their communities  
 
Former prisoners have three specific roles to play within their respective 
communities: they: 
 
• are involved in the transformation of attitudes and the infrastructural 
reconstruction of those communities and in the relationships between them; 
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• seek to influence policy for these areas but also policy as it reflects on former 
prisoners;  
 
• are more broadly involved in the creation of community narratives linked to 
current post-ceasefires political processes; this includes such dimensions as 
human stories of ‘who we are and where we come from’ and the history of the 
conflict and its transformation.  
 
The different repercussions of criminalisation can be summed up thus: 
 
• transitional dialogue is promoted by shared experiences of prison; 
 
• but there are different Republican and Loyalist understandings of 
criminalisation; 
 
• for Republicans, criminalisation was part of the apparatus used by the British 
state to depoliticise the conflict whereas they insist on the British government 
as being a principal party to the conflict; 
 
• for Loyalists, the scale of engagement is much more local; criminalisation was 
a mode of suffering, something to be endured for the greater good of 
Unionism within a structure of the Ulsterisation of state forces and 
normalisation; the Republicans were fighting the state but because of 
Ulsterisation, the ‘dead’ were Unionists. 
 
 
The very different ways in which Loyalist and Republican former prisoners are 
regarded within their own communities is replicated in their dealings outside those 
communities. This means, inevitably, that the effects of exclusions and impediments 
vary between the two groups, as do the constraints on their activities and the extent of 
containment with respect to conflict transformation.  
 
It is the case that for both Loyalists and Republicans, mutual prison experiences 
paved the way for dialogue, originally built on simple, everyday exchanges. There 
was also the shared consciousness of working-class tradition.  
 
The shared experience of criminalisation has had negative impacts on the abilities of 
both Loyalist and Republican former prisoners to work with each other because part 
of its purpose was to separate the two blocs. 
 
Without their communities 
 
It is clear that the legacy of criminalisation and the strategies applied to achieve it 
have diminished the capacity of former prisoners to work outside of their 
communities 
 
Despite the small physical distances involved, there is often a sense of parallel 
worlds, of being interconnected but opting for a voluntary apartheid. Face-to-face 
 9
contact, notwithstanding, fundamental misunderstandings remain between Republican 
and Loyalist former prisoners, as do stereotypical depictions of the other.  
 
Despite certain impediments, Loyalist former prisoners (as shown by EPIC) are well 
in advance of conventional politicians in working with Republicanism. This includes 
practical issues such as interface projects but also mutual attempts to understand 
opposing mindsets through studies of political theory and the multiple interpretations 
of shared histories. Loyalist former prisoners are likely to be more committed to 
conflict transformation than conventional politicians, have experience - no matter 
how imperfect - in dialogue with the other, and also experience in attempting to 
control militarism and paramilitarism in their own communities.  
 
In other words, working outside of each respective community is grinding work 
which depends on individuals and the personal contacts that former prisoners can 
establish between each other. 
 
For Republicans, working without is clearly impeded by their perceptions of 
territorially insular Loyalism versus ideological, ‘non-parochial’ Republicanism. The 
patronising attitudes – either conscious or unconscious – that Loyalists believe are 
sometimes expressed by Republican former prisoners toward them stem both from 
conflicting interpretations of criminalisation and a recourse to stereotypes.  
 
Thus, the thrust of both Republican and Loyalist groups is within their respective 
communities. It must be reiterated, however, that the nature and volume of contact 
between Loyalist and Republican former prisoners has increased since the onset of 
peace building strategies. Therefore the opportunity exists to move beyond present 
divisions and ambiguities. 
 
Former prisoners, particularly in the Republican communities where the issues are 
politically more sensitive, are also providing leadership towards the building of 
relations between the state agencies and communities which have traditionally been 
estranged from them.  
 
Concluding Comments 
 
Politically motivated former prisoners have been at the forefront of a range of 
community and civil society initiatives which have entailed dialogue and cooperation 
(where possible) between traditional segregated and estranged working class 
communities.  
 
They continually make a distinction between this style of work and that which they 
perceive as a traditional community relations approach. The Republican position on a 
community relations understanding of the conflict and template for resolving the 
conflict has long been that community relations is a strategy employed and supported 
by the British and Irish governments to promote a ‘two tribes’ view of the conflict, 
wherein the difficult relations between the two main communities was stressed and 
the role of the British state was either ignored or view as a neutral and ultimately 
benign arbitrator between the warring communities.  
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Loyalist former prisoners have also expressed considerable misgivings concerning 
what they perceive as the community relations approach. They are certainly 
concerned at efforts which might be seen to either dilute their Protestant or Unionist 
culture or indeed to problematise aspects of that culture so that Protestant sectarianism 
becomes defined as the key impediment to peacemaking. While their relationship is 
ambivalent rather than directly antagonistic towards the British government and, of 
course, they see Republicans as the prime ‘enemy’, their mistrust of the community 
relations approach arguably mirrors that of Republicans in some important ways.  
 
Former Loyalist prisoners would make common cause with Republicans concerning 
the need for human rights and equality protections for former prisoners, both of which 
are frameworks against which community relations has traditionally struggled.  
 
This comparative failure to mobilise wider support from within Unionism, and also 
internationally, appears as a fault line with regard to many of the differences 
experienced between the Loyalist and Republican former prisoner communities that 
have been studied here.  
 
There are clear discursive and ideological differences between Republicans and 
Loyalists and these divisions are manifest in terms of the alternative roles undertaken 
by each with regard to the ‘prison experience’. There is also, however, an evident 
place for Republicans to locate themselves within geographically bounded 
communities that offer distinct cultural and political support. Conversely, for 
Loyalists, the failure to garner such significant political or community support 
confines them to being one group within a more heterogeneous political community. 
 
In sum, in terms both of working within and without, Republican former prisoners 
have the advantage over their Loyalist counterparts in that: 
 
• they are empowered by the close relationship between former prisoner groups 
and macro-politics through Sinn Féin; 
 
• the stigmatisation of former prisoners within Loyalist communities contrasts 
to the central role which their Republican counterparts have in community 
politics; 
 
• the experience of criminalisation reflects on relationships both within and 
without for Loyalists but largely only without for Republicans; 
 
• Republican former prisoners do acquire legitimacy and confidence from their 
integration into Republican communities; 
 
• both groups of former prisoners are involved in conflict transformation in the 
sense of promoting social, cultural and economic change within their 
respective communities; 
 
• Loyalists see themselves as being more committed to pushing conflict 
transformation towards relationships with the other community although, in 
part, this may reflect their less secure position within their own community. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology 
 
 
1.1      Background to the project 
 
As in other conflicts, a key element to the process of conflict transformation in 
Northern Ireland has been the release and reintegration of politically motivated 
prisoners (McEvoy, 1998, 1999; Von Tangen Page, 1998). To date, 447 prisoners 
have been released (194 Loyalist, 241 Republican and 12 non-aligned) under the 
provisions of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. These men and women joined thousands of 
other former prisoners who had already served prison sentences related to the 
Northern Ireland/Irish conflict. It is notoriously difficult to estimate total numbers 
imprisoned as a result of the recent conflict in Northern Ireland. Some sources 
estimate approximately 15,000 Republicans and 5,000 Loyalists. While the centrality 
of prisoner release to the process of conflict resolution has been widely acknowledged 
in writing on the Northern Ireland peace process (e.g. Mitchell, 2000), the fate of 
politically motivated prisoners after release has received comparatively little attention. 
Indeed, much of the research on released prisoners has been conducted by former 
prisoner groupings themselves (see e.g., An Tus Nua, 1998; White, 1998; Tar Anall, 
2000; Ó hAdhmaill, 2001), or in co-operation with academics (see e.g., Shirlow, 
2001; Grounds and Jamieson, 2003; McEvoy et al, 2004).  
 
This present study therefore represents the first sustained quantitative and qualitative 
attempt to involve both Republicans and Loyalists in an investigation of the impact of 
imprisonment and the role of politically motivated former prisoners in the process of 
conflict transformation in Northern Ireland. (There is a terminological issue in that 
some groups prefer the term, ‘former prisoner’, as opposed to ‘ex prisoner’ on the 
grounds that the latter term implies a social, political and legal divide between 
incarceration and release. Accordingly, ‘former prisoner’ is employed here although 
‘ex prisoner’ remains in common usage and is retained below where it is cited in 
quotations.) 
 
The overall aim of the project is to examine the ways in which groups of former 
prisoners are involved in peace-building and conflict transformation work and to 
evaluate the constraints and impediments placed upon their activities by the effects of 
the imprisonment process, politically motivated release and residual criminalisation. 
We are concerned with Republican and Loyalist former prisoner groups ‘working 
within and working without’ which refers to their involvement in dialogue and 
various forms of community work, both within their own communities and with the 
‘other’ community. The term ‘community’ has itself multiple meanings, defining 
territorial units that extend from the scale of small inner-city micro-societies to the 
ethnic group as a whole. Both working within and without may be concerned with 
conflict transformation in its cultural, social and economic guises, but that may not 
always be the primary goal of former prisoners, both as groups and individuals, who 
may be more focused on the impacts of the prison experience and issues of 
criminalisation.  
 
The spatial focus of the project is part of North Belfast and the Greater Shankill area 
in West Belfast. Participants in the study generally originated from the highly 
segregated, interfaced and socially deprived inner city communities within which 
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former prisoner groups operate. Some of the communities involved are ranked in the 
top 10% of the most deprived communities in Northern Ireland. Around 60% of the 
households within the study areas are in receipt of housing benefit compared to an 
average of 24.9% for Northern Ireland. Thus the majority of the participants in this 
study live within areas that are targeted with regard to social need as well as policies 
that aim to dilute the impact of cultural and political tension (Shirlow, 2001). 
 
The research has been facilitated by two politically motivated former prisoner groups 
(see Chapter 2). The Loyalist Former Prisoners Interpretive Centre (EPIC) was 
established on Belfast’s Shankill Road in 1995 while Tar Isteach (meaning ‘come in’) 
was launched in 1999 and is based in New Lodge. It is part of a larger network of 
Republican former prisoner groups that come under the umbrella organisation, Coiste 
na n-larchimí (Coiste), which functions at an all-island of Ireland level. Both EPIC 
and Tar Istaech are concerned with the issues preventing the full reintegration of 
politically motivated former prisoners into civic society and provide counselling, 
training and welfare rights service for former prisoners and their families. The groups 
also operate a series of schemes concerned with conflict transformation, social capital 
and community development. 
 
While conflict and conflict transformation has been defined both broadly and 
narrowly, we have found the definition offered by Ho-Won Jeong most useful for our 
purposes:  
 
Conflict can be described as a contentious process of interpersonal or 
intergroup interactions that takes place within a larger social context. 
As sources of grievances are often associated with structural 
injustice, most serious conflicts encompass various types of social 
problems reflected in inter-group relations. Thus intergroup conflict 
is often imbedded in a political framework, and its meaning can be 
socially interpreted and constructed…Resolution of serious social 
conflicts means more than finding solutions to contentious issues. 
Enduring and mutually assured outcomes will not be attained 
without taking into account power imbalances and equitable social 
and economic relations. Self esteem and identity as well as physical 
well-being are key elements to be considered in conflict resolution 
and peace building. The nature of relations between adversaries 
needs to be examined in terms of looking for transformative 
possibilities. In rebuilding communal relations, long-term hostile 
relationships have to be overcome to prevent future occurrences of 
violent conflict (Ho-Won Jeong, 1999: 3).  
 
As discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6, ‘conflict transformation’ refers literally to 
methods that alter the nature of the conflict from violence to some other means. It is 
not synonymous with ‘conflict resolution’, logically an unattainable goal in these 
circumstances as the outcome would be a Northern Ireland either entirely British or 
entirely Irish. Conflict transformation depends on affecting changes in the nature of 
relationships between Loyalists and Republicans.  
 
In the words of one Loyalist: 
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Our interpretation of conflict transformation is not only transforming 
the nature of the conflict, from violence through dialogue to 
something else through the democratic process, but it’s transforming 
the nature of relationships between key people in conflict and that 
has to start with me and with you. To transform the nature of the 
conflict depends on transforming the nature of relationships. That’s 
why, right from our prison experience, we realised that unless I can 
change the attitude towards Republicans, no matter who the enemy is 
then the nature of the conflict is not going to change. It is about 
transformation rather than resolution because we can’t resolve the 
constitutional issue without one becoming the other [Unionist 
becoming Republican or vice versa]. A resolution of the “Irish 
Problem” means we’re all British or all Irish. Governments talk 
about conflict management so we focus on transformation. It’s about 
transforming politics, transforming community action, transforming 
restorative justice – everything is about transforming. It has to start 
with the individual. If it doesn’t change the individual then it’s not 
going to change anything (Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December 
2004). 
 
A Republican interviewee regards conflict transformation as a markedly ambiguous 
concept:  
 
This is a big big question for us in terms of Tar Anall because 
conflict transformation means all things to all people.  I mean some 
people in here think that it's about resolving conflict within 
themselves.  Some people feel well the violent conflict is over – it’s 
now a political conflict – and they have to come to terms with that. 
They’ve spent most of their lives being involved in conflict and their 
families as well.  So that’s conflict transformation for them.  Right 
across to the issues of inter- and intra-community conflict 
(Republican: Interview, 10th December 2004).   
 
Thus conflict transformation operates both within and without (between) the 
respective communities. At the inner scale, it is concerned with the cultural, social 
and economic dimensions to community development, including:  
 
• attitudes to the other community;  
• specific law and order issues and restorative justice;  
• negotiations on paramilitary flags and murals and other forms of display 
pertaining to absolute territorial control;  
• social problems such as deprivation of communities and drug-dealing.  
 
In its external form, conflict transformation can involve:  
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• dialogue between former combatants;  
• attempts at understanding each other’s perceptions and histories (as in the 
North Belfast Conflict Transformation Forum);  
• practical forms of dialogue such as mobile telephone networks at interfaces; 
• and even political tourism in interface areas. 
It is important to acknowledge that despite the efforts to build inter-community 
linkages that there is a division between Loyalists and Republicans regarding the 
nature and meaning of conflict. For Republicans their relationship to the British and 
Irish States remains primary whereas for Loyalists, the conflict with Republicans is 
acknowledged as being of greater significance than their relationship to the state. 
Despite, this ideological division, it is obvious that working between culturally and 
politically polarised communities is important for both groups. 
 
It is also apparent that there has been a significant rise in initiatives and interventions 
by former prisoner groups in more recent times. This has involved engagement, in 
various forms, with academics, members of civil society, political opponents, 
statutory agencies and peace and reconciliation groups. The desire to open up to 
critics and those with alternative perspectives is also a sign of openness and a shift 
away from a more self-reflexive attitude among former prisoners. Indeed, permitting 
access to the academic team engaged in this report is part of that wider process of 
critical engagement and openness with regard to alternative perspectives and 
opinions.  
 
1.2      Research objectives 
 
In pursuing the evaluation of the role of politically motivated former prisoners 
working within and without their own communities, the research has six specific 
objectives: 
 
• To trace the evolution and development of former prisoner groups; 
 
• To evaluate the impacts of imprisonment and release on the personal lives of 
former prisoners; 
 
• To assess the constraints imposed on former prisoners as agents of change by 
the residual criminalisation arising from their status; 
 
• To determine the potential of the former prisoner community in challenging 
intra-community tensions and evaluate their potential and actual contribution 
to conflict transformation at the inter-community level; 
 
• To compare and contrast the effectiveness of Loyalist and Republican former 
prisoners as agents of change within their own communities; 
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• To explore the notion of former prisoners as agents of social and communal 
transformation within broader political processes through grounding the 
knowledge and practical experience of the former prisoner community within 
the broader conceptual context of conflict transformation. 
 
1.3      Methodology 
 
The project has been co-ordinated by a steering group which included the researchers 
from the University of Ulster and Queen’s University, Belfast, together with 
representatives from EPIC and Tar Isteach. Understanding the position, vulnerabilities 
and future of the former prisoner community in the context of conflict transformation 
creates important research challenges and requires a diverse and interlinked empirical 
design. There is an extensive research tradition into the effects of the conflict in the 
island of Ireland and, in particular, the experiences of spatially segregated 
communities. Hargie and Dickson (2002) have described the range of research 
conducted on community relations in Northern Ireland and identified the need for 
sensitivity, objectivity and rigor in researching the impact of ethno-social division 
whilst Connolly and Healy (2002) argue that quantitative techniques alone fail to 
unpack the processes at work in divided communities. They believe that qualitative 
approaches are essential to capture fully the lived experiences of divided cultures and 
uncover the causal relationships which explain why groups act in certain ways. Here, 
the values of the researcher can be challenged by the empirical setting to produce 
more authentic accounts of the world of the target group. The normative bias of 
quantification is modified by the subjectivity of the qualitative paradigm. Hoggart et 
al (2002: 27) make a similar point about researching highly ethnicised communities: 
‘cross-cultural understanding is possible only if you accept other viewpoints on their 
own terms and refrain from judging them’. 
 
Thus the study of complex phenomena such as the involvement of former prisoner 
groups in conflict transformation requires the application of multiple methods. 
Hoggart et al. (2002: 67) conceptualise this process through the idea of triangulation 
which is defined as: 
 
the use of a series of complementary methods in order to gain a 
deeper insight on a research problem. The advantage of using 
complementary methods is that they enhance capacities for 
interpreting meaning and behaviour. This is because the insight 
gained can strengthen confidence in conclusions by providing 
multiple routes to the same result. 
 
In a politically contentious environment, it is essential that the research design 
maintains a high degree of methodological objectivity and ethical robustness. 
Connolly (2003: np) assesses the priority for researchers in Northern Ireland: 
 
Researchers should be committed to the unbiased and objective 
pursuit of knowledge. They have a responsibility to report their 
research comprehensively and accurately, including the methods 
they have used and the data they have gathered. Researchers must 
avoid selectively reporting their findings or fabricating, falsifying 
or misrepresenting their findings in any other way. 
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His criteria for researchers dealing with vulnerable groups include the need to: 
 
• conduct their professional work with integrity and in such a way as to not 
jeopardise future research, the public standing of researchers or the ability of 
others to publish and promote the findings of their research; 
 
• respect the rights and dignity of all those who are involved in or affected by 
their research; 
 
• ensure as far as possible the physical, social and psychological well-being of 
all those who take part in their research or are subsequently affected by it. 
 
These issues have been addressed through the mechanism of the project Steering 
Group while the research design for the project also incorporates an integrated 
methodology which meets these criteria and produces data that is both reliable and 
valid. It has four principal elements: 
 
• A questionnaire survey of former prisoners and their relatives was employed 
to help determine: 
 
- the impact of imprisonment on family life and the effect and nature of 
release upon self-esteem and other social relationships; 
-  the extent of residual criminalisation; 
- attitudes to and impediments in conflict transformation and peace-
building. 
 
The sample included 150 Republican and 150 Loyalist former prisoners and 
their relatives (75 of each). Surveying took place in the late spring and early 
summer of 2004. It was important to give equal measure to family members, 
who have been under-investigated in earlier studies, an omission that 
undermines the meaning of the impact of imprisonment upon communities 
and also obscures a series of complex intra-community relationships. The 
survey work was undertaken in a range of geographical areas. Republican 
respondents came from the New Lodge, Antrim Road, Bone and Ardoyne 
districts. Although the bulk of the Republican former prisoners were 
connected to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), some 
respondents had been involved in other Republican organisations and a few 
had no connection with any particular group but had been imprisoned for 
politically motivated activities. Loyalists were drawn from the Greater 
Shankill area. The Loyalist sample was drawn from within the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF) and Red Hand Commando (RHC) groups.  
 
• To elaborate upon the questionnaire results, two Focus Group meetings were 
held with Loyalist and Republican former prisoners. These took place 
respectively at the LINC Centre, North Belfast, on 1st December 2004 and the 
Ashton Centre, North Belfast, on 3rd December 2004. 
 
• A one-day Workshop involving both Republican and Loyalist former prisoners 
was held at the University of Ulster, Belfast, on 24th June 2004 to explore their 
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sometimes different and sometimes shared key concerns in terms of the 
impacts of imprisonment and residual criminalisation and also their abilities to 
deliver on conflict transformation. 
 
• Semi-structured Interviews were conducted with a number of key former 
prisoners and representatives of former prisoner groups and also members of 
‘civil society’.  
 
All meetings and interviews were taped with the permission of participants and 
interviewees and subsequently transcribed: quotations cited in this report are, of 
course, anonymous except in those instances in which interviewees gave permission 
for the use of their names. 
 
1.4 Themes and definitions: former prisoners, ‘political motivation’ and the 
contested nature of the conflict 
 
Before exploring in greater detail the contribution of former prisoners to the process 
of conflict transformation, it might be useful at this juncture to offer some background 
to the slightly cumbersome phraseology ‘politically motivated former prisoners’. 
Definitional questions concerning prisoners and former prisoners incarcerated as a 
result of the conflict have long been highly contested. As elsewhere, the practical and 
symbolic nature of the prison conditions in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland 
and Great Britain were represented as something of a microcosm of the broader 
question of the political character or otherwise of the conflict (McEvoy, 2001). Indeed 
much of the violence and political strife concerning the prisons focused on the 
struggle between the prisoners' assertion of their status as political prisoners and 
attempts by the prison authorities to deny, undermine or manage that assertion. 
Contestation of the distinction between what constitutes political and what constitutes 
criminal acts is not, however, unique to this particular conflict and a brief discussion 
on the broader context is useful in highlighting a number of key themes for current 
purposes.  
 
For some scholars, the starting point for unpacking definitional difficulties concerning 
political motivation is an acknowledgement that all acts deemed criminal arise as a 
result of a political process of definition (Quinney, 1970; Chambliss 1976). As 
Tunnell (1993: xi) has argued: 
 
 ....crime as an act, and the social reactions to it, are political 
constructs. After all, crime is a violation of legal norms legislated by 
a political body as criminal deviance. 
 
While such broad definitions are arguably true, at least at the conceptual level, they do 
not necessarily elucidate the relationship between crime and politics. Thus, for 
example, at its crudest, this view is represented in reductionist accounts, which view 
all crime as ‘either the expression, symbol or equivalent of political resistance or the 
product of the political order of capitalism' (Cohen, 1996: 3). As Cohen argues, the 
excesses of such discourses in which virtually all crime becomes political, gave the 
whole enterprise a bad name. What is relevant, however, for current purposes is the 
idea that the state is a central constitutive actor in the process of defining crime as 
political or otherwise.  
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Others have sought to define political crime by reference to the ideology or beliefs of 
the particular offender. For example, Cesaro Lombroso’s (1968) classic text on 
criminality devotes several chapters to the causes of political crime, arguing that it 
represents a version of a ‘crime of passion…especially frequent amongst the young 
and in the most intelligent and cultivated of nations’ (Lombroso, 1968: 227). Schafer 
(1974: 145), too, has described political criminals as ‘convictional criminals’, those 
who are convinced of the truth and justification of their own beliefs and who will 
carry out ‘ordinary crimes’ (e.g. murder, kidnapping, robbery etc) as a means to a 
higher political or ideological end. Similarly Hagan (1997: 2) defines political crime 
as ‘criminal activity committed for ideological purposes’ such as social-political 
reasons, moral ethical motivations, religious beliefs, scientific theories or political 
causes. For such commentators, the focus is on the motive rather than the act of the 
‘criminal’.  
 
Elsewhere, greater emphasis has been placed on the nature of the acts carried out 
rather than the motivation of the protagonists. For example, when Amnesty 
International began to campaign for the release of political detainees, its mandate was 
limited originally to ‘prisoners of conscience’, those imprisoned for their political 
beliefs who had never used or advocated violence. Neir (1995: 393) has used a similar 
definition of political prisoner to include only those incarcerated for his/her beliefs or 
for peaceful expression or association, excluding those who have employed or 
‘imminently incited’ violence. While such a comparatively narrow definition of 
political crime may be understandable for the pragmatic campaigning purposes of an 
organisation such as Amnesty, it is of little practical use in a context such as Northern 
Ireland where large-scale violence has been committed for political ends. 
 
A similar struggle to provide adequate definitions of terms such as ‘crime’, ‘political 
violence’ and ‘terrorism’ is characteristic of other areas such as international relations, 
political science, terrorism studies and international law (Gearty, 1996). These too 
have variously focused on: the nature of the violent acts (Van Den Wijngaert, 1980; 
Teichman, 1996; Greenwood, 1996); instrumentalist views such as those discussed 
below which rely primarily upon domestic and international legislative definitions of 
certain acts (Wilkinson, 1986; Schmid et al, 1990); attempts to define such acts by 
reference to the status of the victim/s as a combatant or civilian (Primoratz, 1990); and 
other principles of either international humanitarian  or extradition law (Campbell, 
1989; Keightley, 1993). The common feature of all such attempts at definition has 
been shaped by the means chosen for either distinguishing or indeed disregarding the 
‘political’ or ‘politically motivated’ element of the offenders' actions.  
 
Another method employed has been to distinguish ordinary from political offenders is 
to examine the manner in which individuals are tried by the state. Such logic would 
suggest that if an individual can be determined to have received a ‘political trial’, then 
his/her status as a ‘political prisoner’ if convicted would seem assured. Unfortunately 
of course the definition of what constitutes a ‘political trial’ is itself problematic.1 
                                                 
1 Hain cites an illustrative quote from Judge Alan King-Hamilton in the 1979 case of four young 
anarchists charged with firearms and explosives offences. ‘Some counsel have described this 
trial as a political trial. I direct it is not a political trial. We do not put people on trial for their 
political views in this county…Merely being an anarchist is not a crime.’ However, Hain 
suggests that Judge King Hamilton's denial is so compulsory a statement by a presiding judge at 
 19
Whether individuals are tried by military courts such as the post-World War Two 
trials in Nuremburg and Tokyo (Lane, 1979), trials of former Eastern bloc officials or 
government and military personnel in deposed Latin American regimes (Borneman, 
1997; Huntingdon, 1991), trials of Western European ‘terrorist’ groupings in the 
1970s (Becker, 1989; Moss, 1989) or even the show trials of the Soviet regime (Szász, 
1972), there remains the potential for a narrow interpretation of the process which 
holds that:  
 
…whatever the political background of the individual case, …the 
trial court will sift the evidence and apply the law ; the difference in 
the subject matter, the stature of the individuals or groups involved, 
the degree of public interest, or the widespread implications of the 
verdict will not matter (Kircheimer, 1961:  49).  
 
In a similar fashion, during the most recent conflict, local, Irish and British courts 
have had relatively few problems in defining and understanding what is meant by 
‘terrorism’ in a straightforwardly technical or instrumentalist fashion.2 From 1972 
until the present day ‘terrorism’ has been defined in successive pieces of Emergency 
Legislation as: 
 
…the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of 
violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the 
public in fear. 
 
A terrorist is defined as: 
 
a person who is or has been concerned in the commission or 
attempted commission of any act of terrorism or in directing, 
organising or training persons for the purpose of terrorism.3   
 
Since 1973 in Northern Ireland, any person who has been charged with a suspected 
terrorist offence (a ‘scheduled offence’) has had their case heard before a single judge 
in special juryless court with amended rules of evidence (Jackson and Doran, 1995).4 
In practice the obvious political characteristics of such trials have contributed 
comparatively little to the authorities’ response to the defendants’ assertion of their 
status as political.  
 
An instrumentalist view of terrorism has thus enabled successive British and Irish 
governments and judges to acknowledge that while people may be engaged in acts of 
                                                                                                                                            
a political trial that ‘…one can formulate a handy layman's rule - it’s a political trial if the judge 
(or the prosecutor) specifically denies that it is’ (Hain, 1984: 12).  
2 See McKee v Chief Constable for Northern Ireland (1984) 1 WLR 1358 (HL) 
3 The original definitions, replicated in later versions of the Emergency Provision Act and the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act, are taken from the legislation to enact Internment (discussed 
below), the Detention of Terrorists (NI) Order 1972, Art 2 (2).  
4 Scheduled offences are those normally associated with the commission of terrorist acts (e.g. 
murder, manslaughter, explosions, serious offences against the person, riot, collecting 
information likely to be of use to terrorists etc) and are listed as an appendix to the Emergency 
legislation. The Act also empowers the Attorney General to decree that certain acts of murder, 
manslaughter etc should not be treated as “scheduled” offences and should therefore be tried by 
jury, normally in a case where there is no suspected paramilitary involvement.  
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violence ‘for political ends’, these acts remain criminal in nature and should be treated 
as such, albeit by using a necessarily amended criminal justice process. Unlike many 
European jurisdictions (Radzinowicz and Hood, 1979), the British and Irish tradition 
has been to resist strongly any suggestion of ‘special’ treatment for politically 
motivated offenders. Indeed, for some of the most influential commentators on 
terrorism in Britain and Ireland, to acknowledge the political nature of terrorist crimes 
appears to suggest that such acts are in fact more heinous than ‘ordinary decent’ 
criminality because they represent an attack on the value system of society:  
 
If we attach any meaning and value to our Western Judaeo-
Christian, liberal and humanist values and the ethical and legal 
systems that have been shaped by this tradition, we must logically 
recognise the criminal nature of terrorism...It is a moral crime, a 
crime against humanity, an attack not only on our security, our rule 
of law and the safety of the state, but on civilised society itself 
(Wilkinson, 1986: 66). 
 
Such a view does not, for example, permit any distinction which might be seen to lend 
the slightest degree of legitimacy to ‘terrorism’ such as distinguishing between attacks 
on civilian non-combatants and military or security force personnel.5 Rather, its sees 
the state, whether in the form of its armed personnel or its civilian citizens, as the 
victim of terrorism. Within such a paradigm, any political rationale which underpins 
criminal acts is proof positive of greater wickedness.  
 
In sum, each of the above frameworks is arguably relevant in the various debates 
concerning the definitions of those who have become engaged in and in many 
instances were imprisoned as a result of violence related to the Northern Ireland 
conflict. The British and Irish states were, of course, key actors in the process of 
criminalising certain acts and not others. Discussions on the objectives of the 
paramilitary actor, their use of violence, their targeting strategies (e.g. civilian versus 
security forces), the nature of their trials and, of course, the particular conditions of 
their detention; all have been utilised by those seeking to both assert and deny 
political motivation for those engaged in conflict-related violence.  
 
For current purposes however, while we aware of the complexities of these debates, 
we have mirrored the approach of the Sentence Review Commission established 
under the Belfast Agreement. In making decisions concerning eligibility for early 
release, the Sentence Review Commission utilised the definition laid down in the 
Emergency legislation. People who had been convicted and imprisoned under the 
Emergency legislation in Northern Ireland and legally defined as ‘terrorists’ had 
therefore been adjudged guilty of violence or related acts for political ends and could 
therefore be treated as politically motivated prisoners in making appropriate 
                                                 
5 One of the fundamental principles of humanitarian law (the laws of war) is that attacks on 
civilian non-combatants are outlawed. For example, Common Article 3 (1a) of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions regarding conflicts “not of an international character” outlaws violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture to persons 
taking no active part in the hostilities. While there is a considerable debate as to its applicability 
to Northern Ireland (Hogan and Walker, 1989; Boyle and Campbell, 1992), in line with a 
broader international trend (Petrasek, 2000), a number of human rights NGOs such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch have used international humanitarian law principles to 
criticise attacks by paramilitaries in Northern Ireland against civilians.  
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determinations. Therefore for the purpose of this report, people who have been 
convicted through the Emergency Law system and subsequently imprisoned for their 
role in acts related to the conflict are described as politically motivated prisoners or 
former prisoners, depending on circumstances.  
 
The de facto acceptance of the political motivation of paramilitaries does not imply 
either approval or appeasement. What it does entail, however, is an understanding that 
‘unpalatable’ measures such as prisoner release were necessary in the process of 
conflict transformation and to recognise that the removal of certain structural 
obstacles to successful prisoner reintegration are prerequisite foundations for a new 
society. In a similar fashion to political imprisonment during the conflict, the ongoing 
debate concerning former prisoners may be used as a prism through which to view 
other elements of the body politic beyond the state.  
 
It is no accident that the issue of prisoner release initially proved the greatest obstacle 
to the Unionist ‘Yes’ campaign during the referenda on the Belfast Agreement. At one 
level, this could be attributed to the horrors of the previous thirty years and the 
atrocities carried out by the IRA and other Republican groupings. Such an explanation 
is inadequate, however, ignoring as it does the fact that Nationalists voted 
overwhelmingly for an agreement which saw Loyalist prisoners released, despite the 
often-indiscriminate nature of Loyalist attacks on Catholics throughout the conflict.  
 
The nature, meaning and motivation of violence were generally posited upon 
dissimilar interpretations between the two principal communities. For Republicans 
and supporters of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), the political 
character to the conflict has never been doubted although it should be stressed that the 
latter was opposed to the use of force. The Loyalist campaign against the Nationalist 
and Republican communities did not lessen the perception of these groups that such 
indiscriminate violence was political in character as it aimed to achieve the political 
objective of maintaining Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Within both of these 
traditions, there was a sense that the conflict could be resolved through political 
development. Moreover, and most certainly in recent years, it became clear that 
neither the majority of Nationalists and/or Republicans believed that a ‘military’ or 
‘security’ victory might be possible. Painful though this acceptance was for many 
Republicans, a clear majority of that community saw prisoner releases as necessary in 
order to achieve a political transformation of the conflict.6
  
For many Unionists, on the other hand, ‘terrorism’ was an aberration on the body 
politic perpetuated by a few irredentist ‘men of violence’ for whatever combination of 
criminal or psychopathic reasons (Robinson, 1980; Cochrane, 1997). With little 
support or sympathy for Loyalist prisoners beyond the communities within which they 
lived and the narrow electoral base of the Loyalist parties, and no comparable 
historical experience of political imprisonment to the Nationalist community, the 
mainstream Unionist view of ‘terrorist’ violence was sustained and nurtured by the 
official discourses of the state. Within Unionist thinking, security force members, for 
example, were not protagonists to the conflict but rather those who upheld  ‘law and 
order’ in the face of a vicious attack on a democratic state.  
                                                 
6 ‘Most Nationalists Willing to Accept Some Kind of Amnesty.’ Belfast Telegraph, 30th 
September 1996.  
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This refusal to recognise political motivation insulated Unionism from what 
Republicans, Nationalist and some Loyalists would view as a moral culpability in the 
reproduction of conflict. The state’s formal denial of political motivation also went to 
the core of much of Unionism’s denial of the need for political change. However, 
once the British government’s de facto position on the recognition of political 
motivation had so manifestly changed (through prisoner releases), this represented 
part of a broader betrayal of the fiction of blamelessness (McEvoy, 2001). Thus 
prisoner releases and resettlement (together with the other dramatic structural changes 
to policing, the criminal justice system, equality and human rights legislation and the 
sporadic reality of power sharing with Sinn Féin) have led to accusations that the 
mainstream Unionist denial of the political nature of the conflict is intellectually 
untenable.7   
 
One prominent feature of the attitude towards prisoners of both the Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP) and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has been a consistent linkage of 
the question of prisoner release and resettlement with the treatment of victims of 
violence. Thus, a persistent theme in the campaigns against the early releases was that 
of Unionist politicians framing their position as ‘speaking on behalf of the victims of 
violence’. While of course many victims of violence were opposed to the early 
releases, such an assumed monolithic view on the position of victims was belied by 
the fact that other victims felt they could not take a position on the issue and still 
others argued in favour of the early release programme (McEvoy, 2001).8  
 
Unionist politicians also gave prominent support to legal challenges mounted to test 
the provisions of the early release programme (Morgan, 2000). In the wake of the 
releases, a number of Unionist politicians have also consistently criticised the 
resources allocated to the resettlement of prisoners, often juxtaposing such 
expenditure with the amount allocated to victims.9 While some victims and victims 
organisations have become increasingly disillusioned with politicians who ‘speak in 
their name’ (McBride, 2004), the debate concerning former prisoners amongst 
mainstream Unionists in Northern Ireland has lost little of its vituperative tone. 
Despite the generosity of some of those who have suffered most egregiously at the 
hands of paramilitary and state actors (Hamber, 2003), the fate of former prisoners 
                                                 
7 For an analysis of the notion of denial with regard to human rights abuses, see Cohen (2001).  
8 Amongst the most high profile supporters of the early release programmes as part of the 
broader process of reconciliation were Mrs Joan Wilson, mother of Marie Wilson killed by the 
IRA at the Enniskillen bombing and Mr Colin Parry whose son Tim was killed by the IRA 
bomb at Warrington. Mr Parry expressed his position recently in the following terms: ‘Whilst it 
is offensive to have my son classed as collateral damage, I saw the prisoner release process as 
part of the Good Friday Agreement as being absolutely essential. I accepted that the position 
that both governments were taking, that without prisoner releases there would have been no 
deal.’ (Minutes of Evidence to the Northern Ireland Select Committee, 2nd March 2005).  
9 See e.g. ‘Fury over £6m for prisoners' groups : Contrast with funds for victim support’, Belfast 
Telegraph, 2nd December 2000. Between 1998 and 2001 the British government committed over 
£18 million to victims issues. This figure does not include individual awards made under the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (CICS) or the estimated £120 million costs of the 
Bloody Sunday Inquiry. Funding for trauma services has continued since 2001. Victims related 
money has also come from other sources including over £3 million of the European Union (EU) 
Peace and Reconciliation Programme in the first wave of funding and almost £5 million under 
Peace II. Funding for victims issues has also come from a range of different charitable sources 
(Gilligan, 2005).  
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remains heated, precisely because it speaks to important political and ideological 
struggles concerning the meaning of the Northern Ireland conflict.10 As Brian 
Gormally (2001: 5) has argued, for Unionists in particular;  
 
….prisoners and former prisoners are the most obvious ex-
combatants, the visible concentration of everything people feel about 
the conflict…they are the perpetrators of numerous atrocities, the 
enemies of democracy and civilisation incarnate.  
 
It is little wonder that the role of former prisoners in the future polity remains hotly 
disputed in many quarters for they are viewed as the most visible representation of 
conflict. The meaning of imprisonment and the post-imprisonment experience is 
generally hidden from public discourse. The conflict transformation work, for 
example, undertaken by former prisoners is generally obscured by tabloid accounts of 
criminality and other anti-social behaviour. Similarly, the establishment of linkages 
with state agencies, in itself a sign of conflict transformation, is also obscured. A 
central concern of this report is, therefore, to encourage understandings of the former 
prisoner community which stretch beyond the stereotypical depictions found within 
much of the public domain.  
     
1.5  Structure of the report 
 
Following this Introduction, the report is divided into six further chapters. In Chapter 
2, we describe the evolution of former prisoner groups within the historical context of 
the prison regimes, drawing upon qualitative data to differentiate between Republican 
and Loyalist experiences. Chapters 3-5 are based on the three core themes that 
structure the questionnaire survey: resistance and transition; residual criminalisation; 
and conflict resolution, management and transformation. In Chapter 3, the personal 
dimension of politically motivated former prisoners is examined through an analysis 
of family life, self-esteem and other social relationships. The focus in Chapter 4 is on 
residual criminalisation and the ways in which this set of processes can act as an 
impediment in the ability of former prisoners to work both within and without their 
communities. Chapter 5 is concerned with the contribution of former prisoners to 
conflict resolution, management and transformation, a theme which is further 
developed in Chapter 6 which employs qualitative evidence drawn from the Focus 
Groups and Workshop to elaborate on the contrasting experiences of Republican and 
Loyalist politically motivated former prisoners at working within and without their 
respective communities. Chapter 7 summarises the conclusions of the project by 
revisiting the research objectives. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 The perspective of the DUP on the early releases is instructive. ‘All decent people recoil with 
moral contempt at the prospect of the mass release of those who have murdered and maimed the 
innocent....’  (DUP, 1998). Similarly, Jeffrey Donaldson (then a member of the Official Unionist 
Party, now DUP) has indicated that it was the prisoner release issue together with 
decommissioning which prevented him from supporting the Agreement. Even for pro-
Agreement Unionists, the releases were clearly the most difficult aspect of the peace process 
(see generally Von Tangen Page, 2000; McEvoy, 2001, esp. Chap. 11).  
 24
Chapter 2: The History and Evolution of Former Prisoner Groups 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Politically motivated former prisoner groups are a relatively recent phenomenon, the 
first two examples being established as recently as 1995. The impetus for such groups 
arose from several issues: 
 
• because former prisoners do not regard themselves as either criminals or 
offenders, accessing existing services provided by statutory agencies would 
constitute an admission of criminality;  
 
• former prisoners generally embraced the concept of self-help, seeing 
themselves as possessing the necessary expertise to assist others in similar 
circumstances, while believing that the existing service providers lacked the 
experience or empathy to deal with politically motivated former prisoners 
(NIVT, 2001: 4).  
 
Between 1995-2003, funding of some £9.2 million from the Community Foundation 
for Northern Ireland (CFNI)11 and the European Special Support Programme for 
Peace and Reconciliation (Peace I and II) supported the establishment of 61 groups 
and a further 29 projects for those working with politically motivated former prisoners 
and their families (CFNI, 2003: 47, 50). 
 
This Chapter examines the historical dimension to both Republican and Loyalist 
groups with particular regard to the ways in which the prisoner issue has been 
foregrounded by their respective movements as part of the political strategies shaping 
the shift towards transitional politics both before and after the ceasefires of 1994.  
 
We then examine the groundbreaking talks initiated by the Quakers in 1990 which led 
to a joint approach on the issues of reintegration and funding for self-help groups, the 
difficulties encountered by those involved in this joint approach and the reasons for its 
eventual failure. The Chapter then considers the aims, objectives and funding of past 
and present Republican and Loyalist former prisoner groups, before concluding with 
an assessment of their future role, both in terms of funding and also their overall 
contribution to former prisoner reintegration and conflict transformation. 
 
2.2        The historical context: prison regimes and the ‘downtown centre’ 
 
The introduction of internment without charge in 1971 led to an influx of prisoners 
into the prison systems in the island of Ireland. The early acquisition of  ‘Special 
Category Status’ due to separate campaigns run by Republicans and Loyalists, led to 
the bulk of politically motivated prisoners being imprisoned in Long Kesh under 
‘prisoner of war’ type conditions. After Loyalist protests inside and outside gaol, a 
35-day hunger strike by Republicans and the PIRA cease-fire, Special Category 
Status was eventually introduced by the Government on 20th June 1972 (Garland, 
2001). Henceforth, prisoners who claimed political motivation were granted this 
                                                 
11 Previously known as the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust (NIVT). 
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status if they had been convicted to serve more than nine months and they were 
'claimed' by one of groups of ‘political’ prisoners already in the jail.  
 
‘Special Category Status’ was revoked in 1975 under the recommendations of the 
Gardiner Report and subsequently removed for new prisoners entering the H-Blocks 
located in Long Kesh/Maze Prison, on or after March 1st 1976. The repeal of ‘Special 
Category Status’ was based upon a desire by the British state to further criminalise 
the activities of paramilitary groups. At the same time allegations of a new policy of 
‘systematic beatings’ of detainees became increasingly frequent, backed up by reports 
from Amnesty International (1978) and prominent journalists such as Peter Taylor 
(1980). The Republican prisoners’ rejection of policies that they regarded as being 
based upon criminalisation eventually led to the ‘Blanket Protest’, so called due to 
prisoners donning blankets after refusing to wear prison uniforms. This initiated a 
more proactive struggle marked by the ‘No-Wash’ protests that ran between 1978 and 
1980. This particular campaign against criminalisation led to a deteriorating political 
situation and finally, in 1980, to the Hunger Strikes which eventually led to the death 
of ten Republican inmates (O’Malley, 1990; Campbell et al, 1994). A more 
managerial regime emerged in the wake of the Hunger Strikes following the gaining 
of certain concessions and alternative mode of resistance tied to negotiation and 
external political pressure. By the late 1980s, both Republican and Loyalist inmates 
were partly recognised as political prisoners. 
 
As pro-state paramilitaries, Loyalists had something of an ambivalent relationship 
with a polity to which they owed loyalty but which, nonetheless, imprisoned them for 
actions carried out in ‘defence’ of that state. Again for Loyalists, prison struggle had 
never been a particularly prominent feature of their history or cultural psyche. As one 
Loyalist former prisoner stated: 
 
In the l930s Dawson Bates (the then Minister of Home Affairs in the 
Stormont Government) would have been paying us to do what they 
began imprisoning us for in the 1970s (Loyalist: Workshop, 24th 
June 2004)). 
 
While Loyalists believed that their actions were politically motivated they were less 
inclined to join what many regarded as ‘Republican-type’ prison protests. On certain 
occasions in the late 1970s and 1980s when Loyalists did engage in protests 
demanding segregation, such actions were represented by Unionists as giving succour 
to Republicanism and other anti-state discourses. This animosity toward political 
struggle prevented a sustained, systematic and resistant approach toward prison-based 
regimes. The inability, for example, of the ‘Loyalist blanketmen’ to maintain a 
prolonged political campaign was recognised by Loyalists linked to the UVF/RHC as 
being due to a lack of collaboration from other Loyalist groups and a wider Unionist 
community who ‘offered little support for the protestors’: 
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Republicans were able to draw on a whole reservoir of tradition 
within prisons, but there was nothing for us. What we had to do to a 
large degree was to start and lay the rules and traditions which could 
be followed by others. It was very difficult because we had an 
antagonistic regime (Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
Unlike Loyalism, Republicanism has a history of imprisonment stretching back many 
decades and associated with political conflict in Ireland north and south (see, e.g., 
Coogan, 1987). During the various IRA campaigns, prisoner welfare groups sprang up 
to organise the provision of parcels and to raise funds for prisoners and their families. 
When the current ‘Troubles’ began in 1969, a number of welfare groups materialised 
including: Green Cross; the Prisoners’ Dependency Fund; and the Central Citizens 
Defence Committee. Following the introduction of internment in 1971, more groups 
(most notably the Irish Republican Prisoners Welfare Association) were established as 
political campaigns focused on conditions both in HMP Maze (Long Kesh) and HMP 
Belfast (Crumlin Road). As one former prisoner put it:  
 
Our whole system was based on the same welfare that had existed in 
campaigns as far back as the 40s with the PDF and Green 
Cross…When I went into gaol in 1972, they provided the transport, 
they helped with parcels, that was their role outside, to raise funds. 
We were making things to send out to be sold and they were also 
taking part in the political campaigns (Republican: Workshop, 24th 
June 2004). 
 
The groups involved in welfare and in the support of political campaigns were 
independent of each other and of the wider Republican movement, reflecting the 
many factions that then existed within Republicanism. These included the Official 
Irish Republican Army (OIRA), Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and PIRA. 
While there may have been little cooperation between these groups outside, 
cooperative relationships did develop inside prison while the first intimations of a 
centre to deal with the resettlement of former prisoners also came from Loyalist-
Republicans interaction in Long Kesh. 
 
This latter initiative evolved into the so-called ‘downtown centre’, the first serious 
attempt to address their welfare and resettlement needs by the prisoners themselves 
(Crawford, 1999). The ‘Camp Council’ in Long Kesh, which represented the interests 
of all the paramilitary prisoners, developed the idea in 1974. The ‘Camp Council’ 
achieved ‘tranquillity and understanding between bitter opponents’, so much so that 
both its Republican and Loyalist representatives wanted to ‘export’ the cooperation 
outside gaol into the establishment of a ‘downtown’ office in Belfast (Garland, 2001: 
194). Gusty Spence, Officer Commanding UVF prisoners, and David Morley, Officer 
Commanding PIRA prisoners, both drew up documents on the proposal for 
consideration at Camp Council. The PIRA document, ‘Outline Scheme for 
Resettlement’, argued for an effective after-care scheme including the establishment 
of a Belfast office, controlled by the Prison Welfare Service with a co-ordinating 
committee. This committee would comprise voluntary, probation and prison welfare 
groups and enable interaction between the welfare wings of the five main paramilitary 
organisations (Crawford, 1999). 
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The detailed problems faced by prisoners and their families during and after 
prolonged imprisonment were outlined in the Loyalist document, ‘Proposals for a 
Resettlement Programme’. It suggested that a ‘downtown’ office could be used as a 
base ‘where the representatives of the various Prisoners’ Welfare bodies could meet, 
discuss and work for the common welfare of all prisoners’ (Crawford, 1999: 45). The 
Camp Council agreed that a joint submission be put to the Northern Ireland Office 
(NIO) for consideration. The potential of the centre was not lost on those involved in 
discussions as Gusty Spence commented, ‘Heaven only knows where such 
cooperation could have led Northern Ireland’ (Garland, 2001: 194). 
 
In the end, the British Government’s decision to end Special Category Status and to 
introduce ‘criminalisation’ in 1975 led to the abandonment of the ‘downtown centre’ 
idea.12 Some interpreted the abandonment of the ‘downtown centre as being due to 
‘hardliners’ within the Republican movement not wanting ‘any form of cooperation 
with the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) or other British authorities (Garland, 2001: 
194). Republicans counter this by stating that, at this time, they were ‘up to their 
necks’ in negotiations with the NIO. Republicans also argue that they due to wider 
ideological concerns, they were less motivated by the idea of the ‘downtown centre 
than their loyalist counterparts. One Republican former prisoner stated: 
 
You can chart the attempts made from 1975 to de-politicise the 
whole conflict…it was aimed at Republicanism and it’s something 
we knew from the very beginning, something we always 
resisted…the downtown office…Republicans almost got involved in 
it and then realised just exactly what was going on. The British 
Government was removing themselves as a party to the conflict. 
They were handing it back and creating confusion…to say that it was 
two tribes fighting (Republican: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
The idea, therefore, of a ‘downtown centre’ conflicted with Republican ideology 
which narrates the conflict as an age-old war with the British state and not with 
Loyalism. Endorsing the concept of a centre would have meant lending credence to 
the British Government policy of criminalisation and its counter-claim that the 
conflict was between Loyalists and Republicans.  
 
2.3 Republican former prisoner group development 
 
Although the centralisation of the prisoner issue within Provisional Republicanism 
started around the time of the removal of Special Category Status, it gradually became 
a more important aim of the movement towards the end of the 1970s and early 1980s. 
In 1978, as the ‘no-wash’ phase of Republican protest began inside and outside the H-
Blocks, Relatives’ Action Committees (RACs) were formed in many areas throughout 
Northern Ireland. These committees comprised mainly friends and families of 
prisoners and over the next three years campaigned to highlight the ongoing protests 
inside the Maze (Campbell et al, 1994). As public support grew in Nationalist areas, 
efforts to co-ordinate publicity and protests resulted in the formation of the National 
                                                 
12 Although the decision to end Special Category Status was announced in 1975, the policy was not 
introduced until the following year when those convicted after 1st March 1976 would be treated as 
ODCs (Ordinary Decent Criminals) and would serve their sentence in the new Maze Prison known as 
the H-Blocks. 
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H-Block/Armagh Committee. Von Tangen Page (1998) notes that it was during this 
turbulent time that prisons became the issue through which Sinn Féin was able to 
further promote its political strategy. In demonstrating that the prisoner issue had 
significant levels of support from the wider Nationalist community, Republicans were 
able to gain support for their dual so-called ‘Armalite and Ballot Box’ strategy 
combining an IRA armed campaign with the political contestation of elections.13 They 
also learned the valuable lesson that building broad coalitions around a particular 
issue and beyond their own immediate constituency could add legitimacy to their 
various campaigns (McEvoy, 2001). 
 
For some, the change in prison regime was the catalyst for a re-thinking of the issues 
affecting prisoners. Whereas Long Kesh had been a more open system allowing for 
some, albeit restricted, interaction between the differing political persuasions, the new 
cell system in operation in the Maze severely limited any contact between Loyalists 
and Republicans. One Republican ‘ex-lifer’ notes that the system that operated in the 
Maze: 
 
created a dynamic…one of the offshoots of which was that, after all 
the ups and downs, hunger strikes, escapes etc, for the first time you 
had POWs taking a long hard look at people who at that stage had 
been in 12 years or longer, mostly in the category of lifers…the 
POWs themselves [decided] that a campaign to deal with life 
sentences and SOSPs [prisoners sentenced to the Secretary of State’s 
Pleasure being under 18 years of age at the time of the offence] 
needed to be embarked upon (Republican: Workshop, 24th June 
2004). 
 
By the mid 1980s, Sinn Féin’s Prisoner Of War Department (POWD) had been 
established to co-ordinate the many campaigns being fought around prison-related 
issues including strip-searching, repatriation and extradition. The Campaign for Lifers 
began in February 1988 to struggle against a review system put in place by the 
Northern Ireland Prison Service (NIPS) in March 1983. As pressure grew from 
Unionist and Nationalist politicians criticising the lack of transparency in the 
decision-making processes of the Life Sentence Review Board, the NIO eventually 
detailed the operation of the system in 1985. This was heavily criticised by political 
parties affiliated to paramilitary prisoners as the criteria for release included 
consideration of the actions of the paramilitary group outside (Sinn Féin POWD, 
1986).  
 
The Campaign for Lifers ‘concentrated its efforts to bring about change in the NIO 
criteria for the release of life and SOSP prisoners’ (The Captive Voice/An Glor Gafa, 
Autumn 1989, 1: 1). Although the same criteria remained in place for some time, the 
authorities did introduce numerous initiatives to aid the release of prisoners such as 
the ‘home leave’ and ‘working out’ schemes (McEvoy, 2001). Thus the problems 
associated with release after prolonged periods of imprisonment became the topic for 
discussion not only among the released but also those still in prison: 
 
                                                 
13 The correct quote is: ‘Will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in 
the other, we take power in Ireland?’ and refers to Danny Morrison addressing a Sinn Féin Ard Fheis in 
June 1981 (Taylor, 1997: 281). 
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the campaign to deal with life sentence and SOSPs…was a 
forerunner, although nobody seen it at the time, to asking the 
question about people getting out of gaol, “what are they going to do 
once they are out?” You are going to get this influx of people 
released and nothing there for them…I left gaol in 1990 and was 
asked to take on the responsibility of the POW Department, and to 
carry forward the ideas that had been put together in the gaol in 
terms of an ex-POW centre (Republican: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
Those ideas were further developed when Loyalist and Republicans next came 
together through a Quaker initiative that became known as PROPP (Progressive 
Release of Political Prisoners – see 2.5 below). 
 
2.4 Loyalist former prisoner group development 
 
The lack of a tradition of imprisonment in the Loyalist community was readily 
apparent when its first high-profile representative, Gusty Spence, was sentenced in 
1966. He did have support among the Shankill Road working class but elsewhere 
there was disapproval. For example, as Spence was a member of the local Orange 
Order, his lodge continued to recognise him by stopping outside Crumlin Road gaol 
during the 12th July parades. The Grand Lodge ordered Spence’s expulsion and when 
it refused, his Prince Albert Temperance lodge was threatened with the removal of its 
warrant (Garland, 2001). Again, there was no loose network of welfare groups and 
prisoners depended on friends and family to meet their needs. As the ‘Troubles’ 
intensified, however, and more UVF members were convicted and sentenced, welfare 
groups associated with the organisation were formed. 
 
The first such was the ‘Orange Cross’, replicating the Republican Green Cross. This 
group performed a similar function for UVF prisoners by organising collections and 
‘supplementing parcels destined for the prisoners with basic necessities like soap, a 
comb, hair cream, face flannel and shaving soap’ (Garland, 2001: 129-130). A 
Loyalist former prisoner sums it up: 
 
We had no culture or history of prisoners, we started from scratch 
trying to work out systems…When Gusty Spence went to prison, 
that was the first time that Loyalists went outside the law. In that era 
that was the first time a welfare system the “Orange Cross” was 
formed. Among working class areas we were the same as IRA 
prisoners but once you went outside of those areas you’d no 
support…within the general Unionist population we were outcasts 
(Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
There was a difference, too, for those from a rural background: 
 
Maybe in places like the Shankill, were there’s a high concentration 
of Loyalist prisoners, the working class people supported ex-
prisoners, but you go to a place, portrayed as the “bastion of 
Unionism”…Portadown, within the Loyalist and Unionist 
community there, is outright hostility to our very existence. 
Unionism in Portadown has manifested itself in many extreme forms 
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politically, but they still do not have much time for people who do 
not have the cloak of legitimacy around them…that in many ways 
has curtailed the development of Loyalist ex-prisoner groups 
(Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
As the number of Loyalists imprisoned began to increase in the early 1970s, 
particularly with the introduction of internment, the UVF established the Loyalist 
Prisoners Welfare Association (LPWA). This was: 
 
a loose group whose main focus was transport, family welfare, 
prisoners’ rights, street protests, hoax bombs, blocking 
roads…replicating the Black Taxis to generate funds for families 
(Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004).  
 
The Orange Cross was subsumed by the LPWA, which was the only welfare group in 
existence for UVF prisoners and former prisoners until as late as 1995. The LPWA 
functioned as part of a movement. It had close ties to the UVF outside and to its 
prisoners inside who appointed a welfare officer to liaise with the LPWA. This close 
connection allowed the mobilisation of support for protests and provided extra help 
when needed:  
 
It was a movement. People underestimated the size of the operation 
that organised parcels at Christmas, transport and things like that 
(Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December 2004).  
 
The LPWA also organised protests outside prison to highlight the conditions of 
prisoners inside. One of the first was when Republican and Loyalist prisoners in Long 
Kesh stopped taking visits for 14 weeks in protest at restrictions put in place after a 
PIRA prisoner escaped during a visit. The LPWA was also instrumental in the 
discussions around the idea of a downtown centre’ as one former prisoner recalls: 
 
The concept of the “downtown centre” came from inside. Gusty was 
involved and the NIO bought into it…Trying to bring all the 
paramilitary groups in from the cold…the LPWA did the 
negotiating…the Republicans blocked it (Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st 
December 2004). 
 
Loyalists were involved in ongoing protests throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s 
particularly in relation to the campaign for Special Category Status in the Maze and 
the campaign for segregation in Crumlin Road (Crawford, 1999). As with 
Republicanism, the next main issue for the movement centred on the Life Sentence 
Review Board introduced in 1983. Members of the LPWA and parents of SOSPs and 
life sentence prisoners formed the ‘Justice for Lifers’ campaign in 1985 (Justice for 
Lifers 1985; Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December 2004). Eddie Kinner, a former UVF 
SOSP explains: 
 
The first campaign was aimed at SOSPs. All the parents got together 
to push the issue. That started in and around 1983-84. The first 
indeterminate sentence prisoners to be released were Gusty [Spence] 
and two Republicans. The pressure then grew about SOSPs. What 
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kicked off the genuine acknowledgement of having to release 
prisoners was the attempted escape of Benny Redfern and Ned 
Pollock. Benny Redfern got crushed to death in a bin lorry. The 
desperation of that – there was a recognition that at some stage they 
[the prison authorities] were going to have to do something 
especially if people were going to go to that extent to try and escape 
(Interview, 8th December 2004). 
 
The idea that indeterminate sentenced prisoners had to take part in interviews and 
answer particular questions in order to be considered for release was seen by some as 
reinforcing the Government’s policy of criminalisation. It caused a split within the 
UVF compound in Long Kesh with around 15 indeterminate sentenced prisoners (out 
of around 90) refusing to take part in the process. Eddie Kinner was one of the 15: 
 
As far as I was concerned it was a charade. No one had been released 
and I couldn’t justify taking part. There was ground still to be won. 
There was still scope to negotiate what kind of release procedure you 
would be going through. Once people began to take part then they 
accepted the terms and conditions. Once people started moving out 
through the “working out scheme”, the thing was in place and you 
were only cutting off your nose to spite your face. I had a decision to 
make – get another three-year knock back or bite the bullet and go 
through the process. I was harming no one but myself (Interview, 8th 
December 2004). 
 
Kinner, like many others eventually went through the process. The first two Loyalist 
SOSPs were released in 1988 along with the first Christmas parole for indeterminate 
sentenced prisoners. This marked the beginning of releases of those serving prolonged 
sentences, many Loyalists believing that this was the catalyst for the development of 
former prisoner support groups during the 1990s: 
 
As the first life sentence prisoners began to be released around ’88-
’89, it was then that it dawned on people the problems that were 
there (Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December 2004). 
 
2.5 Progressive Release Of Political Prisoners (PROPP)  
 
The first real initiative in this regard came from the creation of the organisation, 
Progressive Release Of Political Prisoners (PROPP). (Because there is very little 
documentation in public circulation in relation to PROPP before 1994, this section is 
informed mainly by material made available for the study and by interviews 
conducted with three Republicans and two Loyalist members of PROPP.) In 1990, 
Martie Rafferty, a Quaker and social worker who worked in the Quaker Family 
Centre at the Maze, approached some Loyalist and Republican former prisoners and 
asked them if they had encountered any difficulties since their release. During 
separate discussions Rafferty recognised that each side had similar concerns about the 
needs presented by release after prolonged imprisonment and the lack of resources to 
address them. The Quaker movement in Northern Ireland had recognised that 
politically motivated former prisoners would have difficulties working with state 
agencies. Rafferty suggested that Republican and Loyalist former prisoners should co-
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operate in providing a forum to articulate the problems and difficulties faced by 
former prisoners returning to their families and communities. 
 
The initial meeting of PROPP took place in Quaker House, Belfast in 1991. It was 
attended by nine Republican and three Loyalist former prisoners, together with 
Rafferty and three ‘human rights activists’. As more meetings took place the numbers 
eventually levelled off to a nucleus of two or three from each side. The idea was that 
PROPP would grow and develop into a recognised body that would articulate the 
reintegration issues affecting politically motivated former prisoners, the case 
strengthened by its joint Republican and Loyalist members, who had the approval of 
their respective organisations to form the group (PROPP document, undated; EPIC, 
Green, 1996;Crothers,1998; EPIC, 2004). Martin Snodden regarded PROPP as: 
 
the transition from issues concerned with “inside” to issues “outside” 
while the LPWA continued in their role of looking after prisoner 
welfare (Interview, 14th December 2004). 
 
The meetings took place against the backdrop of continuing violence, the risks 
involved for the participants being two-fold:  
 
being targeted not only by the “other” side but also by our “own” 
side…you have to remember there were no ceasefires in place…over 
the course of the next few years, we were “observed” by the 
Republican war machine – there were people sent from that 
particular constituency to check us out and see what we were at…we 
had an unwritten contract with regard to security and confidentiality 
(Martin Snodden (EPIC): Interview, 14th December 2004).  
 
There were times when events caused particular tensions within the group. Tony 
Catney recalls one such episode:  
 
there was an explosion, September ’92, A Wing in the Crumlin Road 
and two Loyalist prisoners were killed. At our meeting the next 
Monday night, I was the only Republican. They started into me 
asking me to condemn the bombing, nearly asking me to apologise 
for it. I said no it wasn’t the right way to go about it, if I did that then 
we would start every meeting condemning the latest incident and it 
would get us nowhere. The tensions we had between us were 
massive. It was a toss up whether I jumped out of the window or 
[they] threw me out (Interview, 14th December 2004). 
 
A number of issues were crucial to the concept of PROPP. These centred on the belief 
that government had a responsibility to fund the cost of reintegrating political 
prisoners back into the community and that this would enable the establishment of 
two separate self-help centres to replace the unacceptable services provided by 
NIACRO and PBNI. Tony Catney explains how PROPP viewed the role of 
government:  
 
Government had a responsibility to fund – that’s it, that’s all. They 
had the resources to make things happen. We had the know-how and 
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the experience to make things happen (Interview, 14th December 
2004). 
 
Unlike the earlier idea of a ‘downtown centre’ catering for the needs of all political 
former prisoners, PROPP never envisaged anything other than separate self-help 
centres. As Martin Snodden recalls: 
 
It was always the case of separate centres. We had to look at reality. 
It was unthinkable at that particular time, no ceasefires; in fact things 
had got worse. It simply wasn’t an option to have a joined-up centre. 
We had an unwritten agreement regarding the exchange of 
information but it was never envisaged as one structure to house all 
factions (Interview, 14th December 2004). 
 
Due to the Hurd Principles, PROPP could not approach government directly but had 
people lobbying on its behalf as well as having meetings with NIACRO, PBNI and 
other potential funders. Members believe that this ‘chipping away’ had a slow but 
positive effect, strengthened by the fact that Loyalists and Republicans were ‘making 
the pitch’ together. The Quakers secured the first funding:  
 
against the backdrop of violent conflict and probably “subversive” 
stamped all over your record. The first funding is always the hardest 
to secure. To be fair it never covered anything other than meeting as 
PROPP but it was about staking the first claim. Then the statutory 
bodies started to take notice for fear of being left behind (Tony 
Catney: Interview, 14th December 2004). 
 
Ironically, according to Martin Snodden, difficulties arose within the group when a 
large amount of funding was offered from backers in the USA. The backers insisted 
that PROPP become legally constituted and encouraged it in seeking additional 
funding to match that on offer. Discussions continued for many months on the issue of 
legal constitution and approaches were made to the NIO regarding statutory funding 
using the offer from abroad as leverage. Then a few months after the ceasefires were 
called in 1994, new Republican representatives replaced Tony Catney and his 
colleague. This changed the dynamic of the group. Eddie Kinner felt the move was 
deliberate: 
 
The other reps were perceived as being too familiar with the Prods – 
so they were pulled out and two others put in…they would have 
nothing to do with meeting NIO ministers because the NIO at that 
stage were refusing to meet with Sinn Féin…they couldn’t be seen to 
be used to undermine that connection so they scuppered any early 
chance of funding (Interview, 8th December 2004). 
 
Snodden attributes these changes to a combination of Republican ideology and the 
Republican movement’s desire for control over the issue of prisoners. From a 
Republican perspective, PROPP was always a tactical rather than a strategic initiative. 
While welcome as a forum for exchanging views, the prospect of a joint project was 
always problematic to them. The issue that undermined the development of PROPP, 
according to Republicans, was the lack of a shared political analysis between them 
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and Loyalists. Republican argue that they were focussed on the conflictual axis 
between themselves and the British state, whilst Loyalists appeared to invest more 
importance in an analysis of the Loyalist/Republican axis of conflict. 
 
In any event, Tar Anall was already established (though not yet funded) early on and 
the issue of attracting funding could not, from the Republican perspective, rest upon 
the parallel establishment of Loyalist services. Additionally, PROPP appeared to be 
predicated upon ‘matching funding for matching development’ in Loyalist and 
Republican structures. Republicans argue that, had this approach taken root, the 
significant development of Republican groupings that subsequently took place would 
not have been possible, given the ‘relative lack of capacity and interest amongst 
Loyalist ex-prisoners’ (Republican: Interview, 22nd August, 2005). According to a 
Republican source: 
 
Moreover, those initially involved in PROPP from the 
Republican side failed to give necessary feedback to other 
stakeholders within the Republican family. When what 
Loyalists interpret as an exertion of control took place, this 
was really an organisational view that individuals claiming 
to represent Republicans really needed to adopt a more 
collegial approach. 
 
In the event, from a Republican perspective, PROPP lost its 
relevance. The development of services for Republican ex-
prisoners took priority as against a forum which was likely 
to impede the attraction of the required resources. Once the 
EU Peace Programme came on stream, the need for a 
parallel funding approach that tied Republicans into what 
Loyalists had the capacity for would have been counter-
productive (Republican: Interview, 22nd August 2005). 
 
Again, there is also the issue of the different capacities in delivery of Republican and 
Loyalist former prisoner groups: 
 
EPIC were trying their best to do a good job but it was a lot harder 
for them then it was for us, because we had a great spring board in 
our community, they hadn’t. That was one of the reasons for the 
demise of PROPP. It was the development. We got our own funding, 
did our own work, we had our own centres. So there was really no 
need for PROPP after that other than as somewhere to meet and talk 
and to keep up…they met at the very very difficult times of the 
struggle. They met when Loyalist assassinations were going on. 
They met throughout times like the Shankill Bombing. It was very 
difficult risky work.  And I think it was very important work 
(Republican: Interview, 12th December 2004).   
 
The difficulties experienced by the group meant that other avenues had to be 
explored. One such avenue was offered by NIVT which, following a series of 
meetings, agreed to fund two six-month contracts, one each for a Loyalist and 
Republican development worker, in the hope that more funding would be secured 
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down the line. This led to the setting up of EPIC on the Shankill Road and Tar Anall 
on the Falls Road. This initiative coincided with the inauguration of the first round of 
European Peace and Reconciliation funding which, ironically, eventually led to the 
demise of PROPP: 
 
Peace I brought in the concept of separate access…the Republican 
community could have total control over the former prisoner issue 
and there would be no need to work with Loyalists (Tony Catney: 
Interview, 14th December 2004). 
 
When Peace I money was secured, the groups started to develop 
separately. The joint approach was no longer needed to secure 
funding and Republicans would no longer approach the state (Eddie 
Kinner: Interview, 8th December 2004). 
 
There was a very clear divide in regards to the focus of PROPP and 
the separation of PROPP. That is when the Peace money came on 
stream and both groups were then able to access it independently of 
the other. There was then a growing separation and PROPP 
eventually dissolved (Martin Snodden: Interview, 14th December 
2004). 
 
The interviewees believe that PROPP never got to fulfil its objective, the issue of 
statutory funding still remaining very high on the agendas of former prisoner groups 
today. Although the dialogue that took place helped to develop relationships, some of 
which still endure, the unrealised potential of the group in terms of conflict 
transformation was noted by Eddie Kinner: 
 
If the Government had have funded that and taken on its 
responsibilities, it could have developed something which could have 
been more powerful and more influential in terms of strengthening 
and cementing the peace process (Interview, 14th December 2004). 
 
2.6 Current former prisoner groups and issues 
 
2.6.1 The groups 
 
Since EPIC and Tar Anall were founded in 1995, many other former prisoner self-
help groups have been established right across Northern Ireland supported, primarily, 
by European Union funding. Most groups have similar aims and objectives, namely to 
support the reintegration of politically motivated former prisoners into their families 
and communities. While these aims remain a ‘live’ issue for the groups, the 
decreasing number of individuals seeking practical assistance has drawn a question 
mark over the sustainability and future of the groups. In particular, it begs the 
question as to the contribution they can offer in building peace. 
 
As we have seen, EPIC was established in 1995 as a self-help centre to address the 
problems surrounding the resettlement of politically motivated prisoners, in particular 
those from a UVF or RHC background. It opened a drop-in centre to deal with the 
many practical issues facing former prisoners on release including housing, benefits 
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and employment prospects as well as offering emotional support and counselling to 
former prisoners and their families. The specific objectives of EPIC are: 
 
• To identify the needs of prisoners and prisoners’ families during the post 
release period; 
 
• Provide resources and facilities which will help former prisoners and their 
families in the process of reintegration into the family and community; 
 
• Provide a reference point for prisoners during the pre-release period and after 
release; 
 
• Link former prisoners and their families with other existing agencies, where 
appropriate, and support them in making use of their services; 
 
• Provide opportunities, both formal and informal, to share experiences and 
encourage the development of mutual support services (Crothers, 1998). 
 
In the run-up to the 1998 Belfast Agreement, EPIC developed regional centres in 
various parts of Belfast, Londonderry and Armagh to cater for the many politically 
motivated prisoners to be released under the terms of the Agreement. It also 
conducted a number of studies into the experiences of Loyalists inside prison and the 
problems associated with reintegration, this latter work being aimed at refining and 
developing the services specifically targeted to meet the needs identified in the 
research (Crothers, 1998; Green, 1998). Over the years, EPIC has developed and 
diversified its services; in the organisation’s own words:  
 
while successful reintegration of ex-combatants in itself makes a 
significant contribution to peace-building, EPIC have, through a 
wide range of activities, made a much wider contribution to peace 
building in Northern Ireland (EPIC, 2004: np). 
 
Its activities now include: 
 
• creating opportunities for ex-combatants and others to engage in dialogue; 
 
• using the experience of former prisoners to influence and persuade young 
people of the value of non-violent methods of conflict resolution;  
 
• empowering and training former paramilitary activists with the skills to pursue 
their objectives in a non-violent way while contributing positively to the 
community;  
 
• and sharing experiences of conflict with others in conflict zones around the 
world to identify common themes and construct models of best practice in 
peace building (EPIC, 2004).  
 
EPIC also continues to work on addressing the issues that prevent the full 
reintegration of politically motivated former prisoners into society. 
 
 37
Tar Isteach, which is a charity and a company limited by guarantee, was launched in 
1999 and provides counselling and welfare rights service for Republican former 
prisoners and their families in the North Belfast area. It is a community-based 
organisation providing support services to ‘a highly marginalised group in one of the 
most deprived areas of Northern Ireland’ and ensuring that the barriers which 
‘persistently prevent political former prisoners, and by association their families, from 
achieving full and equal citizenship’ are overcome (Tar Isteach Annual Report, 2004: 
3). As well as these counselling and welfare services, Tar Isteach is involved in: 
 
• youth projects; 
 
• a not-for-profit social economy construction firm providing employment and 
training; 
 
• development of other former prisoner projects throughout North Belfast such 
as Amach agus Isteach in Ardoyne; 
 
• cross-community projects promoting dialogue and peace building among all 
sections of the community.  
 
Although Tar Isteach’s main aim is to act as a support mechanism for former 
prisoners and their families, the organisation’s welfare rights services are available to 
the wider community. A priority for the group is to work ‘for the overall social, 
economic and physical improvement of the entire community’ (Tar Isteach Annual 
Report, 2004: 3).  
 
As observed above, Tar Isteach is part of a larger network of Republican former 
prisoner groups integrated into Coiste na n-larchimí. Coiste’s aims are to: 
 
• secure the full integration of the Republican former prisoner community 
through recognition of the contribution they have made to the community in 
the past and can make in the future; 
 
• facilitate Republican former prisoners in deepening and developing their 
contribution to justice and peace in Ireland; 
 
• deepen the mutually beneficial links with community organisation, employers 
and other groups. 
 
Coiste’s work focuses on: 
 
• co-ordinating the activities of local groups; 
 
• lobbying government and statutory bodies in respect of political former 
prisoner issues; 
 
• addressing the effects of criminalisation including identifying the legal and 
administrative impediments that prevent full citizenship for Republican 
former prisoners (Coiste, 2004b). 
 38
 
2.6.2 Funding 
 
As observed above, most funding for politically motivated former prisoner groups 
comes from European Union (EU) schemes. Since its inception EPIC has mainly been 
funded by the Peace and Reconciliation I and II programmes. Tar Isteach and Coiste 
have also received support under Peace I and II. This funding is awarded in grant 
form by Intermediary Funding Bodies (IFBs) who are contracted to administer funds 
in relation to certain ‘measures’ or criteria. As the core funding body for former 
prisoner groups, CFNI sets out clear criteria for funding, priority being given to 
projects which: 
 
• support the healing process and help those who are victims of the conflict to 
come to terms with their losses; 
 
• support community involvement, retraining and the development of skills 
among people who have been marginalised by society; 
 
• encourage self-help and user involvement in the provision of quality services 
for marginalised groups and people (NIVT, 2001: 2-3). 
 
Independent evaluations carried out on the projects have concluded that they ‘have 
more than met the objectives of the EU Peace Programme’ (NIVT, June 2001: 8). As 
well as meeting the aims set out above, the evaluation stated that: 
 
• there now exists a comprehensive support structure for former prisoners and 
their families; that structure is led by former prisoners and so is a clear model 
of self-help in practice; 
 
• linkages have been initiated and developed across the divides;  
 
• some innovative approaches by former prisoners and the awareness of their 
potential contribution for good in society have been significantly highlighted; 
 
• networks and alliances with some statutory bodies have been formed (NIVT, 
June 2001). 
 
One of the most significant comments in the evaluation concerns the impact of the 
funding programme and it is worth quoting in full: 
  
The Programme has had impacts which are both quantifiable and 
intangible. The most important single benefit of the programme has 
been the impact it has had on peace building. Peace building has 
involved building confidence within communities as well as 
developing contacts between what had been warring combatants, 
fostering those contacts so that collaborative working can be 
initiated, and identifying ways in which the issues facing former 
prisoners and their families can be addressed. All of this has led to 
many former prisoners and their families feeling much less alienated 
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and seeing that they have a place in this society (NIVT, June 2001: 
6). 
 
The media portrayal of Peace funding has not been so complimentary. Rather than 
highlighting the potential benefits of the funding, some journalists have reported on 
the Peace Programme in a negative and sensationalist way, usually focusing on 
funding for former prisoner groups in comparison to that for victims groups.14
 
Former prisoner groups are concerned that the positive role that they have undertaken 
is submerged in a refusal of sections of the media to go beyond stereotypical 
interpretations of paramilitary groups. There is a general acceptance of press freedom 
but a sense that the media fails to cover and/or acknowledge more positive depictions 
of former prisoner groups and their activities. As stated by a member of Tar Isteach: 
 
We received funding from Comic Relief and we used those funds to 
do crucial work with young people. It was all based on conflict 
resolution and peace and reconciliation work. When sections of the 
press found out they ran a piece on how former bombers were 
getting money from a well-known charity.  
 
The day that press stuff came out was the same day that we had 
taken a group of teenagers up, form New Lodge, to meet the 
Apprentice Boys of Derry. There was nothing written about that, 
about us doing something that challenged stereotypes. We were 
stereotyped and attacked without any consideration or even mention 
of what the funds were used for (Republican: Interview, 25th August 
2005). 
 
The issue of additional funding is at the core of the future sustainability of the groups. 
Given the dependence on Peace money and the absence of statutory funding, former 
prisoner groups are seeking alternative ways of funding projects. Coiste has started a 
‘political tourism’ business showing groups of tourists and other interested parties 
around various parts of West Belfast, including both Loyalist and Republican areas. A 
leaflet promoting the tour in twelve different languages and a promotional DVD have 
been produced (Coiste, 2004a). Tar Isteach has created a new social economy 
enterprise called AAI Construction. This ‘not-for-profit’ construction firm provides 
training and employment for former prisoners although not exclusively so and offers 
affordable building services to people in North Belfast (Tar Isteach Annual Report, 
2004). EPIC continues to lobby government and statutory agencies: 
 
What they [Government] have tended to do is channel funds to “safe 
hands” – sanitised people – and with all the will in the world they 
can’t make a button of difference. Once Government get their head 
round that it may lead to a place for us (Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st 
December 2004).  
 
 
                                                 
14 CFNI provides an assessment of how Peace I was reported in the media in their publication, ‘Taking 
“calculated” risks for Peace II’ (2003). 
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2.7 Conclusion: the future of former prisoner groups 
 
As to the future of politically motivated former prisoner groups, the 
CFNI evaluation found that some of the groups had been actively 
considering their future but that ‘too many are focussed on the 
availability of grant aid and see their survival and growth as fully 
dependent on continuing grant aid’ (NIVT, 2001: 37). That is clearly 
not the case with all the groups as outlined above. Liz McShane 
argued in her 1998 Interim Report that mainstream funding would 
enable groups to continue and develop their work instead of devoting 
considerable time to raising funds.  
 
The groups themselves believe that regardless of the source of their funding that their 
work in resettling former prisoners is far from complete, According to Tommy 
Quigley, Project Coordinator, Tar Isteach: 
 
Notwithstanding the positive contribution [to peace building], we are 
still waiting for full citizenship in legal terms. The effect of the 
“criminal” record in a wide variety of life from employment through 
to adoption needs to be addressed. There is a responsibility on both 
governments across Ireland to fulfil the Good Friday Agreement 
commitment in this regard. But this doesn’t stop former prisoners 
from being involved in promoting justice, peace and community 
empowerment…former prisoners refuse to be passive. They are 
agents of change not objects of transition (Tar Isteach, 2004: 5). 
 
Again, for Tom Roberts, Director of EPIC: 
 
We have a pretty good handle on all the practical issues that ex- 
prisoners face. Unfortunately we haven’t made much impact on the 
legislative that impacts upon ex-prisoners and that will continue for 
quite a while. Our role has become much wider now than former 
prisoners. It leads into the next phase; our future is in providing 
assistance and support to our respective paramilitary organisations, 
the UVF and RHC, in their own transformation process (Loyalist 
Focus Group, 1st December 2004). 
 
It is evident that politically motivated former prisoner groups see their purpose as 
being unfulfilled and, while they can be innovative in terms of their future raison 
d’etre, it is difficult to envisage what the future holds in the absence of secure or 
mainstream funding. If, as Tom Roberts suggests, former prisoner groups move into a 
new phase that assists and supports paramilitary organisations to transform 
themselves into something other than that associated with violence, then mainstream 
funding would be a timely initiative. 
 
It is this dichotomy between the personal and communal goals of former prisoner 
groups that shapes the next three chapters which deal with the results of the 
questionnaire survey from the perspectives, successively, of: 
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• the ways in which imprisonment and release impacted on family life, self-
esteem and other social relationships; 
 
• residual criminalisation and the ways in which this can act as an impediment 
in the contribution of former prisoners to their communities; 
 
• the contribution of former prisoners to conflict resolution, management and 
transformation. 
 
The focus in Chapter 3 is within the respective communities, Chapter 4 deals with 
impediments both within and without, while Chapter 5 focuses primarily on the role 
of former prisoners without their own communities but not exclusively so as elements 
of conflict transformation can also be internalised. 
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Chapter 3: Resistance and Transition: Imprisonment and 
the Post-Imprisonment Experience 
 
 
3.1      Introduction 
 
There is no doubting that incarceration and post-imprisonment has presented 
prisoners and their families with a series of complex problems and difficulties. 
McEvoy et al (2004) isolate the centrality of factors such as loss of income, marital 
breakdown and emotional and psychological stress. In addressing these issues, this 
section of the Report is grounded in ideas of resistance and transition and the ways in 
which the post-prison experience can be seen as a surrogate for continued struggle as 
well as a period of coping with the effects of imprisonment. Consequently, the first 
goal of the questionnaire survey (with its 300 respondents and backed up by the 
Focus Group meetings and semi-structured interviews) was to determine the impact 
of imprisonment on family life and the effect and nature of release upon self-esteem 
and other social relationships. In this Chapter, we deal with: 
 
• personal characteristics of the respondents; 
 
• the impacts of imprisonment on personal relationships; 
 
• the impacts of conflict; 
 
• employment status of former prisoners; 
 
• the issue of benefit dependence. 
 
The survey aimed at obtaining a range of responses from former prisoners both in 
terms of their age and the nature of the regimes under which they were imprisoned. 
These included: internment; criminalisation after 1976; the Hunger Strikes of the 
early 1980s; and the more managed prison regimes of the late 1980s and 1990s. Prior 
to dealing with this dimension to the questionnaire, however, we consider the broader 
issues of resistance and transition which frame this part of the discussion. 
 
3.2 Former prisoners, resistance and transition 
 
Much of the traditional literature on the adaptation of inmates to the prison experience 
focuses on ‘coping’ strategies adopted to deal with the ‘pains of imprisonment’. Such 
pains usually include the loss of liberty, deprivation of family relations, and the 
reutilisation and dehumanisation of prisoner life (Goffman, 1961). The sociological 
literature on coping with imprisonment is broadly divided into two categories. There 
are a range of classic if now somewhat dated studies which focus on prisons as 
‘closed institutions’, wherein specific influences are viewed as central to the prison 
experience and prisoners are seen to develop a series of ‘argot’ roles in order to cope 
with their prison experience (Clemmer, 1940; Sykes 1958; Sykes and Messinger, 
1960). A second genre of sociological literature tends to place greater emphasis on 
existent pre-prison factors and thus examine the relationship between factors such as 
socialisation, gender, socio-economic status, race, educational attainment or a hybrid 
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of such elements in assessing the impact of imprisonment (Toch, 1977; Adams, 1992; 
Matthews, 1999). Psychological literature, on the other hand, appears to be based 
largely on the ‘truism’ that imprisonment must be in some way psychologically 
‘damaging’. Psychological studies tend to explore whether various symptoms such as 
defects in cognitive functioning (e.g. loss of memory or inability to think clearly and 
rationally), emotional problems or problems relating to others or indeed the 
appearance of various psychotic tendencies can be related to imprisonment. In the last 
twenty years, the stress coping paradigm has come to dominate psychological 
research on imprisonment. Utilising a framework derived from environmental 
psychology, this genre of research focuses on the ways in which individuals are seen 
to identify stressors (e.g. threats to their emotional or psychological well being), 
appraise and act upon them. Within this framework, unsuccessful coping can result 
from overwhelming levels of stress, skewed or counterproductive appraisals of 
situations or immature or poor coping skills (Bukstel and Kilman, 1980; Zamble and 
Porporino, 1988; Gibbs, 1991; Sappington, 1996).  
 
As detailed elsewhere (e.g. McEvoy, 2001), this literature on prison ‘coping’ is 
arguably only of limited analytical use in exploring the actions and motives of 
paramilitary prisoners in the arena studied here. The existing academic and 
biographical accounts of political imprisonment in Northern Ireland, reinforced by the 
fieldwork conducted for this research, suggest that the central coping strategy for 
politically motivated prisoners (particularly Republicans) was active and coordinated 
resistance (e.g. Rolston and Tomlinson, 1986; O’Malley, 1990; Campbell et al, 1994; 
Morrison, 1999; McKeown, 2001). Such a distinction is what Cohen and Taylor 
(1977: 131) referred to as the difference between  ‘making out’ and ‘fighting back’. 
Although more critical accounts of imprisonment elsewhere do allow space for 
resistant strategies amongst prisoners, (e.g. Mathiesen, 1965; Sparks et al, 1996), 
arguably such strategies are best illustrated with regard to politically motivated 
prisoners where the act of imprisonment is intimately bound up with the political and 
ideological contours of a broader political struggle (e.g. Buntman, 2003). Actions 
such as collective organisation into paramilitary command structures, military and 
political education, communicating through the Irish language, refusal to wear prison 
uniforms with their associated tag of ‘criminality’, no wash protests, hunger-strikes, 
escapes, legal challenges and violence against prison staff, which became 
synonymous with Northern Ireland prisons, were given particular resistant meaning 
because of the broader political conflict. 
 
Simplifying for the sake of brevity, there were also some differences in the resistant 
styles of Republican and Loyalist prisoners. With a long history of political 
imprisonment to draw upon, Republicans tended to locate their analysis of 
imprisonment within the context of their ‘struggle’ against British ‘imperialism’. 
Republican prisoners were able to appropriate power at both a symbolic and material 
level as part of a broader resistant strategy which places considerable emphasis on the 
collective nature of their detention (McKeown, 2001; McEvoy, 2001). Their 
traditional ability to mobilise a powerful political power base in the community was 
given added impetus and strategic direction by the growth of Sinn Féin from the 
1980/1981 hunger-strikes onwards (Clarke, 1987). They were sustained by a view of 
imprisonment as a continuance of the struggle, the epicentre of which was resistance 
to the criminalisation of the political roots of the conflict.  
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For Loyalist prisoners on the other hand, with a more ambivalent relationship to the 
state and no history of political imprisonment outside the most recent conflict, such 
clear oppositional resistance was more problematic. In promulgating that ‘their only 
crime is loyalty’, they were forced to conceptualise and acknowledge a prison system 
(and by extension a state) which was legitimate but which was punishing them either 
erroneously or over zealously for acting for the best of motives in defence of that state 
(Crawford, 1999). Loyalist prisoners did engage in sporadic hunger strikes and a more 
sustained campaign of no wash protests in support of segregation but prison ‘struggle’ 
for Loyalists was not such an obvious microcosm of a broader political struggle. 
While Loyalist prisoners received sporadic encouragement from some Unionist 
politicians and, of course, from their own prisoner welfare associations (see Chapter 
2), they had no similarly mobilised and organised political constituency from which to 
draw support – a feature which has continued during the post-conflict transition. For 
these and other reasons, Loyalist prisoners’ capacity for resistance was 
correspondingly muted when compared to their Republican counterparts when one 
considers the respective prison histories of different resistant strategies such as hunger 
strikes, no wash protests, violence, escapes and the use of law (McEvoy, 2001).15    
 
Despite these differences, the forging and maintenance of a notion of a ‘prison 
community’ in direct contravention of NIPS’s oft-stated determination to ‘treat 
prisoners as individuals’ (e.g. NIPS, 1987) was viewed by many Loyalist and 
Republican prisoners as a practical and symbolic assertion of their status as political 
prisoners. This was clearly made easier in a context where prisoners were already 
members of illegal paramilitary organisations, used to command structures, and 
shared a common political and ideological base. Organising themselves into such 
groupings was viewed by prisoners as direct challenge to the traditional power 
relationship within prisons wherein the capacity of a small number of prison staff to 
control and direct prisoners is predicated upon dealing with individual prisoners rather 
than organised groups. In the Northern Ireland context, collective resistance was both 
a ‘coping’ strategy and a practical and symbolic assertion of the political status of the 
inmates.  
 
Such resistant strategies were certainly understandable in the context of political 
imprisonment while the conflict was ongoing. However, the resistant techniques 
honed during imprisonment - the emphasis on collective solidarity in the prisons, the 
tendency to mask or control emotions and the determined focus on the political and 
military nature of the respective ‘struggles’ - have arguably amplified personal, 
familial and social difficulties experienced by former prisoners after release. The 
significant reduction in organised political violence over the past few years in 
Northern Ireland has, in turn, seen a move away from identities primarily shaped by 
the exigencies of resistance, to one wherein former prisoners and combatants 
generally have had to come to terms with those subjective and collective 
consequences of the transition from violent conflict in an honest fashion. As will be 
discussed in more detail below, and indeed as has been demonstrated by other studies 
(Shirlow, 2001; Grounds and Jamieson 2003; McEvoy et al, 2004), former prisoners 
have been increasingly frank about acknowledging issues such as: indicators of post-
                                                 
15 The most notable ‘success’ in terms of prisoner resistance by Loyalist inmates was securing of 
segregated accommodation for paramilitary remand prisoners after Loyalist prisoners had 
severely damaged Crumlin Road prison in 1994 and the authorities moved the prisoners to 
segregated accommodation at the Maze. 
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traumatic stress disorder amongst their numbers; family and relationship difficulties 
with wives, partners and children; emotional and personal difficulties as well as a 
range of issues related to their continued exclusion from employment and related 
aspects of civic and political life. The Chapter now moves to reflect upon post-release 
personal outcomes for politically motivated former prisoners. The different attitudes 
that emerge are shaped by the contrasting views on resistance formulated ‘inside’ 
prison. 
 
3.3 The personal characteristics of survey respondents 
 
3.3.1 Age 
 
Over half of all former prisoner respondents were aged between 36 and 55, a finding 
that reflected the high level of imprisonment among young persons in the 1970s and 
1980s. The sample included persons who had been released from as early as 1967 
through to 2000 and, as such, covered all of the various prison regimes during the 
contemporary conflict. Unsurprisingly, relatives covered a wider range of age groups 
ranging from parents to children. As shown in Table 3.1 nearly one in five 
respondents in the 66+ age category were family members compared to 4% of former 
prisoners. Similarly, 24.3% of relatives were aged between 18-25 compared to 5.3% 
of former prisoners, all being Loyalists.  
 
Table 3.1: Age of respondents (percentage Republican and Loyalist respondents) 
 
Age Republican 
 
Loyalist 
 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
18-25 0.0 9.6 5.3 14.7 
26-35 18.7 26.0 18.7 16 
36-45 26.7 26.0 29.3 40.0 
46-55 49.3 28.8 32 14.7 
56-65 4.0 1.4 12 4.0 
66 plus 1.3 8.2 2.7 10.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 
      
The gender of former prisoners was heavily biased, being predominantly male (Table 
3.2). Only 5% of Loyalist former prisoners were female compared to 20% of 
Republicans. Loyalists were generally less supportive of women being included in 
direct action although it is recognised that women played other supportive roles.  
 
Conversely, women have always played a more defined role within the history of 
Republicanism and thus there was a precedent for the direct role of women in the 
newly emerging Republican movement after 1969. Initially, women tended to be  
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Table 3.2: Gender of respondents (percentage Republican and Loyalist respondents) 
 
 Republican Loyalist 
 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives 
Male 80.0 27.0 95.0 29.3 
Female 20.0 73.0 5.0 70.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
allocated subsidiary roles in that movement, although this began to change, 
particularly from the mid-1970s onwards. Nevertheless, the number of Republican 
female activists imprisoned was always much lower than their male counterparts. The 
masculine preponderance within the prison population also created a family based 
support network within which females were predominant and, as noted in both 
Loyalist and Republican Focus Group meetings, there has been a strong demand by 
many female partners that their role be adequately recognised. Such voices aim to 
encourage a greater acknowledgement of the complexities of imprisonment and the 
negotiation of partners back into family life within a post-imprisonment environment. 
 
3.2.2 Duration of imprisonment 
 
Nearly half of all the former prisoners had spent 5 years or less in jail. More 
Republicans (38.7%) than Loyalists (24%) had spent 5-10 years in jail, whereas a 
similar proportion of Loyalists (25%) and Republicans (21%) had been incarcerated 
for more than 10 years. One in eight Republicans compared to around 7% of 
Loyalists had spent more than 15 years in jail. Most respondents had been sentenced 
to fixed terms, while 14.7% of Loyalists and 17% of Republicans had been sentenced 
to life. One in five Republicans had been interned without trial compared to one in ten 
Loyalists. This differential impact of internment echoed the British state’s primary 
desire to tackle Republicanism, internment being only used against Loyalists over a 
year after it had begun in 1971. As one Loyalist stated in relation to internment: 
 
Republicans were interned in the first phase of internment because 
internment was brought in to protect the state and it was they who 
were threatening it (Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
Nearly 70% of Republicans had first been imprisoned between the age of 16 and 20, a 
finding which in part reflected the unequal impact of internment upon Republican and 
Loyalist communities. Conversely, only 30% of Loyalists had initially experienced 
imprisonment when aged between 16 and 20. It was suggested during the relevant 
Focus Group meeting that Loyalist former prisoners tended to be slightly older and 
that this was due to individuals joining paramilitary organisations during the peak of 
violence in the early-to-mid 1970s. It was argued in their Focus Group that 
Republican prisoners were more likely to be younger than Loyalists due to the more 
general community reaction to increasing militarisation in the early 1970s. It was also 
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maintained that many of the early members of Loyalist groups would have been older 
than Republicans as they had joined paramilitary organisations after spending time in 
the British Army. According to evidence from the Republican Focus Group, a wide 
range of age groups had been introduced to active Republicanism for the first time 
when the conflict started in late 1960s. In later years, as the conflict progressed, it 
would have been unusual for people to wait until they were in their late 20s or early 
30s before becoming involved. Indeed, persons in their later 20s and early 30s 
seeking to join the Provisional IRA would have been viewed with suspicion.  
 
Former prisoners were also asked to provide their age at last release from prison. 
(Around 20% of respondents had served more than one period of incarceration, 
including: being on remand; being on remand and never sentenced; and being 
sentenced.) About a fifth of both groups were released between the ages of 16 and 23, 
while 40% of Republicans and 25% of Loyalists were aged between 23 and 29. A 
fifth of both groups were aged between 29 and 35, while more Loyalists (28.3%) than 
Republicans (17.4%) were aged over 35. In sum, the majority of respondents had 
been incarcerated during their late youth and early to mid-20s.  
 
3.4 The impact of imprisonment 
 
3.4.1 The nature of the impacts  
 
Imprisonment had a series of effects on both the prisoners and their families. 
However, those effects did not necessarily disappear with the end of incarceration 
and, for many respondents, the effects of imprisonment upon post-release outcomes 
was not directly linked to the period of time spent in jail or the nature of the 
imprisonment regime when incarcerated. The effects of imprisonment included: 
 
• problems with physical and psychological health; 
 
• relationship problems; 
 
• difficulties obtaining and maintaining long-term employment; 
 
• problems centred around coping with life on the outside.  
 
While most of the studies on ‘coping’ with the impacts of imprisonment discussed 
above involved non-political prisoners with different motivations to their political 
counterparts, there are, nonetheless, obvious similarities in experience. All prisoners 
are denied normal contact with their families; they endure long periods of isolation 
and remain disconnected from normal life. Nevertheless, political prisoners may have 
a number of advantages compared to non-political inmates. They may, for example, 
be sustained by their political motivations and by the desire to present a unified mode 
of resistance toward prison authorities. They might also have better support from 
family, friends and community than non-political prisoners.  
 
The reality that many Republican prisoners, in particular, viewed imprisonment as 
another ‘site of struggle’ may in itself have been a ‘coping’ mechanism (McKeown, 
2001). However, the ability to cope with social and psychological deprivations of 
imprisonment and forced confinement is not the same as coping with and maintaining 
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‘normal’ social and family relationships. In their study of the partners of 200 
Republican and Loyalist former prisoners, McEvoy et al (1999) found that political 
motivation did not prevent prisoners and their families from experiencing emotional 
stress. A new set of challenges faced prisoners on release as in many instances they 
entered an environment that was alien to them. Evidence from the Focus Groups 
suggested that long periods of incarceration, in particular, had removed prisoners 
from wider societal and technical changes. For example: 
 
When I got out I went for a job and had to draw a plan in metres and 
centimetres. I simply didn’t know what these things meant. When I 
went inside everything was pounds, shillings and inches. I just 
couldn’t do what was a very simple test (Republican: Focus Group, 
3rd December 2004).  
 
Other comments pointed to difficulties in coping with new technologies, the impact 
of urban redevelopment and a subsequent failure to recognise places that were once 
familiar to prisoners. In addition, children had grown up and this in many cases 
reaffirmed a sense of loss. For others, there was a strong sense that only those who 
had been incarcerated operated at the same emotional level. The initial sense of joy 
that accompanied the return to family life was sometimes short-lived and replaced by 
children questioning the authority of a parent who was relatively unfamiliar to them.  
 
3.4.2 Personal relationships 
 
Among former prisoners slightly more Republicans (61%) than Loyalists (56%) were 
married or in an adult relationship. A quarter of Republicans and 18.7% of Loyalists 
were divorced or separated while twice as many Loyalists were single (24% and 12% 
respectively). Former prisoners and relatives were asked to comment as to whether 
incarceration had led to a positive or negative impact on various relationships. In the 
main, most of these relationships were seen to have been adversely affected. Among 
those who were married when incarcerated, around two thirds stated that their 
imprisonment had a negative affect upon their relationships with partners and 
child/children. 
 
There was more variation in responses concerning parents and extended family 
members; 53.3% of Loyalist former prisoners, compared to only 18.7% of 
Republicans, stated that imprisonment had a negative impact in their relationships 
with  parents. Unsurprisingly, few former prisoners held that imprisonment had a 
positive impact upon relationships with their extended families but even then, 
Republicans (20%) outnumbered Loyalists (10%). Again this demonstrates the more 
positive attitudes toward imprisonment within the Republican former prisoner group 
and the stronger sense of support from relatives than the community compared to 
Loyalists with their far more ambiguous intra-community relationships. In the words 
of one Loyalist former prisoner: 
 
Unionists seem obsessed with this notion of respectability. If my 
brother had his state uniform on and slaughtered all round him it 
would have been quite acceptable. He had the legitimacy of the state 
around him. Because I stepped outside the law to do what I engaged 
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in – that wasn’t acceptable, even within my own family (Loyalist: 
Focus Group, 1st December 2004). 
 
Similar numbers of Republican (21.3%), and Loyalist (24%) respondents stated that 
imprisonment had had a negative impact on relationships with their children, although 
again, a higher percentage of Republicans (12.0%) compared to Loyalists (2.7%) 
argued that imprisonment had created more positive relationships with their children. 
Former prisoners who pointed to a negative impact upon family life generally argued 
that imprisonment led to them ‘missing out on their children growing up’ or even to 
complete estrangement. Children themselves, now adults, talked of never having 
experienced a complete parent-child relationship. In general, with regard to parent-
child relationships, incarceration, equated with notions of loss and hurt, as well as a 
strong sense of alienation and suffering. 
 
Relatives were also asked to comment on the effects of imprisonment on personal 
relationships. More Republican (38.7%) than Loyalist (28%) relatives felt that 
imprisonment had had a negative impact on their relationship with the prisoners. This 
reverses the trend noted above in that Loyalist former prisoners were generally more 
likely to acknowledge a negative relationship than their Republicans counterparts. No 
convincing explanation of these findings emerged from the Focus Groups. 
 
Small majorities of both Republican (54.1%) and Loyalist (54.7%) former prisoners 
stated that they had found it easier to cope on a day-to-day basis while in prison. This 
reflected a lack of worries over personal finances and strong and durable senses of the 
defined comradeship developed during imprisonment. Equally, 37.3% of Republican 
(37.3%) and 38.7% of Loyalist former prisoners found it difficult to adapt to a post-
imprisonment environment. The vast majority of both Republicans (93%) and 
Loyalists (84%) had experienced financial problems when first released and nearly 
two thirds of Republicans and just under a half of Loyalists (48%) were currently 
experiencing financial difficulties. Sizeable majorities of Loyalist and Republican 
former prisoners (over 80% in both cases) stated that they found it easier to talk about 
their prison experiences with other former prisoners than to discuss such issues with 
non-prisoners. Only 34.7% of Republicans and 22.7% of Loyalists found it easy to 
relate to people from within their own age group who had not been incarcerated. A 
similar share of Republican (42.7%) and Loyalist (43.8%) relatives stated that former 
prisoners found it difficult to talk to them about their prison experience. 
 
3.4.3 Family and community 
 
The experience of imprisonment was more commonplace among Republican former 
prisoners and their relatives than was the case within the Loyalist group. Around two 
thirds of Republican former prisoners and relatives had other family members or 
relatives who were imprisoned compared to just under 50% of the Loyalist sample. 
Again, 80% of Republican former prisoners had friends who were imprisoned 
compared to 62.7% of Loyalists and a similar trend was characteristic of relatives. 
Nevertheless, despite the dissimilarities between the groups, it is evident that both 
sets of respondents held a highly significant knowledge of imprisonment compared to 
the norm, especially when it is recognised that those imprisoned constituted no more 
than between 2% to 3.5% of the total adult population. 
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Within the Republican community, imprisonment clearly affected a more significant 
share of the population and was recognised by some as a community phenomenon. 
Within the Loyalist community fewer individuals were affected by imprisonment and 
this is reflected in the lower rate of direct experience regarding prisoner issues. In 
addition, the dissimilar experience of imprisonment between Loyalist and Republican 
communities was matched by differing political organisations, strategies and tactics 
and the limited ability of Loyalists to politicise the prisoner issue. In direct contrast, 
Sinn Féin and other Republican groups mobilised around the prisoner question and, in 
so doing, developed wider strategies of political resistance and related community 
concerns.  
 
The different representation of prisoner issues within each community may partly 
explain the finding that around 70% of Republican former prisoners compared to half 
of the Loyalist respondents found it ‘easy to fit in with’ their community after release. 
Similarly, 85.3% of Republican former prisoners compared to half as many Loyalists 
claimed that they had received support from their community whilst they were 
imprisoned. This contrasting sense of support was acknowledged by the Loyalist 
Focus Group which noted that Loyalist former prisoners were still treated by many 
members of their residential community with senses of loathing and mistrust, even 
after a long period of release. Hence, Loyalist former prisoners were often depicted 
by members of their own community as being involved in criminality such as drug 
dealing and other illegitimate sources of income generation.  
 
3.5 The impact of conflict 
 
3.5.1    Death, injury and psychological impacts 
 
Former prisoners and their families experienced a significant loss of persons known 
to them during the conflict. A third of Loyalist and Republican former prisoners lost a 
family member as a result of political violence. Furthermore, a third of Republican 
relatives had members of their families killed compared to 17.8% of Loyalist 
relatives. More than half of the Republican former prisoners (54.7%) and 48% of 
their relatives had lost a relative, compared to 42.7% of Loyalist former prisoners and 
their relatives. A highly significant 94.7% of Republican former prisoners and 78.7% 
of Loyalist former prisoners had lost a friend, as had 58.7% of Republican relatives 
and 45.9% of Loyalist relatives (Table 3.3). The lower figures for relatives may relate 
to former prisoners knowing other members of their organisation who had been 
killed.  
 
Table 3.3: Death caused by the conflict (percentage Republican and Loyalist 
respondents) 
 
 Republican Loyalist 
 
 Former prisoners Relatives Former prisoners Relatives
 
A family member 32.0 36.0 34.7 17.8 
A relative 54.7 48.0 42.7 42.7 
A friend 94.7 58.7 78.7 45.9 
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Given that deaths in the Troubles equated to 0.25% of the population of Northern 
Ireland, it is evident that the prisoner community experienced a far greater intensity of 
direct violence and experience of loss. Moreover, violence was at its most intense in 
specific areas, including the Greater Shankill and North Belfast, which accentuates 
the knowledge of loss and intensifies subsequent community notions of 
commemoration and hurt. Both Republican and Loyalist Focus Groups agreed that 
critics of non-state combatants undermined the status of victimhood within 
Republican and Loyalist communities and in so doing aimed to de-legitimise the 
significance of such loss. Such perspectives also deny the reality that former prisoners 
were also persons who had lost family and friends through violence, thus allowing 
critics of Loyalists and Republicans to portray former prisoners as perpetrators of 
conflict and deny their claim to victimhood. 
 
Again, there were some marked differences between Republican and Loyalist 
experiences of conflict-related death and injury. Republican former prisoners and 
their families were more likely to have suffered serious personal injury in comparison 
to Loyalists and their families. Over a quarter of Republican former prisoners (26.7%) 
and 14.7% of relatives had suffered serious injury as a result of the conflict compared 
to 9.3% of Loyalist former prisoners and 1.3% of their relatives. Republican 
explanations for these differentials pointed to the uneven impact of mistreatment 
within the prison system, the nature of policing within their community and the 
higher level of rioting within Republican areas in the early 1970s and during the 
period of the Hunger Strikes (Table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.4: Serious physical injury (percentage Republican and Loyalist 
respondents) 
 
 Republican 
 
Loyalist 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
Self 26.7 14.7 9.3 1.3 
Family 
members 
37.3 38.7 32.0 17.3 
Relative 34.7 30.7 37.0 24.0 
Friend 57.3 36.0 49.3 20.3 
 
As noted above, political prisoners in Northern Ireland were not immune from the 
traditional pains of imprisonment. They have had to cope with the intrinsic personal 
and familial problems familiar to any long-term prisoners such as the fear of mental 
deterioration, familial strains and fears of harassment by the security/state forces after 
release. Analyses have shown that the consequences of imprisonment and related 
stresses upon former prisoners and their families were somewhat masked during the 
conflict (see McEvoy et al, 1999). However, the period since the ceasefires has seen a 
greater willingness to acknowledge such human costs more openly. Thus the study 
also sought to explore the psychological impact of imprisonment and related conflict 
experiences. 
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The rates of reporting of serious psychological trauma affecting themselves, or people 
close to them, was particularly high among Republican former prisoners and their 
relatives. A quarter of Republican former prisoners (24%) and 27% of their relatives 
stated that they themselves had experienced serious psychological trauma as a result 
of the conflict. These figures rose significantly with regard to reporting the 
experience of family members, relatives and friends. Nearly half (48%) the  
Republican former prisoners reported serious psychological trauma among family 
members and friends. The figures for relatives were 40% and 29.3% respectively. In 
general, Loyalist former prisoners and their relatives tended to report fewer 
experiences of conflict related trauma. Nevertheless 17.4% of former prisoners stated 
that they had experienced trauma compared to more than a quarter of family members 
and 38.4% of relatives (Table 3.5). 
 
Table 3.5: Psychological trauma due to the conflict (percentage Republican and 
Loyalist respondents) 
 
 Republican Loyalist 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
 Self 24.0 28.0 17.3 8.1 
Family 
member 
48.0 40.0 26.7 28.4 
Relative 33.3 36.0 18.7 32.0 
Friend 48.0 29.3 38.7 21.6 
 
3.5.2 Intimidation out of home 
 
Given that the respondents lived within the most politically violent area within 
Belfast, it is not surprising that many had experience of being intimidated from their 
homes. Nearly, 40% of Republican former prisoners (38.7%) and 25.3% of their 
relatives had been so intimidated. According to Republican former prisoners, 
Loyalists were principal intimidators (58.6% of cases). Two respondents identified 
their intimidators as ‘state forces’ and one the ‘Official IRA.’ All other Republican 
former prisoners (38%) blamed a combination of Loyalists and state forces, reflecting 
the common supposition that security/state forces conspired with Loyalists to 
perpetuate such intimidation.  
 
Within the Loyalist sample, 32.9% of former prisoners and 20.3% of relatives had 
been intimidated from their homes. These figures rose dramatically when respondents 
were asked if they knew of friends (58.9%) and relatives (36.5%) who had suffered 
this experience. The majority of respondents identified other members of the Loyalist 
community as the intimidators, a reflection of more recent feuds within Loyalism: 
two-thirds of relatives (67.3%) and 44.2% of former prisoners blamed other 
Loyalists.16 A quarter of former prisoners (26.9%) and 21.2% of relatives blamed 
Republicans for this particular form of intimidation (Table 3.6).  
                                                 
16 Given the geographical area where the survey was completed such findings are to be expected given 
the feud that took place between the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and UVF during the summer 
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Table 3.6: Intimidated out of home (percentage Republican and Loyalist 
respondents) 
 
 Republican Loyalist 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
Self 38.7 25.3 32.9 20.3 
Family 
member 
33.3 41.3 35.6 40.0 
Relative 38.7 28.0 32.9 27.0 
Friend 49.3 33.3 58.9 36.5 
 
3.6 Employment status 
 
While accurate official figures on rates of unemployment among politically motivated 
former prisoners are not collated, it is possible to gain some insight into the extent of 
the problem by crosschecking research carried out by academics, community groups 
and former prisoner groups themselves. In one study, for example, conducted by the 
Republican former prisoner group, Tar Anall, it was found that a mere 27 per cent of 
Republican former prisoners released before 1990 were in employment at the time the 
study was completed in 2003. McGill (1999) suggested that there might be as many 
as 6,000 former prisoners in West Belfast alone while other estimates are that up to 
one in four of those unemployed and living in West Belfast’s were former prisoners.  
 
Table 3.7: Employment status (percentage Republican and Loyalist respondents) 
 
 Republican Loyalist 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
Employed 41.3 40.0 53.3 61.3 
Self-employed 8.0 8.0 2.7 27.0 
Unemployed 40.0 28.0 29.3 16.0 
Sickness/incapacity 18.7 14.7 14.7 8.0 
Pensioner 1.3 10.7 2.7 12.0 
Student 2.7 5.3 0 2.7 
Training scheme 2.7 0 0 0 
 
Thus, despite the lack of precise figures, the claim that long-term unemployment is a 
widespread problem for politically motivated former prisoners is not seriously 
contested. Such high levels of long-term unemployment are due to a range of factors, 
                                                                                                                                            
of 2000. The feud started when the UDA showed support for the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF; a 
splinter group made up of expelled Mid-Ulster members of the UVF and accused of being heavily 
involved in the illegal drugs trade) during a UDA parade on the Shankill Road. Over 250 families were 
displaced before talks to secure an end to the violence succeeded. 
 54
including a lack of skills or the possession of skills or qualifications that were no 
longer valid following long periods of incarceration. Other factors that lead to high 
levels of unemployment include an inability to work in areas dominated by the ‘other’ 
community as well as issues concerned with illness and trauma related conditions.  
 
The unemployment rate among Republican former prisoners in the survey was 40%, a 
higher rate than that of their Loyalist counterparts (29.3%). Relatives also showed 
higher than average rates of unemployment at 28% for Republican relatives and 16% 
for Loyalists. Given that the average rate of unemployment within the study area was 
around 14%, it is obvious that rates of unemployment are well above community 
norms. After excluding those in employment and pensioners, the observed levels of 
economic inactivity were 58.2% and 44% respectively for Republican and Loyalist 
former prisoners (Table 3.7).  
 
In part, the differential unemployment rate between former prisoners and relatives 
may be explained by the different age profile of latter who include younger persons 
less likely to have experienced long-term unemployment. Furthermore, relatives who 
have not been imprisoned will not be as compromised in their search for work by 
labour market based modes of criminalisation (see Chapter 4). Among those in 
employment, it was suggested that former prisoners tended to find jobs as taxi-
drivers, doormen and labourers, usually for relatively low pay and within their own 
communities. However, relatives were also likely to have limited employment 
opportunities. Many were employed in the service industry as shop assistants or 
waiters/waitresses. Since the advent of Peace I and II funds, many relatives and 
former prisoners have found employment within the community sector. Virtually all 
the Republican former prisoners and their relatives felt constrained to their own areas 
when seeking work, a situation linked to chill factors and other issues concerning 
immobility. The fragile nature of employment and self-employment was also clearly 
noted by a Republican respondent: 
 
It is obvious that it is hard to get well-paid and long-term work at 
that. Some of us get into the community sector, which is fine, but 
there is always the problem with long-term finance and job 
sustainability. You can get a bit of door work, but then again it’s late 
nights and its more “brawn than brain”. You can set up on your own 
but then you have to have a few pounds behind you which most of us 
don’t have.  
 
For me it’s like always being a teenager. No money. No regular 
money and still waiting to start a career. A teenager without the kicks 
(Republican: Interview, 15th December 2004). 
 
Although the economic situation of Loyalist former prisoners and their relatives was 
relatively better than that of Republicans, it was still, however, significantly worse 
than the average for both Northern Ireland in general and their local areas in 
particular. Interestingly there appear to be major differences in the economic 
experiences of Loyalist former prisoners and their relatives, which is not as apparent 
within the Republican community. Relatives of Loyalists seem to fare significantly 
better in the labour market in terms of the employment/unemployment differential 
than all other groups. They also tend to be less dependent upon incapacity benefits. 
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The differences in economic experience between the Republican and Loyalist former 
prisoners also appears to be borne out by the finding that nearly two thirds of 
Republicans (64%) were currently experiencing financial problems, compared to 48% 
of Loyalists.  
 
Both Republican and Loyalist former prisoners stated that they had experienced 
difficulties gaining employment. One key factor, shared by 91.4% and 82.4% of 
Republicans and Loyalists respectively, was a refusal to work in places dominated by 
the ‘other’ community. Similar shares of respondents from both groups suggested that 
their prison records constituted a barrier to gaining work for which they were 
qualified. Moreover, 15% of Republican and 9.6% of Loyalist relatives stated that 
their association with a former prisoner had also caused them difficulties gaining 
work for ‘which they were qualified’.  
 
A majority of Republicans (60%) stated that they would not include the possession of 
a prison record when completing job application forms. This reflects the pragmatic 
experience that such disclosure could lead to the cessation of an interview or, indeed, 
a failure even to be shortlisted for one. Most argued that their refusal to list criminal 
records on such forms was explained by a desire not to criminalise their own actions.  
 
Table 3.8: Receipt of benefits (percentage Republican and Loyalist respondents) 
 
 Republican Loyalist 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives 
 
Benefits 77.3 78.7 64.0 53.3 
Job Seeker’s 
Allowance 
(income-based*) 
14.7 4.0 17.3 1.3 
Job Seeker’s 
Allowance 
(contributions-
based) 
2.7 0 0 0 
Income 
Support* 
24 28 13.3 9.3 
Housing 
Benefit* 
16.0 26.7 4.0 9.3 
Incapacity 
Benefit 
9.3 8.0 5.3 8.0 
Disability Living 
Allowance 
16.0 16.0 9.3 5.3 
Tax Credits* 8.0 13.3 0 5.3 
Child Benefit 26.7 42.7 1.3 8.0 
Pension 0 0 2.7 6.7 
 
( * indicates means-tested benefits) 
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However, the opposite was the case among Loyalist former prisoners, 67.7% of 
whom stated that they would declare a prison record if asked to. This reflected, 
essentially, a ‘you are damned if you do and damned if you don’t’ perspective. The 
majority of both Republican (86.7%) and Loyalist (89.3%) former prisoners said that 
the attitudes of employers were a barrier to them finding work.  
 
3.7 Benefit dependence 
 
The lack of job opportunities available to former prisoners and the low level of 
income within their communities were reflected further in the numbers dependent 
upon welfare benefits (Table 3.8). The majority of both former prisoners and their 
relatives were in receipt of benefits of one kind or another. More than three quarters 
of Republican former prisoners and their relatives were in receipt of benefits. In 
addition, 64% of Loyalist former prisoners and 53% of their relatives were also in 
receipt of benefits. Some benefits are universal such as pensions and child benefit 
whilst others are linked to disability. Republican former prisoners were more likely 
than Loyalists to be recipients of employment/unemployment linked benefits and also 
much more likely to be in receipt of Disability Living Allowance, Child Benefit and 
Tax Credits, suggesting they were more likely to have disabilities, children, and low 
income levels. Loyalist former prisoners were more likely to be in receipt of Job 
Seekers Allowance. Notwithstanding the differentials between groups, it is clear that 
both Loyalist and Republican former prisoners and their relatives are heavily 
dependent on a range of state benefits. Their high level of dependence on means-
tested benefits, in particular, reflects their low economic status. 
 
3.8       Repercussions 
 
From this account of the personal characteristics of Republican and Loyalist former 
prisoners and their relatives, it is apparent that both sets of respondents have been 
disadvantaged in various ways by imprisonment although there are variations between 
the two groups. As a generalization, the key point seems to be that in addressing their 
personal difficulties, Republican former prisoners have a higher degree of community 
and personal support than their Loyalist counterparts. This implies that they may 
therefore be more effective at ‘working within’ their own communities but also 
possibly more effective in the former prisoner role generally.  
 
Moreover, regardless of the reality of those consequences of imprisonment and 
conflict for many individual former prisoners, it would be wrong to give the 
impression that they view themselves as passive victims of circumstance. Indeed, 
quite the opposite is the case. Many Republican former prisoners have been explicit 
that while the focus of their ‘resistance’ many have changed, they remain committed 
political activists within the broader Republican ‘struggle’ (Ritchie, 2002). Similarly, 
Loyalist former prisoners, particularly although not exclusively those from a 
UVF/RHC background, have also sought to channel the experience, leadership and 
energy of Loyalist former prisoners into activities to benefit both the former prisoners 
themselves and the Loyalist community in general. As we have seen in Chapter 2, 
although the aims and objectives, analysis of the conflict and views of peace building 
may differ between Republican and Loyalist former prisoners, many similarities exist 
in the form of organisation and the type of projects developed by both groups. 
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Nevertheless, while the personal circumstances of former prisoners can be used to 
advantage in committed work within their own communities and even in conflict 
transformation, it is also apparent here that they act as an impediment to the 
effectiveness of former prisoners as catalysts for change within and between 
communities. In part, this reflects the negative consequences of the circumstances 
themselves, but, importantly, also their interconnection with the issue of 
criminalisation already briefly noted above. This interaction forms the focus of 
Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4: Residual Criminalisation and its Effects 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the past, both during the recent and previous phases of conflict, politically 
motivated former prisoners had to make a number of choices on release from prison – 
whether to continue with their political activism, whether to curtail or alter it or 
whether to give it up completely. Only a small percentage of the estimated 20,000 
politically motivated former prisoners imprisoned as a result of the conflict were 
actually released under the terms of the Belfast Agreement. Indeed many more 
activists on all sides were never imprisoned. It was therefore important for both 
Republicans and Loyalists to harness support for their positions among activists past 
and present. For both groupings, the support of former prisoners also provided a vital 
legitimacy to their respective political leaderships in attempting to sell the new way 
forward to their respective support bases. At a practical level, they also needed to 
ensure that former prisoners remained on board, not least to deny potential leadership, 
experience, skills and resources to emerging dissident groupings opposed to the 
leadership strategies. The Belfast Agreement went some way to recognising the 
importance of reintegration as well as release of politically motivated former 
prisoners to the overall conflict resolution process as have the funding initiatives 
discussed in the previous Chapter. However, neither British nor Irish governments 
have been prepared to remove all the barriers facing former prisoners to full 
citizenship or inclusion in society and this residual criminalisation has emerged as a 
key impediment to the effectiveness of politically motivated former prisoner groups. 
 
This Chapter examines the issue of residual criminalisation from several perspectives: 
 
• a contextual discussion of the issues; 
 
• examples of the effects of the process;  
 
• the ways in which it constrains former prisoner behaviour and leads to 
stereotyping and stigmatisation. 
 
4.2 Residual criminalisation 
 
Former prisoner groups contend that Section 10 of the Belfast Agreement, which 
dealt specifically with the issue of politically motivated prisoners in Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland, recognises their demands for civil and political inclusion. 
Within a wider policy context the final part of Section 10 of the Agreement states 
that:  
  
The Governments continue to recognise the importance of measures 
to facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into the community by 
providing support both prior to and after release, including assistance 
directed towards availing of employment opportunities, re-training 
and/or re-skilling, and further education.  
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A key stumbling block in the development of a more inclusive role for politically 
motivated former prisoners is that the law makes no differentiation between criminal 
activity and political conflict. This lack of a formal differentiation between politically 
motivated and non-politically motivated prisoners is reflected in the argument 
between those who seek the de-criminalisation of politically motivated acts and those 
who wish to maintain an ideology and practice of criminalisation.  
 
Stronger anti-discriminatory employment legislation within Northern Ireland was 
established through the 1976 and 1989 Fair Employment Acts. State-led political 
‘normalisation’ policies, international pressure (arising as a result of the MacBride 
campaign in the United States)17 and internal political pressure from within the 
Nationalist and Republican communities, encouraged a more active approach to the 
practice of fair employment through the implementation of strong enforcement 
bodies. However, the various legislation that concerns anti-discriminatory practices 
explicitly permits the non-employment of those, as stated in section 2 (4) of the Fair 
Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, whose political opinions:  
 
approve or accept the use of violence for political ends, connected with 
the affairs of Northern Ireland, including the use of violence for the 
purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear. 
 
In addition, the same Act states that discrimination against those who are ‘proven’ to 
be a threat to national security, public safety and public order is not unlawful. In 
simple terms, the possession of a conviction which upholds membership of a 
proscribed organization permits the denial of an interview and any legal redress to job 
applicants who are politically motivated former prisoners. Moreover, in recent years, 
there has been a significant growth in employers seeking knowledge regarding 
‘criminal’ convictions, not least to identify potential employees who are sex 
offenders.  
 
This legislation is viewed by former prisoner groups as a form of criminalisation that 
is intimately connected to discrimination in general, and the reality that employers 
and employment agencies hold information regarding former prisoners at their 
disposal. There is no accurate information on how often Section 2 (4) of the Fair 
Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 is utilised by employers 
but as noted by Mike Ritchie, Director of Coitse na n-Iarchimí, the existence of the 
legislation has a wider personal impact:  
 
We usually are asked to look into the issue of declaring convictions 
about 20-30 times a year. However, in most cases it is obvious that 
former prisoners simply don’t bother either applying for jobs or taking 
up cases when it is clear that they have been rejected because they 
have “convictions”. The legislation’s main impact is that it creates a 
sense of fatalism and rejection (Interview: 15th December 2004). 
 
Former prisoner groups thus constantly campaign to ensure that issues of 
criminalisation remain within the respective human rights and equality arenas. 
                                                 
17 The MacBride Principles — consisting of nine fair employment principles — are a corporate code of 
conduct for U.S. Companies doing business in Northern Ireland and have become the Congressional 
standard for all US aid to, or economic dealings with, Northern Ireland.  
 60
Concerted attempts have been made to ensure that the Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission (established under the Belfast Agreement) includes former 
prisoners within the Draft Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (- this is not the correct 
cite for this, we didn’t write this until after 2001 (McEvoy et al, 2004). After 
considerable lobbying, the Draft Bill of Rights now contains a non-discrimination 
clause, which stipulates that:  
 
Everyone has the right to be protected against any direct or indirect 
discrimination whatsoever on any ground (or combination of 
grounds) such as race or ethnic origin, nationality, colour, gender, 
marital or family status, residence, language, religion or belief, 
political or other opinion, possession of a criminal conviction… 
(Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, 2002: Article 4).  
 
The Draft Bill of Rights also contains a clause which stipulates that:  
 
The State shall take effective measures to ensure that favourable 
conditions are created for the reintegration of former prisoners into 
society (Ibid.: Article 15). 
 
However, the same draft Bill does not distinguish between politically motivated and 
non-politically motivated convictions as it includes the exception that discrimination 
on the grounds of a criminal conviction may be adjudged legitimate if the 
characteristics used to discriminate constitute ‘…a genuine and determining 
requirement’. As such, politically motivated former prisoner groups have been 
unsuccessful in lobbying to have the Draft Bill of Rights distinguish between 
‘politicals’ and other offenders on the grounds of motivation. 
 
In relation to the Single Equality Bill proposals for Northern Ireland (2001), the 
Equality Commission for Northern Ireland suggested that legislation could be 
introduced:  
...to outlaw discrimination against those who have past convictions, 
with proper safeguards in place through necessary exemptions from 
dangerous individuals (Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, 
2002: para. 3.8.5).  
The Equality Commission deliberated whether separate consideration needs to be 
given to those who considered their offences to have been based on political grounds 
and that the legislation should consider a formulation wherein discrimination could 
not occur on the basis of  ‘irrelevant criminal convictions’ (Equality Commission for 
Northern Ireland, 2002: paras. 3.8.8.1 and 3.8.7). Virtually all politically motivated 
former prisoner groups accept that the interventions from the Equality Commission 
represented a recognition, although without delivery, of alternative legislative 
provisions for dealing with political and non-political offenders and the potential to 
argue that political offences might be considered as irrelevant criminal convictions 
(Ritchie, 2002). However, the ability to deliver more meaningful forms of de-
criminalisation has also been undermined by the collapse of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. 
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Despite draft legislation, the significant achievements of politically motivated 
prisoners in resisting criminalisation during their incarceration (see McEvoy, 2001), 
and the explicit recognition of the political nature of their offences as evidenced by 
the accelerated release provisions, it is evident that former politically motivated 
former prisoners remain confronted by an active series of policies and processes 
which reproduce criminalisation. As a result of this, they remain legally or indirectly 
barred from a significant number of political, social and economic positions. The 
questionnaire survey addressed these issues through a succession of questions aimed 
at assessing the awareness of residual criminalisation. These were concerned with 
examples of such constraints and also problems encountered in dealing with statutory 
agencies, employers and training providers. In addition, questions were asked 
concerning stereotyping by state forces and the media.  
 
4.3 Examples of the effects of residual criminalisation 
 
In an attempt to measure something of the practical effects of residual criminalisation, 
the survey included questions related to obtaining: Public Service Vehicle 
(PSV)/Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) licences; compensation for criminal injuries or 
damage to property; pensions; visas; and loans/mortgages. Republicans tended to be 
more aware than Loyalists of the constraints placed upon former prisoners through 
criminalisation although this did not apply to pensions or loans/mortgages (Table 4.1). 
 
4.3.1 PSV licences 
 
Anyone wishing to drive a public service vehicle requires a PSV licence. Nearly three 
quarters of Republican (74.7%) and just over half of Loyalist former prisoners (53%) 
were aware of difficulties in obtaining PSV/HGV licences and it is instructive to 
pursue this example in a little detail as it does demonstrate the practical difficulties of 
residual criminalisation. Taxi driving is important in terms of employment within 
socially deprived communities where many public taxis operate on a community-bus 
service level. The occupation does not require significant skills and can also be 
undertaken on a part-time basis, which provides the opportunity to raise income 
levels. These licenses are issued through the Department of the Environment. 
Routinely, a politically motivated former prisoner is informed that he is 'not a fit 
person' for employment as a taxi driver. Such decisions are usually appealed to the 
magistrate's court where the refusal is normally confirmed. An appeal is then made in 
the County Court where, eventually, some licences are granted.  
 
The central problem for politically motivated former prisoners lies in the arbitrary 
nature of the process. The judgement on a person's suitability is not made on the basis 
of ability but rather on the presumed ‘morality’ of the applicant. One prominent case 
was that of Damian McComb, a former Republican prisoner who had been released 
under the early release provisions of the Belfast Agreement. He challenged a ruling 
by the Recorder in Belfast which upheld a Department of Environment determination 
that he was ‘not a fit and proper person to hold a taxi driving license in all of the 
circumstances….’. McComb’s lawyers successfully relied upon the commitment to 
reintegration in the Belfast Agreement and the determination that a person released 
under the Northern Ireland Sentences Act was, by definition, deemed no longer to 
represent a danger to the public. Mr Justice Kerr, now Lord Chief Justice of Northern 
Ireland, held that: 
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The Agreement contemplated that mechanisms would be put into 
place for the accelerated release of prisoners and that those prisoners 
who benefited from that program would be reintegrated into society. 
It appears to me therefore that particular attention should be paid to 
the fact that a prisoner released under the terms of the Northern 
Ireland (Sentences) Act has been adjudged not to be a danger to the 
public (McComb, 2003). 
 
Table 4.1: Awareness of issues and experiences arising from residual 
criminalisation (percentage Republican and Loyalist respondents) 
 
 Republican 
 
Loyalist 
 Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives 
 
Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
Awareness - PSV/HGV 
licence 
74.7 48.0 53.0 22.7 
Personal experience - 
PSV/HGV 
13.3 34.7 17.3 18.7 
Family experience - 
PSV/HGV 
2.7 5.3 0 6.7 
     
Awareness- 
compensation 
81.3 82.7 62.7 45.3 
Personal experience - 
compensation                    
26.7 62.7 25.3 34.7 
Family experience - 
compensation 
4.0 20.0 8.0 12.0 
     
Awareness - visa 86.7 88.0 70.7 42.7 
Personal experience - 
visa                          
49.3 68.0 33.3 36.0 
Family experience - visa 24.0 25.3 1.3 9.3 
     
Awareness - pension 30.7 13.3 44 10.7 
Personal experience - 
pension                          
8.0 8.0 6.7 10.7 
Family experience - 
pension 
4.0 4.0 1.3 1.3 
     
Awareness - 
loans/mortgage 
37.3 24.0 37.3 21.3 
Personal experience - 
loans/mortgage                 
10.7 13.3 24.0 13.3 
Family experience - 
loans/mortgage 
2.7 5.3 2.7 2.7 
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4.3.2  Criminal injuries compensation 
 
Again, there was a higher awareness of problems in Criminal Injuries compensation 
among Republican former prisoners and their relatives than was true of Loyalists. 
Nevertheless, the relatively high numbers of Loyalist former prisoners (62.7%) and 
their relatives (47.2%) aware of such problems could be related to events in the 
aftermath of the Loyalist feud in 2000. Both EPIC and a number of families affected 
by this were refused compensation by the Northern Ireland Compensation Agency 
because former prisoners were either family members or, in the case of EPIC, part of 
the management committee; EPIC has since won its appeal through the courts. 
 
4.3.3 Visas 
 
There was relatively little difference in the awareness of problems in this regard 
except for the comparatively low percentage of Loyalist relatives (42.7%). Republican 
former prisoners had more experience of actual problems - (49.3%) compared to 33% 
of Loyalists - in obtaining a visa (usually for travel to the United States or Canada) 
although the reasons for this difference are not transparent.  
 
4.3.4  Pensions 
 
Whilst it is difficult to say conclusively why Republicans tended to be less aware than 
Loyalists of problems arising from pensions and other financial factors, part of the 
answer might lie in the historic economic and employment experiences of Republican 
communities. For example, people will only be aware of pensions if there is a 
community tradition of receiving them while those who tend to spend most of their 
lives unemployed or in low-income employment tend to depend on means-tested 
benefits at retirement age. The slightly younger age profile of the Republican former 
prisoner sample compared to its Loyalist counterpart sample may also have been a 
factor. 
 
4.3.5  Loans and mortgages 
 
Equal numbers (37.3%) of Republicans and Loyalists were aware of difficulties in 
obtaining loans/mortgages/insurance although compared to Republicans (10.7%), 
twice as many Loyalists (24%) had personally experienced difficulties. These issues 
also had the lowest awareness for all categories of respondents.  
 
4.4 Dealing with statutory agencies 
 
The interaction between former prisoners and their relatives and the statutory 
agencies of the state provides another important dimension to residual criminalisation 
(Table 4.2). Nearly half of Republican (46.7%) and just over a third (34.7%) of 
Loyalist former prisoners were aware of difficulties in dealings with statutory 
agencies, and 25.3% compared to 20% had personal experience of such difficulties. 
Both groups tended to cite what is now the Department of Health, Social Services and 
Public Safety (DHSSPS) (formerly Department of Health and Social Security – 
DHSS) as the agency with whom problems were most frequent, followed by the 
Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE). Interestingly, this was one of the few 
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areas in the survey in which the difficulties experienced by Loyalist relatives scored 
higher percentages than their Republican counterparts. Over a fifth (21.3%) of 
Loyalist relatives compared to 8% of Republican relatives cited difficulties with 
NIHE; additionally 18% compared to 5.3% had experienced problems with social 
services/social workers. Again, the Shankill feud of 2000 may offer one explanation 
for this trend. 
 
Table 4.2: Difficulties in dealing with statutory agencies (percentage Republican 
and Loyalist respondents) 
 
 Republican Loyalist 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives 
Awareness of 
difficulties 
46.7 37.3 34.7 9.7 
Personal experience 25.3 25.3 20.0 5.6 
Family experience 10.7 13.3 4.0 2.8 
     
Housing Executive 26.7 8.0 20.0 21.3 
Social Security 42.7 14.7 28.0 20.0 
Social 
Services/Workers 
17.3 5.3 13.3 18.0 
  
 
Table 4.3: Difficulties in dealing with employers and training providers 
(percentage Republican and Loyalist respondents) 
 
 Republican Loyalist 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
 
Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
 
 
Awareness – public-sector 
employment 
70.7 53.0 52.0 21.3 
Personal experience 20.0 32.0 13.3 9.3 
Family experience 14.7 22.7 10.7 6.7 
     
Awareness – private 
employment 
54.7 28.0 36.0 10.7 
Personal experience 22.7 16.0 20.0 5.3 
Family experience 2.7 8.0 1.3 2.7 
     
Awareness - training 32.0 12.0 22.7 4.0 
Personal experience                         8.0 8.0 5.3 1.3 
Family experience 0 2.7 0 1.3 
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4.5 Dealing with employers and training providers 
 
In relation to employment and training, 70.7% of Republican and 52 % of Loyalist 
former prisoners were aware of difficulties in obtaining public-sector employment, 
while 20% and 13.3% had direct experience of such difficulties. Republican former 
prisoners were also more aware of difficulties with regard to private employment and 
training. The rates of awareness were considerably higher among Republican 
prisoners than their Loyalist counterparts but the personal experience of employment 
and training difficulties was less uneven. The awareness and experience rates among 
Loyalist relatives were significantly lower when compared to the other categories, 
Republican relatives having similar awareness levels to Loyalist former prisoners. 
The politicisation of the Republican movement could explain these variations in 
levels of awareness, especially with regard to relatives. But the relatively similar 
levels of experience among prisoners would suggest that imprisonment, irrespective 
of group membership, influences both the awareness and occurrence of such 
difficulties (Table 4.3). 
 
4.6       Stereotyping: the state, media and the International Monitoring 
Commission (IMC)   
 
The vast majority of Republican former prisoners (99.9%) and their relatives (68%) 
stated that they had experienced harassment from state/security forces (Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC)/PSNI/British Army) due to their status. Fewer Loyalists had 
experienced such harassment (46.7% of Loyalist former prisoners and 34.7% of 
relatives). A Republican respondent commented: ‘I feel labelled and used to suit the 
politicians and the PSNI’. 
 
Table 4.4: Treatment by state forces (percentage Republican and Loyalist 
respondents) 
  
 Republican 
 
Loyalist 
 Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
Personal 
harassment 
24.0 13.3 16.0 22.7 
Personal 
unfair treatment 
33.3 13.3 26.7 24.0 
Generally undermines 
Peace Process 
93.3 92.0 76.0 68.0 
 
The representation of former prisoners in the media was also an issue of concern. 
Nearly a quarter of Republican former prisoners said they had experienced harassment 
at the hands of the media and a third said they had been treated unfairly. Smaller but 
still significant numbers of Loyalist former prisoners and Republican relatives had 
similar experiences of such harassment. Interestingly, this was one of the few areas in 
the survey where Loyalist relatives scored more highly than Republicans. Nearly a 
quarter of Loyalist relatives had personally experienced harassment from the media 
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(22.7%) compared to 13.3% of Republican relatives. A majority of both Republican 
former prisoners (93.3%) and relatives (92%) believed that the media’s representation 
of former prisoners undermined the Peace Process. Three quarters of Loyalist former 
prisoners and two-thirds of Loyalist relatives concurred.  This issue is seen as being 
important by Coiste: 
 
…we…challenge media reports.  For example, last week Jim Allister 
put out a very negative press statement opposing us getting EU 
funding.  We challenged that – though it was not carried by the 
media.  But at least the media hears a different voice even if the 
decide not to let anyone else here it (Mike Ritchie: Interview, 15th 
December 2004). 
 
The majority of all respondent groups also interpreted the first IMC Report in April 
2004 as undermining the potential for peace building. The IMC was established by 
the British and Irish Governments in April 2003 in response to Unionist demands for 
increased monitoring of the Republican and Loyalist ceasefires. Both Sinn Féin and 
the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) were fined as a result of the suppositions made 
within this report. One aspect, which particularly angered former prisoners, was the 
supposition that community groups should vet members to ensure no linkage with 
paramilitary groups. Such declarations were held to be reminiscent of political vetting 
programmes that were commonplace in the 1980s. Respondents also noted that such 
vetting practices ignored the efforts of many former prisoners who were engaged in 
the promotion of social, welfare and conflict transformation projects. 
 
The comments of Loyalists were particularly scathing. As noted the IMC report 
‘reintroduces the justification for violence’, as it is perceived as being centred upon 
the ‘scapegoating of former prisoners’. Furthermore, the establishment of the IMC 
was heralded as being based upon creating ‘ another stick to beat the ‘bad boys’. For 
Loyalists in particular the report ignored ‘all the good work being done’. According 
to the PUP the IMC had focused on: 
 
the further marginalisation of those working hardest…It narrows the 
ground of those actively involved in building peace and gives the 
“wreckers” a leg up (PUP, 2004: np).   
 
4.7       Summary 
 
While no policy initiative has yet taken effect to deal with the residual criminalisation 
experienced by politically motivated former prisoners, it is important to note recent 
developments which may yet lead to these issues being addressed. Lobbying by 
former prisoner groupings has focussed for some time on the establishment of a 
government approach which would take a comprehensive look at the range of barriers 
with a view to a policy change across departmental areas of responsibility. For 
Republicans, this would be required in both Irish jurisdictions. As noted: 
 
All ex-prisoner groupings actively participated in conferences 
organised by CFNI in Belfast and Dublin in 2004. These were able 
to highlight the positive work of ex-prisoner groups and argue for 
policy change. It is hoped that, along with the debates opened up 
 67
by the Equality and Human Rights Commissions in the north and 
the more positive political environment created by the IRA 
statement of July 2005, a favourable approach will be taken by 
government and civil servants over the next period. The ex-
prisoner groupings are involved in on-going contacts with relevant 
government departments to press their case (Republican: 
Interview, 22nd August, 2005). 
 
In sum, therefore, Republican former prisoners are more likely than their Loyalist 
counterparts to be aware of the actual and potential problems caused by residual 
criminalisation although actual personal experience does not vary significantly 
between the two groups. Republican relatives have far greater awareness of these 
issues than Loyalist relatives. Both sets of relatives tend to be most or least aware of 
the same issues as the respective sets of former prisoners. For example, Republican 
relatives, like Republican former prisoners were least aware of issues concerning 
pensions and loans/mortgages whereas both Loyalist former prisoners and their 
relatives were more conscious of these concerns. The number of Loyalist relatives 
who were aware of a particular issue was also usually very close to the number that 
had actually experienced the difficulty. It thus seems to be the case that Loyalist 
relatives were usually only aware of residual criminalisation issues which had affected 
them personally.  
 
Such trends confirm the findings of Chapter 3 and point to Republican former 
prisoners and their relatives as having a higher awareness of residual criminalisation 
than their Loyalist counterparts. Financial issues apart, Loyalist former prisoners are 
less aware of the impact of criminalisation and this may point to the differences in the 
ways in which the prisoner issue has been politicised in the two communities, former 
prisoners being far more visible within - and central to - the politics of Republicanism 
than is true of Loyalism (see Chapter 6). The much higher awareness of levels of 
Republican relatives also supports this conclusion. Conversely, while Loyalist former 
prisoners have been informed of difficulties through the network of former prisoner 
and other groups, their relatives have encountered the effects of residual 
criminalisation only when they had experienced them. We return to the issue of 
criminalisation in Chapters 5 and 6 because, together with the personal difficulties of 
former prisoners, it constitutes a further impediment to the ability of former prisoners 
to work both within and without their respective communities. 
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Chapter 5: Criminalisation, Community and Conflict 
 
 
5.1       Introduction 
 
The discussion so far has largely been concerned with the politically motivated 
former prisoner groups within their own communities. In the next two chapters, the 
emphasis shifts somewhat to consider the ways in which the groups have become 
involved in conflict transformation work despite the impediments isolated in Chapters 
3 and 4. Conflict transformation involves work both within and without the respective 
communities. In this present Chapter, we are concerned first with the context of 
conflict transformation and then, secondly, with those aspects of the questionnaire 
survey devoted to the activities of former prisoner groups in their respective 
communities and in working between communities. 
 
5.2 Conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict transformation 
 
In recent years, three main schools of thought have developed in relation to how 
conflict should be handled, and these are often classified under the headings: conflict 
resolution; conflict management; and conflict transformation. All three not only 
articulate varying approaches to conflict intervention, but also reflect different 
conceptualisations of conflict. Even within these three broad approaches differing 
perspectives exist. It is also the case that many theorists and practitioners interchange 
the terms, adding to the confusion.  
 
Conflict resolution approaches have tended to be the traditional response to conflicts 
which have not been able to ‘resolve’ themselves satisfactorily through violence or 
other means. Proponents of these, such as Burton (1993), argue that it is possible to 
transcend conflicts if parties can be helped to explore, analyse, question and reframe 
their positions and interests. Conflict resolution, therefore, usually emphasises 
intervention by skilled third-parties working with the parties to foster new thinking 
and new relationships and therefore involves trying to move parties from zero-sum, 
destructive patterns of conflict to positive-sum constructive outcomes. Different types 
of intervention may be appropriate at different times. Thus, for example, Fisher and 
Keashly’s (1991) contingency theory suggests that facilitation may be appropriate at 
the early stages of conflict but that power-based mediation (or even coercion) is 
required when a conflict has reached a high stage of polarisation.  
 
Conflict management approaches emerged in the context of conflicts which did not 
appear to have a readily available solution. Advocates of these approaches tend to 
view violent conflicts as the result of differences of values, interests and power within 
and between communities. Resolving such conflicts is viewed as unrealistic: the best 
that can be done is to manage and contain them, and occasionally to reach a historic 
compromise in which violence may be laid aside and normal politics resumed. 
Conflict management is usually concerned with making appropriate interventions to 
achieve political settlements, particularly by those powerful actors having the 
authority and resources to bring pressure on the conflicting parties in order to induce 
them to settle. As Bloomfield and Reilly (1998: 18) suggest: 
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Rather than advocating methods for removing conflict, [conflict 
management] addresses the more realistic question of managing 
conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring 
opposing sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a 
practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive 
management of difference.  
 
Again, a number of conflict theorists and practitioners, including John Paul Lederach, 
advocate the pursuit of ‘conflict transformation’, as opposed to ‘conflict resolution’ or 
‘conflict management’. Lederach (1995, 1997) argues that conflict transformation 
differs because it reflects a better understanding of the nature of conflict itself. For 
him, a ‘conflict resolution’ approach suggests that conflict is destructive and thus 
something that should be ended. It also suggests that conflict can be ‘resolved’ 
permanently through mediation or other intervention processes. This ignores the fact 
that many conflicts occur as a result of great injustices or inequalities and that 
‘resolution’ may require structural changes in the society, changes which may not be 
possible in the short-term. For Lederach, ‘conflict management’ can be a better 
approach since it accepts that conflicts often cannot be quickly resolved. However, 
‘management’ suggests that people can be directed or controlled. It also suggests that 
violence is the problem in a conflict and this may divert attention away from the real 
problem causing the violence and the conflict in the first place. Conflict 
transformation on the other hand recognises that social conflict occurs between people 
involved in relationships and once it occurs it transforms those people and the 
relationships which created the conflict. If left alone, a conflict can end up being very 
destructive for all involved. Conflict transformation approaches can, however, reduce 
the potential for this to happen by operating at a number of levels to help transform 
the relationships, interests and discourses which support the continuation of violent 
conflict. It can operate at the personal level, where beliefs and perceptions are 
challenged and where non-violent advocacy methods are promoted. Lederach argues 
however, that transformation also involves structural change affecting injustice and 
inequality in the social structure as a whole. Thus it may include ending oppression or 
fairer sharing of resources.  
 
Conflict transformation represents the most secure means of conceptually grounding 
this study of politically motivated former prisoners. Undoubtedly, the effects of 
imprisonment and politically motivated release act as a serious impediment to the 
potential contribution of former prisoners to these processes while a second major 
impediment stems from residual criminalisation. To these two significant sets of 
processes can be added a third barrier – the legacy of conflict between Republican 
and Loyalist combatants. All three sets of impediments interconnect to compromise 
the effectiveness of former prisoner organisations within and without their own 
communities and also to accentuate the differential experiences and impacts of 
Republican and Loyalist groups on conflict transformation. 
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5.3 Working within the community 
 
5.3.1 Involvement in community work 
 
The questionnaire responses pointed to an extensive differential between Loyalist and 
Republican former prisoners concerning their involvement in community-based 
activities. A large majority of Republicans (81.3%) stated that they had been involved 
in community work since their release compared to just under half (46.7%) of 
Loyalist former prisoners. The most significant form of community-based activity 
related to in interface work and the attempts made to dilute the rationale and impact 
of violence within highly segregated areas. Two-thirds of Republicans compared to 
33.3% of Loyalist former prisoners had been involved in such efforts. There was also 
extensive involvement in youth and community safety/restorative justice schemes that 
aimed to lower incidents of anti-social behaviour. Other activities of former prisoners 
are shown in Table 5.1. 
 
In each of the specific areas of community work, Republicans were more likely to be 
involved than Loyalists, a further reflection of different linkages between community 
based politics and ideology which, within Republicanism, accords a higher status to 
former prisoners. The lower level of involvement among Loyalists was viewed as 
being a feature of that community’s more conservative attitude towards the British 
state and social change more generally but also to the lesser status of former 
prisoners. One Loyalist commented that many of his compatriots ceased their role as 
activists upon release: 
 
Most UVF men saw themselves as irregulars. When the war ended 
that was it. They went back to being plumbers, welders or whatever 
their trade was. It was over. Militant Republicanism has ceased and 
that was it (Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December 2004). 
 
Table 5.1: Involvement of former prisoners/relatives in community work since 
their release (percentage Republican and Loyalist respondents) 
 
 Republican Loyalist 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
Yes  81.3 66.7 46.7 52.0 
No 18.7 33.3 53.35 46.7 
     
Interfaces 63.3 70.6 33.3 34.7 
Youth work 53.3 54.9 26.7 30.7 
Community safety 51.7 45.1 24.0 22.7 
Elderly 25.0 17.6 12.0 5.3 
Women’s groups 30. 0 23.5 6.7 1.3 
Environment 36.7 33.3 12.0 5.3 
Restorative justice 33.3 33.3 25.3 29.3 
Economic regeneration 46.7 43.1 9.3 8.0 
Other  16.9 8.0 6.7 8.0 
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Republican Focus Group members felt that the higher share of Republicans involved 
in community work reflected the interconnection of politics and community 
representation in which Republican former prisoners were viewed as part of a defined 
community of shared aspirations and commitment. The political commitment of 
Republicans was seen as having close links to the overall tradition of Republican 
‘volunteerism’. Moreover, involvement in community work was also seen to reflect 
the regard and support for Republican former prisoners within their own community, 
as well as the importance that they and their community attach to community-based 
work. Involvement took many diverse firms including a plethora of party political and 
community organisations as well as former prisoner groups.  
 
5.3.2  Former prisoner groups and the community 
 
Table 5.2: Reasons for contact with former prisoner groups (percentage 
Republican and Loyalist respondents) 
 
 Republican 
 
Loyalist 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
Housing 46.8 24.0 56.0 37.3 
Benefits 77.4 32.0 58.7 44.0 
Relationship 
problems 
14.5 13.3 10.7 16.0 
Illness/alcohol/ 
drug issues 
4.8 5.3 5.3 4.0 
Work-related 
issues 
43.5 14.7 46.7 29.3 
Training/ 
education 
62.9 28.0 40.0 21.3 
Legal 
impediments 
35.5 10.7 12.0 20.0 
Counselling 12.9 8.0 14.7 21.3 
Friendship 74.2 29.3 52.0 44.0 
 
A substantial majority of both Republicans (81.3%) and Loyalists (73.3%) 
interviewed had availed of the services offered by former prisoner groups. Of these, 
95% considered the services offered to have been valuable. More Loyalist (62.7%) 
than Republican (45.3%) relatives had used a former prisoner group while their 
relative was in prison and this trend continued after release. The reasons offered for 
the lower use rate among Republican relatives included the lack of specific former 
prisoner groups and the availability of support services provided by other community 
organisations.  
 
The main areas of support offered by former prisoner groups to Republicans were 
linked to benefits (77.4%), friendship (74.2%) training/education (62.9%) and 
housing and work-related issues. More Republican former prisoners than Loyalists 
have used the groups for help with benefits, possibly because of their higher rate of 
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unemployment. Republican former prisoners were also nearly three times more likely 
than Loyalists to seek help with legal issues, a further reflection of the link between 
political discourse, resistance and legal redress. The principal reasons for Loyalist 
usage centred on housing (56%), benefits (58.7%) and work related issues. Among 
the four categories of respondents, counselling was most used by Loyalist relatives 
(21.3%) but friendship was considerably more important for all groups. A central 
explanation for the high usage of former prisoner groups was that of trust. 
  
Among former prisoners who had not used such groups (18.7% of Republicans and 
26.7% of Loyalists), the main reasons given were the lack of need, a desire to ‘move 
on’ and a lack of knowledge over what such groups offered. Thirty-six percent of 
Republican and 10.7% of Loyalist relatives stated that they had not used former 
prisoner groups because they did not need them.  
 
5.3.3  Issues affecting communities  
 
Respondents were asked to rank the five most important issues affecting their 
communities. Among Republican former prisoners (46%) and their relatives (50.7%), 
it was clear that anti-social behaviour was a major issue of concern. Within the 
Loyalist sample, 41.3% of prisoners and 56% of relatives shared the same anxieties.  
 
Table 5.3: Main issues affecting local community (ranked 1-5 in order of 
importance) (percentage Republican and Loyalist respondents) 
 
 Republican Loyalist 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
Anti-social behaviour  46.0 50.7 41.3 56.0 
Policing  37.3 30.7 29.3 34.7 
Crime  30.7 29.3 50.7 56.0 
Drugs 29.3 34.7 61.3 65.3 
Lack of jobs 28.0 26.7 34.7 36.0 
Lack of youth facilities 28.0 24.0 14.7 36.0 
Youth anti-social 
behaviour 
22.7 21.3 41.3 50.7 
Human rights/equality 22.7 16.0 13.3 0 
Peace Process 21.3 12.0 30.7 29.3 
Lack of housing 17.3 29.3 10.7 9.3 
Relationships within the 
community 
10.7 6.7 17.3 13.3 
Relationships with other 
communities 
5.3 4.0 17.3 18.7 
Language issues 1.3 0 4.0 4.0 
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5.4 Contact between former prisoners and political groups  
 
Over 60% of both Loyalist groups compared to only half as many Republican 
respondents chose drugs as the leading issue of community concern. For Loyalist 
former prisoners, crime and drugs were identified as the new enemy ‘within’. Drugs 
and crime were seen to be ‘destroying our communities, this is the new war for our 
communities’ (Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December, 2004). Loyalists also challenged 
the sanguine attitudes of Republicans in relation to the drugs issue. In their view 
Republicans were complacent concerning drug usage within their own communities. 
In response to this, Republicans viewed drug usage as a much lower priority within 
their community, due to the methods they employed to deal with such issues, and 
claimed that Loyalists were responsible for supplying any drugs that did exist to 
Republican communities. Similar numbers chose policing as a key concern, although 
 
Table 5.4: Contact between former prisoners and people of different political 
perspectives* (percentage Republican and Loyalist respondents) 
 
 Republican Loyalist 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
Yes 56.0 30.7 44.0 41.3 
No 24.0 34.7 17.3 18.7 
     
Sinn Féin 30.7 (5.3)* 16.0 30.7 (26.7) 29.3 
Irish Republican 
Socialist Party 
36.0 (22.7) 12.0 21.3 (18.7) 2.7 
Workers Party 14.7 (12.0) 5.3 20 (18.7) 12.0 
Official Republican 
Movement 
17.3 (13.3) 5.3 18.7 (16.0) 5.3 
Republican Sinn Féin 14.7 (6.7) 5.3 8.0 (8.0) 0 
32 Co. Solidarity 
Comm. 
9.3 (8.0) 6.7 5.3 (5.3) 2.7 
SDLP 32.0 (25.3) 17.3 14.7 (14.7) 16.0 
UUP 20.0 (17.3) 8.0 24.0 (24.0) 28.0 
DUP 13.3 (12.0) 4.0 20.0 (20.0) 20.0 
PUP 28.0 (18.7) 13.3 40.0 (17.3) 33.3 
Ulster Political 
Research Group 
17.3 (13.3) 6.7 29.3 (13.3) 26.6 
UK Unionist Party 4.0 (4.0) 1.3 8.0 (8.0) 10.7 
Alliance Party 12.0 (10.7) 8.0 10.7 (10.7) 14.7 
Parties in the South  30.7 (29.3) 12.0 17.3 (17.3) 21.3 
Ethnic minorities 36.0 (29.3) 13.3 16.0 (14.7) 18.75 
 
* In brackets are the percentages stating such contact occurred ‘only when required’. 
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the concerns over policing may have been driven by alternative viewpoints. 
Republicans being more concerned with legitimacy and Loyalists with the inactivity 
of the PSNI regarding the growth in criminal activity (Table 5.3). 
 
5.4.1 The contacts 
 
Former prisoners involved in community work were asked if, as a result of that work, 
they had had contact with people with different political perspectives, both within and 
outside their own community (Table 5.4). More Republican (56%) compared to 
Loyalist former prisoners, (44%) stated that such work had led to contact with people 
from other political perspectives. This probably reflected the greater numbers of 
Republicans who were involved in community work. While the highest percentages 
of contacts were with other political perspectives within the broad Republican and 
Loyalist ideologies, there were also relatively small but still significant contacts 
across the divide, indicating, perhaps, the role that former prisoners can play in 
conflict transformation. Nearly a third of Loyalists and Republicans had made contact 
with Sinn Féin. There was more contact between Loyalists and Sinn Féin than with 
the SDLP. Twenty eight percent of Republican prisoners had been in contact with the 
PUP. Interestingly, excepting only the PUP, more Loyalists had contact with Sinn 
Féin than with any of the Unionist groups within their own area. This may reflect the 
marginalisation Loyalists feel with respect to the other Unionist groups (see Chapter 
6) but also some openness to conflict transformation possibilities. 
 
The reasons for such exchanges were extensive (Table 5.5). Almost half of 
Republican respondents (46.7%) and a third of Loyalists stated that contacts were 
linked to community work. Around a fifth of all activities involved prisoner projects, 
interface work, dealing with unrest between communities and political development 
work. Socialising proved a less common reason for inter-group co-operation. 
 
Table 5.5: Reasons for contacts with people of different political perspectives 
(percentage Republican and Loyalist respondents) 
 
 Republican Loyalist 
 
 Former 
prisoners 
Former 
prisoners 
Community work 46.7 32.0 
Former prisoner 
project 
18.7 22.7 
Community initiative 29.3 21.3 
Interface project 22.7 28.0 
Unrest/tension 26.7 24.0 
Political work 21.3 18.7 
Socialising 10.7 4.0 
 
5.4.2 Awareness of and attitudes to contacts between former prisoners 
 
Loyalist former prisoners and their relatives were questioned about their awareness of 
dialogue between former prisoners, political groups, state agencies and ethnic 
minorities (Table 5.6). They were also asked to consider how they interpreted such 
 75
contacts. Over two-thirds of Republicans were aware of contact between Loyalists 
and Republicans compared to Loyalist prisoners (42.7%) and Loyalist relatives 
(40%). Large majorities in all four groups supported these contacts, the only 
substantial resistance coming from the 10.7% of Loyalist former prisoners who would 
not support such activities. A similar series of responses were found with relation to 
awareness of contact with state agencies, with over 80% of all respondents supporting 
such contacts. While respondents, more especially Loyalists, tended to be less aware 
of contact between their respective groups and ethnic minorities, between three-
quarters and 80% of respondents supported such exchanges.  
 
Table 5.6: Awareness of and attitudes to contacts between former prisoners 
(percentage Republican and Loyalist respondents)  
 
 Republican 
 
Loyalist 
 Former 
prisoners 
 
Relatives Former 
prisoners 
Relatives 
Aware of contact between 
Loyalists and Republicans 
68.0 69.3 42.7 40.0 
Would support contact 82.7 86.5 69.3 72.0 
Not interested 0 8.1 5.3 8.0 
Too soon 2.7 2.7 4.0 6.7 
Would not support contact 1.3 0 10.7 2.7 
     
Aware of contact between 
Republicans/Loyalists and 
state agencies 
69.3 57.3 46.7 46.7 
Would support contact 80 69.3 81.3 82.7 
Not interested 0 10.7 5.3 9.3 
Too soon 2.7 2.7 2.7 0 
Would not support contact 1.3 2.7 2.7 1.3 
     
Aware of contact between 
Republicans/Loyalists and 
ethnic minorities 
60 44.0 28.0 24.0 
Would support contact 84 76.0 74.7 80.0 
Not interested 0 6.7 8.0 9.3 
Too soon 1.3 0 1.3 1.3 
Would not support contact 0 0 5.3 1.3 
 
When asked about the role of former prisoners in terms of peace building, a 
significant percentage (over 80%) of Loyalist and Republican former prisoners and 
relatives felt that the wider community did not understand the role former prisoners 
were playing to build peace in local communities. Many Loyalists were particularly 
annoyed at the ‘holier than thou’ attitudes of some of their detractors, who viewed 
them as ‘scum’. One Loyalist noted:  ‘quiet summers do not happen by accident’ 
(Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004), a statement that reflects the notion that 
groundwork undertaken by former prisoners has led to a reduction in potential 
interface violence.  
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5.5  Who are the victims? 
 
The issue of victimhood constitutes another important actual or potential constraint 
on the capabilities of former prisoner groups to work effectively within and without 
their communities. While impacting on the acceptability of those groups as agents of 
conflict transformation, attitudes to victimhood also help shape the ideologies of the 
groups. A large majority of respondents agreed that civilians were victims as were 
their own communities (Table 5.7). With the exception of Loyalist former prisoners, 
over 80% of respondents stated that their families had been victims. Eighty percent of 
Republican former prisoners and 77.3% of Republican relatives agreed that 
Republicans were victims compared to 48% of Loyalist former prisoners and 66.7% 
of Loyalist relatives. Nearly as many Republican (66.7%) as Loyalist former 
prisoners (70.6%) held that Loyalists were victims. There were relatively similar 
responses with regard to prisoners, although more Republican  (74.7%) than Loyalist 
former prisoners (58.6%) self-identified themselves as victims. 
 
Table 5.7: Attitudes to victimhood (percentage Republican and Loyalist 
respondents)  
     
 Republican Loyalist 
 Former prisoners Relatives Former prisoners Relatives 
 
 Agree/ 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Disagree
/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree/ 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Disagree
/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree/ 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Disagree
/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree/ 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Disagree
/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Civilians 88 0 82.6 1.3 83.3 1.3 93.4 0 
Your 
community 
93.3 0 92.0 0 81.4 0 93.3 0 
Your 
family 
85.3 0 84.0 4.0 69.3 1.3 81.3 0 
Republican
s 
80.0 1.3 77.3 4.0 48.0 10.6 66.7 2.7 
Former 
prisoners 
77.3 4 81.4 1.3 69.4 1.3 78.7 0 
Yourself 74.7 0 65.4 5.3 58.6 1.3 72.0 0 
Loyalists 66.7 5.3 53.3 14.5 70.6 0 86.7 0 
RUC/PSNI 40.0 30.6 20.0 52.0 49.3 8.0 73.3 0 
British 
Army 
37.3 33.4 18.7 57.4 58.7 6.6 76.0 0 
Prison 
Officers 
36.0 30.6 22.7 49.3 42.7 10.6 58.8 0 
Judiciary 30.6 36 13.4 52.0 38.6 13.3 56.0 0 
 
 
Comparable shares of Republican (40%) and Loyalist former prisoners (49.3%) stated 
that police officers were victims, although 30.6% of the Republican former prisoner 
group disagreed with this proposition compared to only 8% of Loyalists. The 
difference was much more marked in the responses from relatives, three quarters of 
Loyalist relatives believing that RUC members had been victims, compared to only 
one-fifth of Republican relatives. Interestingly, more Republican relatives (52%) than 
former prisoners argued that police officers were not victims. Unsurprisingly, 
Loyalists were more likely than Republicans to regard the British Army as victims 
although the percentage (58.7%) is perhaps less clear-cut than might be anticipated; 
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however, only 6.6% of Loyalist former prisoners disagreed with this proposition 
compared to 33.4% of Republicans. As one Loyalist explained: 
 
A lot of Loyalists who became involved in the conflict did so 
because they had an empathy with security forces and that is 
reflected in the figures. When Republicans killed security forces they 
were attacking us – they still can’t get their heads round that. 
(Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December 2004). 
  
That said, however, there seemed to be differences among some Loyalist former 
prisoners in their attitudes towards the different types of security forces. While they 
generally viewed the British Army as victims fewer were prepared to make the same 
assessment about local security personnel. Only slightly more Loyalist than 
Republican former prisoners agreed that the RUC/PSNI (49.3%), Prison Officers 
(42.7%) and the Judiciary (38.6%) were ‘victims’ though fewer disagreed with this 
than had Republicans.  
 
Only 36% of Republican former prisoners regarded prison officers as victims, 
although this was still greater than the 30.6% who disagreed. Republicans said that 
there was still a great deal of hostility towards prison officers over their treatment of 
Republican prisoners during ‘the blanket’ and other protests and one Republican 
stated that he was less inclined to view them as victims because they had received 
large salaries and thus had benefited more from the conflict than most. Of all the 
categories the judiciary were the least likely to be described as victims. 
 
One interesting result from the survey is that fewer Republican relatives than former 
prisoners were prepared to identify ‘victims’ in all categories. This difference was 
particularly pronounced when it came to describing opponents who were directly 
involved in the conflict. Whereas a majority of relatives termed Loyalists as ‘victims’, 
at 53.3% this was well below the 66.7% of former prisoners who termed them as  
 
Table 5.8: Attitudes to conflict (percentage Republican and Loyalist respondents) 
  
 Republican 
 
Loyalist 
 Former prisoners 
 
Relatives Former prisoners Relatives 
 
 
Agree/ 
Strongly 
Agree 
Disagree/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree/ 
Strongly 
Agree 
Disagree/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree/ 
Strongly 
Agree 
Disagree
Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree/ 
Strongly 
Agree 
Disagree/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
‘Harm’ was caused to 
all sides in the conflict 
89.4 4.0 94.7 4.0 90.7 9.3 88.0 8.0 
‘Harm’ caused 
includes inequality 
and/or discrimination 
96.0 0 98.7 0 89.4 10.6 80.0 6.7 
 ‘Harm’ caused to my 
community and to 
others should be 
commemorated  
92.0 1.3 92.0 1.3 94.7 2.7 82.6 2.6 
Understanding the 
causes of ‘harm’ can 
contribute to building 
a new society 
96.0 0 93.3 0 100 0 82.6 2.6 
‘Harm caused remains 
an impediment to 
building a new 
73.4 9.4 78.7 8.0 84.0 5.3 77.4 12.0 
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society’ 
‘Issue of harm caused 
may not have been 
resolved but wider 
peace building 
initiatives should 
continue’  
68.0 0 68.0 0 61.3 1.3 52.0 1.3 
 
‘victims’. Furthermore, the 14.5% of relatives who disagreed/strongly disagreed that 
Loyalists were ‘victims’ was significantly above the 5.3% of former prisoners who 
concurred. Republican relatives were also less likely than former prisoners to regard 
the British Army and the RUC/PSNI as ‘victims’. One possible reason for the 
difference between the responses of Republican relatives and former prisoners might 
be the ongoing involvement of so many of the latter in both political and conflict 
transformation work.  
 
Finally, respondents were asked to consider the impact of harm with regard to conflict 
related issues (Table 5.8). Harm was defined as ‘inflicting physical, psychological or 
emotional trauma’. Unsurprisingly, given the findings regarding victimhood, the 
majority of respondents agreed that harm was caused to all sides in the conflict. No 
Republicans disagreed with the statement that ‘harm caused includes inequality 
and/or discrimination’, compared to 10.6% and 6.7% of Loyalist former prisoners and 
relatives respectively. There were also significantly positive responses to the 
propositions: ‘harm caused to my community and to others should be 
commemorated’; and that ‘understanding the causes of ‘harm’ can contribute to 
building a new society’. Over three-quarters of all respondents noted that ‘harm 
caused remains an impediment to building a new society’, with at least 60% from the 
Republican groups and Loyalist prisoner group agreed that ‘issues of harm caused 
may not have been resolved but wider peace building initiatives should continue.’ 
Just over half of Loyalist relatives agreed within this latter proposition.  
 
5.6 Summary 
 
Although there are significant differences between Republican and Loyalist former 
prisoners and their relatives in their responses to this section of the questionnaire, 
there still does appear to be implications of a common ground that the experience of 
imprisonment and release can be used positively in terms of conflict transformation. 
Many prisoners felt that their experience of the conflict and prison could be used to 
help others particularly as a ‘deterrent to young people’ and to ‘show the motivations 
and help explain the cause’ of the conflict. The sentiment of numerous comments was 
that lessons should be learnt from those involved in the conflict so as not to repeat 
them. Clearly, however, the same experiences have produced impediments to the role 
of former prisoners in the transition from conflict to conflict transformation. To 
reiterate, these are: 
 
• the ‘disabling’ and alienation of former prisoners through their personal 
responses to imprisonment and release; 
 
• criminalisation; 
 
• the differing attitudes of their own communities which have the cumulative 
effect of making Republicans more effective in the former prisoner role; 
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• the legacy of the conflict and the contested nature of victimhood. 
 
In Chapter 6, we move to examine the significance of these impediments through the 
idea of conflict transformation within and without the respective communities. 
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Chapter 6: Former Prisoners and Conflict Transformation Both 
Within and Without Their Communities 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Former prisoners have three specific roles to play within their respective 
communities: they: 
 
• are involved in the transformation of attitudes and the infrastructural 
reconstruction of those communities and in the relationships between them; 
 
• seek to influence policy for these areas but also policy as it reflects on former 
prisoners;  
 
• are more broadly involved in the creation of community narratives linked to 
current post-ceasefires political processes; this includes such dimensions as 
human stories of ‘who we are and where we come from’ and the history of the 
conflict and its transformation.  
 
In pursuing these goals, former prisoners encounter the exclusions and impediments 
discussed in the previous Chapter, specifically criminalisation and stigmatisation. 
These factors impact on the capacity of former prisoners to deliver conflict 
transformation, as do salient differences between the two communities and the 
contrasting attitudes to former prisoners within each.  
 
This Chapter extends the findings of the questionnaire survey with a detailed 
examination of the qualitative evidence gathered in the project and addresses the 
specific capacity of former prisoners to contribute to conflict transformation by 
working both within and without their respective communities. It is also concerned 
with a more detailed analysis of the factors constraining the capacity of former 
prisoners to contribute to conflict transformation. The Chapter is divided into four 
sections which deal successively with: 
 
• the leadership capacities of former prisoners in conflict transformation; 
 
• the constraints on former prisoners as agents of conflict transformation both 
within and without their communities; 
 
• working within from both Loyalist and Republican perspectives; 
 
• working without from two perspectives: with each other; and with the state 
and its agencies. 
 
6.2 Former prisoners, leadership and conflict transformation 
 
The fate of former prisoners and combatants in the process of transition from conflict 
has been widely recognised as central to attempts at peacemaking. In some of the 
most lengthy and complex armed conflicts, the failures in planning and delivery in 
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finding new roles for former armed actors has been viewed as highly destabilising for 
nascent transitional processes. The traditional focus of much of this kind of work has 
been to break up armed groups as quickly as possible and remove their weapons in 
order to better protect and provide security. However more recently, the gaze of the 
international community on this issue has shifted somewhat. As Kofi Annan argued in 
a speech in Derry, peace cannot be secured without: 
 
….providing the fighters with an alternative, peaceful means of 
earning their living. Nowadays we no longer contemplate 
demobilisation and disarmament – the two “D’s” – without adding 
an “R”, which stands for reintegration into the civilian economy. 
Without this, it is a virtual certainty that new weapons will be 
acquired and violence will resume (Annan, 2004).  
 
In Northern Ireland, it is important to note that many former prisoners have been 
focused on making a much broader impact upon the process than merely securing 
their own rights and entitlements. In fact, it is our contention that many former 
combatants and former prisoners have provided leadership – or have the capacity to 
do so - in preventing the resumption of organised political and communal violence. 
Before going on to discuss that claim in more detail, it is important to enter two 
caveats.  
 
First, we are not suggesting that all former prisoners are necessarily ‘leaders’ in the 
traditional sense. As already shown above, some Loyalist and Republican former 
prisoners have been long since disassociated from their respective movements to re-
establish a ‘normal’ life for themselves and their families. Even amongst those who 
have retained their allegiances in different fashions, some of these former prisoners 
might baulk at the description of themselves as even having been ‘leaders’ rather than 
footsoldiers. However, the notion of leadership we are suggesting is more subtle than 
individuals who ‘give orders’ which are in turn obeyed by others further down a 
hierarchical structure. From this perspective, former prisoners who are, for example, 
involved in community work and community-based restorative justice programmes, 
seeking to calm tensions at interface areas, or in reconciliation or ‘nation building’ 
work, are all providing different forms of leadership in the transition from and 
prevention of conflict.  
 
Secondly, it is also important to stress that we are not postulating some form of naive 
eulogising of all of those who once took up arms. As in any post-conflict situation, of 
course, some former prisoners may become involved in individual acts of political or 
sectarian violence or individual criminality. At an organisational level, certainly it is 
possible to argue cogently that at least one of the paramilitary organisations whose 
members benefited from early release provisions under the Belfast Agreement (the 
UDA) has largely morphed into a criminal gang involved in drug dealing, 
racketeering and prostitution (McDonald and Cusack, 2004). In addition, UVF 
members have also been involved in drugs and ordinary criminality (McDonald and 
Cusack, 2000). While the IRA has not been credibly linked to drug dealing or 
distribution, its long tradition of robberies, smuggling and related criminality to fund 
the Republican ‘cause’ has allegedly survived beyond the ceasefires of ‘military’ 
operations in the mid 1990s (Neuman, 2002). It is also obvious that members of the 
respective organisations have been involved in punishment attacks.  
 82
 83
 
The fixation upon criminality and other violent acts has subverted the public discourse 
regarding the positive role that former prisoners have played. Much of the public 
discourse appears to  promote a notion of such groups as a cabal within which the 
realities of debate regarding an appropriate future and role in civic society is hidden. 
The argument on the role of former prisoners has generally focused on specific events 
and, in so doing, does not place such events within a wider context of transitional 
politics. These evident difficulties, as outlined above, and the general presentation of 
them have denied alternative interpretations of such incidents. This does not mean that 
such difficulties are unimportant but they should be contextualised with regard to 
other positive positions and influences that have emanated from within former 
prisoner groups.  
 
It is possible to identify at least three overlapping styles of leadership by ex-
combatants with regard to political transition.  
 
6.2.1 Political leadership  
 
There is a considerable literature on leadership in general and the notion of political 
leadership in particular (e.g. Burns, 1978; Blondel, 1987; Gardner, 1995; Elcock, 
2001). Of particular interest for current purposes is that work which focuses upon the 
way that political leaders prepare, cajole and sometimes even bully their 
constituencies in national and international peacemaking processes (Sheffer, 1993; 
Westlake, 2000). Much of that work also considers the intersection between agency 
and structure, the ways in which individual actors transform themselves from armed 
actors to negotiators often as a result of changed political circumstances (McGarry, 
1998; Gormley-Heenan, 2001). At a general level, the political leadership provided by 
former prisoners in Northern Ireland has been obvious. Most of those who negotiated 
the Belfast Agreement from the Republican and Loyalist parties were former 
prisoners who had been convicted of politically motivated offences committed during 
the conflict (Mitchell, 2000). Indeed, many are quite candid that the negotiation skills 
employed were actually learned in their dealings with the prison regime when 
incarcerated (Sinnerton, 2003). In addition, both sets of protagonists have 
demonstrated finely honed antennae as to the potential for ‘stretching’ their political 
base and considerable dexterity at overcoming seemingly insurmountable political 
difficulties.  
 
Such skills have also been evidenced at the micro-level through various community-
based initiatives. In the working-class Republican and Loyalist communities in which 
such peacemaking activities take place, former prisoners are largely regarded as 
having ‘done their bit’ on behalf of their communities. While, as we discuss below, 
there are important differences between the attitudes of the two communities, the ex-
combatants involved in community-based work do on the whole bring a considerable 
degree of credibility, respect and legitimacy to such programmes. As one former 
Republican prisoner commented: 
 
Locally ex-prisoners are involved in every aspect of their 
communities. Community Restorative Justice is an example where 
ex-prisoners are involved – trying to provide an alternative form of 
response to anti-social behaviour. Housing committees, community 
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groups. I mean they are activists. They went to jail for activism – a 
different type of activism but they are passionate about righting 
wrong, about bringing about change for people in these areas. And 
that type of culture is there still, despite people being released. They 
are giving leadership to people in their areas and they are leading by 
example, they are getting involved (Republican: Workshop 24th June 
2004). 
 
The community-based restorative justice programmes in Republican and Loyalist 
areas are a useful illustration of the kind of leadership under discussion. Since their 
inception, the presence of former prisoners in these programmes has been a defining 
feature (McEvoy and Mika, 2001, 2002). The quality of their work has increasingly 
garnered recognition, even  from the most critical of sources: 
 
…we have received evidence which we find convincing that 
community restorative justice can under the right conditions help 
offer alternatives to paramilitary violence and intimidation. To the 
extent that it can do this, can operate accountably and to acceptable 
standards, fully respect human rights, and can demonstrate to people 
that they need not look to paramilitaries to deliver reasonable 
behaviour within their communities, we believe that it can have a 
valuable part to play (IMC, 2004:  36). 
 
As well as their previous organisational and ‘jail time’ experience, many former 
prisoners have also been involved in community work for years. The effect of 
working with and subscribing to values of non-violence, human rights, inclusiveness, 
and so forth across a range of community settings is to provide considerable small ‘p’ 
political leadership in transforming community attitudes to violence.  
 
6.2.2 Military leadership   
 
Leadership is holistic. Leadership means leading laterally or 
collaboratively, and not just from upper echelons. Leadership entails 
leading the people, the structure, the process…Leadership is 
symbolic. Leadership is about the influence of meanings and 
interpretations that important constituencies give to the 
organization’s function (Paparone, 2004: 9).18
 
Within military studies generally, there is an increased recognition that the notion of 
leadership is much more complex than giving orders through rigid hierarchical 
structures and expecting them to be carried out (e.g. Mathews, 2002). Certainly the 
more sophisticated literature on the ways in which volunteer paramilitary 
organisations ‘think’ suggests that the exercise of leadership in a process of change is 
much more likely to be based on internal discourses, relationships, organisational 
cultures and mythologies than simply instructions being issued from the upper 
echelons and obeyed by the rank-and-file (Crenshaw, 1990; Irvin, 1999). Again, the 
notion of credibility is central to this behavioural response rather than an instrumental 
approach to military leadership. Put simply, unless those who bring the peacemaking 
                                                 
18 Colonel Paparone is an Instructor at the US Army War College. 
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message have credibility amongst current paramilitary activists and can frame it 
appropriately within the organisation’s way of thinking, the message will not be 
heeded.  
 
As one former Loyalist prisoner commented : 
 
I think the analysis we give to the UVF has been good. It has been 
instrumental in a lot of interface issues and in that some responses 
have been measured. Since the ceasefires you can see the effect of 
good leadership. Other than interface stuff the organisations have 
been very disciplined. That has involved former prisoner analysis. If 
it wasn’t for the rednecks things would be a lot better (Loyalist: 
Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
Again the work of former prisoners and former combatants in the community-based 
restorative justice programmes is instructive. As well as working and volunteering in 
these programmes, former prisoners have been central to efforts at persuading 
paramilitary organisations to desist from punishment violence, to refer ‘complainants’ 
from the community to the programmes and to consider their own internal 
organisational attitudes towards violence. The Director of Alternatives,19 himself a 
former UVF life-sentenced prisoner, conducted the original research and interviews 
with the UVF which led to the establishment of the programme (Winston, 1997). The 
Director of Community Restorative Justice Ireland (CRJI), which is based in working-
class Republican communities, is a former internee who was one of four individuals 
involved in direct dialogue with the IRA and other Republicans which led to the 
establishment of the programmes on the Republican side (Auld et al, 1997). Many 
others working on the programmes have served lengthy sentences for the respective 
organisations so no-one within the respective constituency can question their past 
commitment. Together with other ex-combatants, and again precisely because of their 
collective credibility with the respective paramilitary groupings, they have been 
involved in countless peacemaking efforts with such groups.  
 
Such a process of persuasion or leadership in trying to move paramilitary 
organisations onwards should not be understood as either smooth or easy. For 
example, in agreeing to cooperate with the establishment of Alternatives, the UVF 
inserted a number of caveats where they would reserve the right to shoot or beat 
particular individuals (McEvoy and Mika, 2002). Similarly, while the IRA has 
cooperated with the CRJI programmes in the areas where programmes are established, 
they have continued beatings and shootings in other areas, at least up until the recent 
announcement that the organisations was moving to a new exclusively peaceful mode. 
Involvement in peacemaking work is not without its personal risks, particularly for 
former Loyalist prisoners. As one former Loyalist prisoner argued : 
 
You could be shot dead – it’s as simple as that!  If you criticise about 
drug houses or individuals involved in drugs then those type of 
people want to do you as much damage as possible – they have the 
most to lose from the political and peace processes. It applies across 
                                                 
19 The programme was originally called Greater Shankill Alternatives but has since expanded 
and been renamed Northern Ireland Alternatives.  
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the board. It terms of military leadership for example, if you try to 
clamp down on these people, the ones who are making a living from 
drugs or whatever, then you are making enemies (Loyalist: 
Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
  
Despite these difficulties, it is through the leadership and persuasion efforts of former 
prisoners involved in initiatives such as restorative justice that we have seen 
significant reductions in punishment violence in the areas where the projects are 
operational, as well as changes (for the better) in the ways in which local paramilitary 
organisations conduct their ‘policing’ activities such as referring cases to one of the 
schemes rather than punishing alleged anti-social offenders (Mika, 2004).  
 
As was noted above, former prisoners have played a prominent role in other key 
aspects of the conflict transformation process. For example, they were at the forefront 
of the internal discussions within Loyalism and Republicanism which led to the 
production of two documents concerning the respective constituencies’ attitudes 
towards truth recovery processes (Eolas, 2003; EPIC, 2005). Outside their own 
immediate base, both Loyalist and Republican former prisoners have played 
significant roles in other truth-focused civil society initiatives such as Healing 
Through Remembering (2002) and participation in Glencree sponsored events. 
Similarly the efforts of former prisoners and others to reduce tension at interface areas 
and contentious marches have been widely viewed as a key element in the 
comparatively peaceful marching seasons in recent years (Jarman, 2004). In addition, 
the current internal debate within the IRA, which has lead to the organisation 
‘standing down’, has been achieved through the stewardship of former Republican 
combatants, many of whom are also former prisoners.  
 
The prison experience, however, may not be the defining characteristic of the life 
history of many Republicans and Loyalists. Indeed some former prisoners bridle at the 
constant reference back to their time served in prison, pointing out with some 
justification that their identities are not ‘frozen’ as former prisoners, but rather the 
prison experience is but one part of their broader identity as political and military 
activists. None the less for current purposes, the fact that the prison experience is such 
a common one amongst older members of paramilitary organisations means that the 
former prisoner role has been central in providing leadership in the transition from 
conflict.  
 
6.2.3 Moral leadership and community building  
 
The third overlapping style of leadership provided by former combatants and former 
prisoners is the notion of transformative or moral leadership in the process of 
community building. As Burns has argued:   
 
…transforming leadership ultimately becomes moral in that it raises 
the level of human conduct and ethical aspirations of both leader and 
led, and thus has a transforming effect on both (1978: 20).  
 
The issues of community building and the attention paid to the needs of former 
combatants are strongly connected (Babo-Soares, 2004; Verwip and Verpoorten, 
2004). Indeed the process of being involved in community development work also 
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guards against elitist tendencies which are sometimes identified with those who have 
been involved directly in armed struggle (e.g. Irvin, 1999). None the less, involvement 
by ex-combatants in strong and independent community organisations - utilising their 
existing organisational and political skills as well as demonstrating a willingness to 
learn new ones – is an appropriately balanced organic relationship between such 
individuals and the communities from which they come.     
 
Among both Republicans and Loyalists, the breadth of work has included 
campaigning on a vast range of issues on behalf of former prisoners and local 
communities. These include: improved services, facilities and rights; establishing 
local employment and economic development schemes in local communities; welfare, 
education, counselling, advisory and advocacy roles; the establishment of advice 
centres, family projects, counselling services, children’s activities, social activities, 
classes, campaigning for the rights of former prisoners and their families and 
organising meetings and tours for individual and groups; and working on interfaces to 
reduce tensions, especially at time of heightened risk (Shirlow, 2001; Coiste, 2003a, 
2004). As the Director of Coiste, for example, has argued:  
 
Our member groups at local level are actively pursuing dialogue and 
debate with people from perspectives traditionally hostile to 
Republicanism in order to increase understanding and build 
relationships (Ritchie, 2002).  
 
In both communities, as with political and military leadership, the key attribute which 
former prisoners bring to the process of moral leadership is the notion of credibility. 
As one former Loyalist prisoner suggested : 
 
Because of the background that former prisoners have they have 
been able to argue successfully for moderation in terms of dealing 
with conflict. It’s difficult for people in the community to accuse 
them of unwillingness to engage in violence if it is necessary. If they 
advocate a non-violent response it tends to be respected more by the 
community (Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
Community building around issues such as the injustices of the past or exclusionary 
practices against anti-social offenders is key in the process of political transition. 
Former prisoners argue that as individuals who have been directly involved in 
committing acts of political violence former prisoners are suitably placed to make the 
arguments to local communities about the difficulties that such practices can create.  
 
As the same Loyalist former prisoner cited above argued: 
 
If it was an ordinary member of the community, they might be 
accused of cowardice for not engaging in conflict but they cant very 
well say that to a person who has lived that way before and came to 
the conclusion that there is better ways to do things. They also can 
provide leadership by encouraging people not to become involved in 
militarism and paramilitarism…In the early days of the conflict those 
who became involved didn’t have the benefit of people who had 
lived through a conflict to give them advice. Now younger people 
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who may be tempted to go down that road, have the luxury of having 
someone who has lived the experience and drawn different 
conclusions (Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
The notion of ‘moral leadership’ provided by former paramilitaries may strike some 
as counter-intuitive. To take such a view, however, is to conflate judgements 
concerning the morality (or indeed lack of moral justification) of engaging in extreme 
acts of political violence during a conflict with the potential for moral acts in 
subsequent processes of conflict transformation. Indeed it is precisely because of their 
violent pasts that many former prisoners are ideally placed to provide leadership. For 
those who have both inflicted and been on the receiving end of extreme violence, 
often it holds little allure. Their rejection of the efficacy of violence as a strategy is 
itself a powerful exercise in both moral leadership and community capacity building.  
 
6.3  The constraints on former prisoners as agents of conflict transformation 
 
Politically motivated former prisoners of whichever hue share a common concern that 
there is no influx of young people into their groupings who might eventually replace 
those with direct prison experience and developed leadership skills. The principles 
that sustain conflict transformation include education, active citizenship and 
community ideology. Obviously, the definition of such broad concepts will vary, 
given the contrasting attitudes to the state. Conflict transformation is also about the 
creation of ‘social capital’ and ‘capacity building’, terms that reflect the language of 
funders rather than former prisoners. Money, however, will not sustain conflict 
transformation and the shifting agendas of funders may militate against the 
dissemination of its principles and ideology. Funders are more likely to be concerned 
with tangible outputs such as skills training, whereas conflict transformation, which 
certainly has social and economic dimensions, also reflects less tangible but equally 
important cultural issues. 
 
Given that there are variations in the effective capacity of Loyalist and Republican 
former prisoners to deliver results, and that former prisoner groups and funders may 
have different agendas, what can former prisoners contribute to the process of conflict 
transformation?  Both Loyalist and Republican individuals and groups involved in 
this project have a shared concern with the deprivation of working-class areas in 
North and West Belfast and the needs for community regeneration and programmes 
such as restorative justice. They have an understanding of each other, which builds 
upon the shared experience of prison, but also more recently acquired mutual skills in 
preparing applications for funding and dealing with the agendas of funding agencies.  
 
Interestingly, as shown in the results of the questionnaire survey, relatives of former 
prisoners had significantly more entrenched attitudes to the ‘other’ than the former 
prisoners themselves. In being more open to the ‘other’, the latter can also bring 
analytical, reflective and organisational skills to conflict transformation and thus, 
based on experience, possess an expertise and ability to engage with the issues and 
each other. For Republicans, former prisoner status also brings credibility to conflict 
transformation although that is much less likely to be the case in Loyalist areas. A 
shared openness and expertise in the skills that can deliver conflict transformation and 
agreement on its desirability should not obscure, however, the vital point that 
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irreconcilable ideological differences still separate Loyalist and Republican politically 
motivated former prisoners. 
 
Moreover, the effectiveness of former prisoners in delivering leadership whether 
political, moral or even military, is constrained by the impediments under which they 
work. Some have been disenfranchised altogether by the experiences of imprisonment 
and release and have ‘disappeared’ back into their own communities. This seems a 
more likely outcome for Loyalist former prisoners, many of whom simply went back 
to their previous forms of employment, accepting prison as the price to pay. For 
Republicans, however, former prisoner groups and their activities can be seen as 
constituting another mode of resistance which offsets the negative impacts of 
criminalisation. As a generalisation, therefore, Republican former prisoners have a 
higher status in their own communities than that accorded to their counterparts in 
Loyalist areas. Republican former prisoners, are ‘everywhere’ as community activists, 
reflecting the point that, unlike Loyalists, their stigmatisation is only without the 
community rather than both without and within.  
 
If you throw a stone in any direction say in the New Lodge – there’s 
former prisoners involved in whatever, residents’ groups, training, 
welfare (Republican: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
This difference also reflects the fragmentation of Loyalism between the two principal  
paramilitary blocs, the UDA and UVF. Arguably, the UVF/PUP is the only Loyalist 
grouping with a developed ideological basis for its activities, but Loyalism does 
appear to be irrevocably disparate and local, a situation that creates the factions and 
feuds between the UVF/LVF-UDA and even within organisations. The UDA has had 
little involvement in conflict transformation:  
 
People from a UVF/RHC background seem to want to engage, but 
for whatever reason, people from a UDA background don’t 
(Republican: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
 
While the history of Republicanism does not necessarily constitute the smooth, linear 
narrative often claimed by the movement, it clearly is characterised by a more 
centrally shared ideology and coherent infrastructure when compared to Loyalism. 
Arguably, these different mindsets are reflected in the varying capacities of Loyalist 
and Republican former prisoner groups in conflict transformation. Loyalist delivery 
tends to be at the local scale of micro-communities divorced from macro-politics; the 
Republicans also deliver at the local scale but have much more clearly defined 
linkages to the macro-scale. In particular, this is expressed in the ways in which 
conflict transformation is viewed through the filter of collusion – which fits into the 
Republican colonial mindset – and the belief that the state is not an honest broker.  
 
Other differences stem from the varying responses to criminalisation. As explained in 
Chapter 4, both Loyalist and Republican former prisoners are stigmatised by the 
criminalisation policies invoked by the British government. For Loyalists, however, 
that stigma also helps define their position within their own communities whereas, for 
Republicans, the status of former prisoner is a ‘badge of honour’, denoting activists 
imprisoned by the British state for their part in the war against that state but also now 
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continuing the ‘struggle’ by other means. These issues are discussed in greater detail 
below but their more general significance again lies in the varying capacities of 
Loyalist and Republican former prisoners to contribute to conflict transformation.  
 
The different repercussions of criminalisation can be summed up thus: 
 
• transitional dialogue is promoted by shared experiences of prison; 
 
• but there are different Republican and Loyalist understandings of 
criminalisation; 
 
• for Republicans, criminalisation was part of the apparatus used by the British 
state to depoliticise the conflict whereas they insist on the British government 
as being a principal party to the conflict; 
 
• for Loyalists, the scale of engagement is much more local; criminalisation was 
a mode of suffering, something to be endured for the greater good of 
Unionism within a structure of the Ulsterisation of state forces and 
normalisation; the Republicans were fighting the state but because of 
Ulsterisation, the ‘dead’ were Unionists. 
 
These various differences between Republican and Loyalist former prisoner 
groupings can be used to inform the discussion of working within, working without. 
 
6.4  Working within 
 
6.4.1  The Loyalist perspective 
 
As we have suggested, the capacity of Loyalist former prisoners to work within their 
own communities is seriously compromised by the stigmatisation resulting from 
criminalisation. In addition, those communities themselves have very different 
histories to their Republican counterparts. Unlike Republicanism, Loyalism has no 
culture or history of political prisoners, of going outside the law. Instead, Loyalists 
wore uniforms: 
 
We just put on a B Specials uniform or police uniform and you could 
shoot as many people as you want  (Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 
2004). 
 
Middle Unionism is doubly alienated. Loyalist former prisoners are working on 
behalf of: 
 
a community within a community…an underclass [marginalised] by 
middle Unionists, the media…middle Unionism doesn’t like [conflict 
transformation] because they don’t want a working class 
movement…The other thing is social engineering which is 
destroying our communities. North Belfast has lost 50-60,000 
people…The peace process has meant absolutely nothing to them 
[inner-city working class]…Educational disadvantage within 
working class Protestant communities is abysmal. Those who are 
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trying to take a lead are ex-POWs and there are very few of us 
(Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
Middle Unionism also expects Loyalist former prisoners to be criminals whose 
presence stigmatises and criminalises entire communities. To some extent, this 
ignores the fragmentation of Loyalism and regards former prisoners through the ‘hard 
man’ or gangster perspective of the UDA (which in colouring Republican attitudes to 
Loyalist former prisoners allows the former to portray themselves as being somehow 
more principled and ideologically consistent). This is not to deny, however, that such 
criminalisation exists: 
 
What we’re seeing is the criminalisation of whole communities 
within Loyalist areas…by the selective handling and protection of 
key individuals involved in criminality. Drugs have been put into our 
community…[creating] a criminal culture [organised] by the lowest 
element in Loyalist communities, that means the whole community is 
stigmatised by the media, politicians and in some cases by 
Nationalists. It’s come to the stage now that many ex-POWs are 
afraid to build an extension, buy a new car or own their own house 
because they’ll be stigmatised as drug dealers, criminals or gangsters 
(Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
In the Loyalist Focus Group meeting, this issue of stigmatisation emerged as the key 
issue in constraining the effectiveness of Loyalist former prisoners in working within 
their own communities. At best, they receive only grudging recognition from the 
communities and even from their families:  as one participant observed: 
 
I would say that there is a greater understanding from Republican 
politicians that what there would be among Unionists in terms of the 
role that former prisoners can play…one of the ironies is that among 
the Catholic/Nationalist community, I would find a better 
understanding of my position in life…there is not the same prejudice 
(Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December 2004). 
 
The Loyalist former prisoners expressed no sense of continuing the war by other 
means: the nationality war is over and the key issues are now those of their own 
communities and, in particular, their criminalisation by the drugs which are 
destroying those communities. ‘Republicans are in denial on drugs’, said one 
participant, commenting on the questionnaire findings that almost two-thirds (61.3%) 
of Loyalist former prisoners cited drugs as being the most important key issue 
affecting their community.  
 
Unlike their Republican counterparts, Loyalist former prisoners are working within 
their communities, not specifically as former prisoners or in former prisoner groups, 
but in community organisations that also include former prisoners. Thus EPIC is 
concerned with a ‘Protestant’ way of doing things, of empowering communities and 
with giving people ownership of their own communities. Republican former prisoner 
community organisations are different, being aligned to the macro-politics of Sinn 
Féin. 
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But even the presence of a former prisoner may be sufficient to stigmatise the group, 
or community centre: 
 
Take the centre I work in. It is a church based centre employing both 
Protestants and Catholics. As far as the DUP is concerned – this is a 
UVF centre (Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December 2004). 
 
The further difficulty is, however, that – as discussed below – this selfsame labelling 
and stereotyping applies to the relationships between Loyalist former prisoners and 
statutory agencies. Such constraints are crucial to the effectiveness of Loyalist former 
prisoners in conflict transformation. 
  
6.4.2 The Republican perspective 
 
As we have suggested, there are very marked contrasts between the status of 
Republican and Loyalist former prisoners within their respective communities. In the 
first instance, Republicanism has a long historical experience of imprisonment in the 
1940s, 1950s and 1960s and therefore, as explained in Chapter 2, prisoner welfare 
groups were a ‘natural response’ once internment without trial was introduced in 
1971. Also, a number of Republican former prisoners were already involved in 
community work before they went to prison and returned to this on release, whereas 
Loyalists went back to their trades and other forms of employment. One participant in 
the Republican Focus Group argued that Republicans also had a more inclusive and 
embracing definition than Loyalists of ‘community work’ which could involve a 
whole gamut of activities including: economic and infrastructural development; 
community support; festivals; and sport (particularly the GAA).  
 
Secondly, it is contended that the cumulative Republican experience of being 
imprisoned  ‘was much more positive for Republicans than Loyalists’ (Republican: 
Focus Group 3rd December 2004). These ‘benefits’ included education (especially in 
the social sciences), ideological development and openness to philosophical 
developments such as feminism. There were also Republican women prisoners so 
gender issues are more important within Republican former prisoner groups 
compared to Loyalist communities where, as discussed in Chapter 3, the role of 
women has been to provide cultural and welfare support within a patriarchal society. 
This is one factor that makes Republican former prisoner groups more inclusive and 
also influential. The other is that there is no stigma to being a former prisoner: 
 
The community is with you in Republican areas: the community is 
against you in Loyalist areas (Republican: Focus Group, 3rd 
December 2004). 
 
Thus there are higher expectations of Republican former prisoners than their Loyalist 
counterparts whom the former regard as dupes of the state – or more charitably, 
victims of a ‘false consciousness’ – who have assumed criminality upon themselves. 
 
Thirdly, this lack of stigmatisation within extends to the democratic election by the 
Republican macro-community of the former prisoner leadership of Sinn Féin as their 
representatives. Former prisoner groups are thus seen as being legitimate and part of 
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the wider ideological and leadership structure of militant Republicanism. As Mike 
Ritchie, Director of Coiste, explains: 
 
I’ve often described ex-prisoners as middle managers in the Peace 
Process. Because of their experience and aptitudes they naturally 
take leadership roles in local communities.  When there are 
situations where most people would just head for home, potential riot 
situations, for example, ex-prisoners are likely to be the people who 
are trying to calm things down. That’s happened again and again on 
interfaces.  But also in terms of local community activity ex-
prisoners have commitment and drive. What they would see is they 
were involved in armed struggle as a way of acting out their 
community’s fears, concerns and aspirations. Now that there’s a 
ceasefire they are still committed to their community’s aspirations, 
fears and concerns so they’ll be to the fore in articulating them 
(Interview: 15th December 2004). 
 
Thus former prisoners form part of the war being waged by other means against the 
British state and its oppression, of which they themselves are victims. Thus not only 
are they struggling for the rights of deprived Republican communities but also for 
their own rights: 
 
We have always seen the main issue as the British government as the 
main party to the conflict and criminalisation was a deliberate policy 
by them to remove themselves from it (Republican: Workshop, 24th 
June 2004).  
 
Former prisoners will remain as such until the records of that criminalisation process 
are expunged. Meanwhile, they form part of the oppositional politics of 
Republicanism and Sinn Féin continues to organise awareness of their problems as do 
organisations such as Coiste via support for funding applications to various 
programmes, most especially EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation I and II.  
 
6.5  Working without 
 
The very different ways in which Loyalist and Republican former prisoners are 
regarded within their own communities is replicated in their dealings outside those 
communities (without). This means, inevitably, that the effects of exclusions and 
impediments vary between the two groups, as do the constraints on their activities and 
the extent of containment with respect to conflict transformation. The idea of working 
without refers both to the relationships of these groups with each other and also to the 
state and its agencies. It is readily apparent that ‘within’ and ‘without’ are 
interconnected domains in that the capacity to work within relates to that without and 
vice-versa.  
 
6.5.1 Working with each other 
  
It is the case that for both Loyalists and Republicans, mutual prison experiences 
paved the way for dialogue, originally built on simple, everyday exchanges. There 
was also the shared consciousness of working-class tradition.  
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In a kind of sense we’re from the same kind of working-class 
backgrounds…I think it was that sense of conditions that kind of 
paved the way for dialogue between us (Republican: Workshop, 
24th June 2004). 
 
As observed above, the shared experience of criminalisation has had negative impacts 
on the abilities of both Loyalist and Republican former prisoners to work with each 
other because part of its purpose was to separate the two blocs. 
 
We were the cannon fodder who were marched up to the top of the 
hill and like eejits we went over it…You had a whole community 
backing you and supporting you…a lot of those men from the 
Catholic church, even the most moderate of politicians…the 
criminalisation process succeeded because middle (mainstream) 
Unionism backed it…everyone in civic society were opposed to us – 
we were the criminals in this (Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004).  
 
Criminalisation as a policy was set out to define some people as 
criminals for a political purpose…the repercussions are still going 
on. Middle Unionism see themselves as legitimate, the RUC see 
themselves as legitimate, the British army see themselves as 
legitimate, everybody else isn’t and that’s not the way it is and that’s 
not the way it should be (Republican: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
But these experiences also have a value in their being shared: 
 
Everybody’s social experience is something similar…OK we’re not 
gonna resolve the constitutional or the national question but there’s a 
whole raft of social and economic issues which apply and which 
effect both communities in the same way (Republican: Workshop, 
24th June 2004). 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that this legacy of criminalisation and the strategies applied to 
achieve it have diminished the capacity of former prisoners to work without. Despite 
the small physical distances involved, there is often a sense of parallel worlds, of 
being interconnected but opting for a voluntary apartheid. Face-to-face contact, 
notwithstanding, fundamental misunderstandings remain between Republican and 
Loyalist former prisoners, as do stereotypical depictions of the other.  
 
Differences remain irreconcilable and Loyalists and Republicans continue to see the 
world from dissimilar perspectives and mindsets that can be paralysing for dialogue. 
The attitudes of both Loyalist and Republican former prisoners have been shaped too 
by events and experiences and there is no doubt that the legacy of violence against 
‘civilian’ targets) remains important to the psyche and reservations concerning 
working without.  
 
There is one further problem for Loyalist former prisoners in circumventing these 
barriers and impediments to conflict transformation. That is the major gap between 
Unionist macro-politics and the ‘real’ work on the ground which helps explain why 
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expectations of attainment with respect to conflict transformation are low-level. For 
EPIC, the biggest problem is the DUP and that legacy of criminalisation which 
prevents it being perceived as a legitimate expression of Loyalism. This was 
compounded by the IMC Report of April 2004 which recommended sanctioning the 
PUP, the principal Loyalist political organisation committed to conflict 
transformation. 
 
Given all the impediments, Loyalist former prisoners (as shown by EPIC) are well in 
advance of conventional politicians in working with Republicanism. This includes 
practical issues such as interface projects but also mutual attempts to understand 
opposing mindsets through studies of political theory and the multiple interpretations 
of shared histories. Loyalist former prisoners are likely to be more committed to 
conflict transformation than conventional politicians, have experience – no matter 
how imperfect - in dialogue with the other, and also experience in attempting to 
control militarism and paramilitarism in their own communities. The problem, 
however, is how far to go?  It is clear that Stormontgate (October 2003), despite 
contestation over its actuality, damaged cross-community linkages and is still seen as 
a breach of trust: 
 
For those of us involved in cross-community work, I don’t believe 
the spying was an attempt to do physical harm but there was a 
political espionage going on at a community level as well. When 
police were coming out and saying to people that these things were 
said about you at meetings. For a lot of the more reluctant members 
of our community who didn’t really approve of the value of 
engagement with Republicans, it gave them a stick to beat those of us 
who were engaged. We haven’t fully recovered from that episode 
yet. There’s still not the level of engagement that there was prior to 
Stormontgate. It was a big risk (Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December 
2004). 
 
Again:   
 
There’s a lot of progress that hasn’t been publicised [meetings]…we 
were making great progress and then when the “Stormontgate” thing 
came out, we got threats…Minutes of the meetings that we had been 
at with Republicans were, sections of them had been recorded which 
to us was a breach of trust…But we since got over that, we’re 
meeting people…We’re not meeting the great and the good, we’re 
meeting at the coalface (Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
In other words, working without is difficult, face-to-face and grinding work which 
depends on individuals and the personal contacts that former prisoners can establish 
between each other. 
 
For Republicans, working without is clearly impeded by their perceptions of 
territorially insular Loyalism versus ideological, ‘non-parochial’ Republicanism. The 
patronising attitudes – either conscious or unconscious – that Loyalists believe are 
sometimes expressed by Republican former prisoners toward them, stem both from 
conflicting interpretations of criminalisation and a recourse to stereotypes. As we 
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have seen, for Republicans criminalisation was an attempt by the British state to 
depoliticise the conflict into a ‘two tribes fighting’ scenario, whereas Republicans see 
the British government as a principal party to the conflict. For them, Loyalists are 
parochial and territorial, dupes of the British state, whereas Republicanism is 
ideological (seen as the antithesis of parochial): 
 
I found then quite insular in that they never really bothered looking 
at history, colonialism and I’ve always thought that if they did, the 
blinkers would fall of their eyes and they would see the reality here 
(Republican: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
 
Loyalists, therefore, are much less likely to take on the state whereas the ideology of 
Republican oppositional politics is that the state ‘is there to shit on you’ (Republican: 
Focus Group, 3rd December 2004)). There is a sense of lip service to the idea of 
interconnectedness but also one of passive dismissal along the lines of: ‘we really 
don’t know these people’ (who are about one mile away in physical terms if almost 
invisible in psychological distance). Republican former prisoner groups are working 
at the local level too but are connected much more effectively to macro-politics than 
are Loyalist former prisoners. Their community work is part of a greater whole and 
they derive additional legitimacy from that. Nevertheless, the thrust of their activities 
is within, not without. It is in the interconnections with the state and funding agencies 
that they function most effectively without: 
 
The Republicans have been successful in changing their military 
clout into political clout which Loyalists haven’t been able to do and 
are never likely to be able to do’ (Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 
2004). 
 
It must be reiterated that despite contact over several decades that the nature 
and volume of contact between loyalist and republican former prisoners has 
increased since the onset of public peace building strategies. Therefore the 
opportunity exists to move beyond present divisions and ambiguities. 
 
6.5.2      Working with the state and its agencies 
 
Former prisoners, particularly in the Republican communities where the issues are 
politically more sensitive, are also providing leadership towards the building of 
relations between the state agencies and communities which have traditionally been 
estranged from them. Nevertheless, the same issues of criminalisation, legitimacy and 
clashing perceptions of the other colour the relationships between former prisoners 
and the state agencies that control the funding on which they depend for work in 
conflict transformation and community regeneration. Loyalists have a keen perception 
that their criminalisation and the lack of legitimacy on the ground accorded them by 
macro-politics creates significant barriers: 
 
Personal baggage is hampering funding so we need recognition and 
legitimacy from our politicians (Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December 
2004). 
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The dissonance between effective work ‘on the ground’ and the impediments of 
macro-issues is a recurring theme in the way in which Loyalists work with statutory 
agencies:  
 
We have built up a working relationship with them. You have a good 
system of working with those on the ground but where we find great 
difficulty is when trying to get them to make decisions that have to 
get approval from above (Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December 
2004). 
 
There are also strong feelings about the hypocrisy and double standards of a state that 
deals with the former prisoner leadership of Sinn Féin but has: 
 
great difficulty in working with us. Not because of the work that we 
are doing, but because we used to be involved (Loyalist: Focus 
Group, 1st December 2004). 
 
The problem is less acute at community level where organisations are prepared to use 
former prisoner expertise but, for Loyalists, ‘the statutory agencies won’t. Or maybe 
aren’t allowed to’ (Loyalist: Focus Group, 1st December 2004). 
 
One example given concerned a mediation centre where a programme aimed at 
addressing issues of paramilitary intimidation of young people was refused funding. 
Eventually, a Christian-based organisation did receive funding ‘as a safe pair of 
hands’ but was ineffective because it had no links to the paramilitaries. If conflict 
transformation is about the creation of social capital, then such funding difficulties do 
act as an impediment if former prisoner expertise and attitudes are more ‘progressive’ 
than those of the paramilitary, political and even voluntary organisations. Moreover, 
the lack of legitimacy accorded former prisoners works against the social training of 
young people who might replace them in community organisations. 
 
Oddly, perhaps, Republican former prisoner groups seem to have a less fraught 
relationship with the state. In part, this is because funding is often channelled through 
European programmes such as Peace and Reconciliation I and II which makes it 
easier for Republican groups to justify and rationalise these applications for grant aid. 
There are, however, the problems of being answerable to other agendas although 
these can be circumvented in that the money granted can be used to shape projects on 
the ground. Therefore, Republicans see themselves as ‘buying into the system for 
specific purposes’ (Republican: Focus Group, 3rd December 2004). Again, the 
relationship with statutory agencies seems less fraught for Republicans, perhaps 
because they have greater confidence in such dealings deriving from their more 
secure place within their own communities. The agencies are prepared to recognise 
and use the expertise of former prisoner groups, one example cited being a former 
prisoner group acting as a witness to the DHSS’s application for a charter mark. 
Nevertheless, there remain issues of having to justify the involvement of former 
prisoners and, like the Loyalist experience, it is easier to deal with statutory agencies 
at the local level than with head offices.  
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Chapter 7: Concluding Discussion 
 
 
7.1       Former prisoners, community relations and conflict transformation 
 
Before summarising the results of this research, it is important to make one further 
point regarding the relationship between former prisoners and community relations 
work. As we have noted above, former prisoners have been at the forefront of a range 
of community and civil society initiatives which have entailed dialogue and 
cooperation (where possible) between traditional segregated and estranged working 
class communities.  
 
In conducting this work former prisoners have continuously made a distinction 
between this style of work and that which they perceive as a traditional community 
relations approach. We are conscious that there has been a debate ongoing within 
community relations circles for some time concerning the meaning, value and 
methods of community relations work (Hughes and Knox, 1997; Jarman, 2002; 
Harbinson, 2002; Hughes et al, 2003). While some of that debate is beyond the scope 
of this research, it is important to register at this juncture some of the limitations of 
that framework as perceived by Republicans and Loyalists. The fact that this research 
was funded via the Community Relations Council (CRC) posed a considerable hurdle 
in seeking the co-operation of both Loyalist and Republican former prisoners. Both 
groups are opposed to the CRC’s ‘two tribes’ language and analysis, while there is a 
shared cynicism about ‘ceasefire soldiers’ jumping on the ‘conflict transformation 
bandwagon’.  
 
The Republican position on a community relations understanding of the conflict and 
template for resolving the conflict is well-known. Their view has long been that 
community relations is a strategy employed and supported by the British government 
to promote a ‘two tribes’ view of the conflict, wherein the difficult relations between 
the two main communities was stressed and the role of the British state was either 
ignored or view as a neutral and ultimately benign arbitrator between the warring 
communities. As McVeigh (2002: 57) has argued: 
 
The community relations paradigm offers almost nothing to any 
process of reconciliation. It continues to deny and sublimate the 
violence of the most powerful actor in the equation, the northern 
state. It has generated an industry that is shallow, self-serving and 
profoundly Unionist in its inability to critique and challenge the 
state.  
 
The particular view of former Republican prisoners is well summed up in a range of 
documents concerning Coiste’s ‘nation building programme’ Coiste, 2003a-e). For 
example, as is outlined in their response to the ‘Shared Future’ document on the future 
of Northern Ireland, (a document viewed as coming avowedly from that tradition by 
Republicans), Coiste argued:    
 
…the role and agency of the British state in constructing and 
maintaining sectarianism through institutional activity and policy are 
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absent from the document…the document ignores the pro-active role 
of the British state in creating the current divisions within our 
country and society – the role of its military and paramilitary forces; 
its Civil Service; judiciary; legal system; heads of 
industry/commerce…the British government chose to focus on 
fostering ‘good community relations’ as an alternative to 
establishing justice and equality (Coiste, 2003b: np). 
 
The response of Coiste to the Shared Futures consultation provides some idea as to 
how Republican former prisoners view both community relations and wider process 
of conflict transformation. They see the problem as ‘the colonial relationship between 
Britain and Ireland and the way in which ‘the two communities’ relate to the British 
connection with Ireland’. Ultimately the aim is ‘national reconciliation’ within the 
island of Ireland, but in the meantime they believe that the best way to promote ‘good 
relations’ within Northern Ireland is to promote ‘equality (Coiste, 2003b: np). 
 
Loyalist former prisoners have also expressed considerable misgivings concerning 
what they perceive as the community relations approach. They are certainly 
concerned at efforts which might be seen to either dilute their Protestant or Unionist 
culture or indeed to problematise aspects of that culture so that Protestant sectarianism 
becomes defined as the key impediment to peacemaking. While their relationship is 
ambivalent rather than directly antagonistic towards the British government and, of 
course they see Republicans as the prime ‘enemy’, their mistrust of the community 
relations approach arguably mirrors that of Republicans in some important ways. 
Former Loyalist prisoners would make common cause with Republicans concerning 
the need for human rights and equality protections for former prisoners, both of which 
are frameworks against which community relations has traditionally struggled 
(Jarman, 2002). Certainly the Republican identification of community relations with 
Unionism resonates with what many former Loyalist prisoners refer to as ‘middle 
Unionism’ or ‘political Unionism’. In particular their characterisation of the latter 
throughout this research as anti-working class Loyalist, anti-prisoner, weak on rights 
protections and geared towards creating an illusory ‘middle ground’ was reflected in 
the comments of some former prisoners on the CRC.  
 
As one former Loyalist prisoner suggested: 
 
My view of the CRC is that they provide a very cosmetic solution as 
to what they perceive to be the problems here…If all the nice people 
get together then everything will be all right…Some would regard it 
as two warring tribes. I have a different view. I see it as a political 
war between Nationalist and Unionist.  If you could use a political 
analogy to the CRC; it used to be that they tried to find political 
solutions here without engaging the people who were involved in the 
violence, you are talking about agreement where Republican or 
Loyalist activists weren’t consulted or brought in on it. The Good 
Friday Agreement for all its faults has survived longer than all 
previous initiatives because they have brought all those people in. 
That’s the analogy I would draw with the CRC, I think they have 
tried in general to solve the problem exclusively without dealing 
with the real hard issues (Loyalist: Workshop, 24th June 2004). 
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The point in underlining these misgivings by both Republican and Loyalist former 
prisoners at this stage is to emphasise that both sets of protagonists view conflict 
transformation as a more ambitious process than that which they regard as traditional 
community relations work. In the foregoing chapters, we have explored precisely 
what is meant by conflict transformation in this context. While the breath of work in 
which former prisoners are involved in some of the most challenging communities in 
Northern Ireland certainly involves building relations both within and between such 
communities, it would be wrong to give the impression that it might easily be 
subsumed into the traditional community relations paradigm without some hard soul 
searching within that tradition. As another Loyalist ex-prisoner commented:   
 
Their [CRC] concept of community relations is flawed. They want 
clean community relations, nice Protestants meeting nice Catholics, 
not people with certain connections meeting others with certain 
connections. A lot of their projects are nicey nicey. Not that they 
aren’t necessary in building relationships but they are afraid of the 
risky stuff. I wouldn’t put Duncan (Morrow) in that bracket and a 
few others. When it comes down to the CRC Board, I think their 
policies are about safe community relations and safe projects. We 
keep talking about conflict transformation as a process for a 
generational change that won’t be achieved by three-year funding 
cycles of wee projects…Some of us believe that government should 
have a conflict transformation pool, separate from, it could be part of 
CRC but it should be a separate fund. With task force to look at hard 
core, coalface conflict transformation. The response that we 
normally get it that it should be done through the existing services. 
Hard core conflict transformation between Republicans and 
Loyalists need a special task force to do that (Loyalist: Workshop, 
24th June 2004).  
 
7.2 Summary 
  
This comparative failure to mobilise wider support from within Unionism and also 
internationally appears as a fault line with regard to many of the differences 
experienced between the Loyalist and Republican former prisoner communities that 
have been studied here. Evidently, there are clear discursive and ideological 
differences between Republicans and Loyalists and these divisions are manifest in 
terms of the alternative roles undertaken by each with regard to the ‘prison 
experience’. However, there is also an evident place for Republicans to locate 
themselves within geographically bounded communities that offer distinct cultural 
and political support. Conversely, for Loyalists, the failure to garner such significant 
political or community support confines them to being one group within a more 
heterogeneous political community. 
 
 The division between Loyalist and Republican former prisoners is more than a 
division between ideological intent. The unfolding of imprisonment and the uneven 
capacity to draw upon community support indicates that the groups studied do not 
possess the same levels of political corroboration and international support. This 
means that ideological difference is a form of division which equates to alternative 
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political and cultural meanings and interpretations. The divisions that exist between 
various Loyalisms and Unionisms and also between Republicanisms and Irish 
Nationalisms is a further reminder that political difference and experience within 
Northern Ireland/Ireland is not merely between but also within dominant traditions 
and political groups.  
 
As shown here the differences between Loyalist and Republican prison-based 
experiences highlights how imprisonment and post-imprisonment draws upon a 
mixture of shared, part-shared and unshared personal and political experiences. Thus 
the rationale of a conflict transformation model based upon the ‘two traditions’ model 
undermines the subtleties of knowledge, experience and the complexity of community 
background. 
 
In sum, in terms both of working within and without, Republican former prisoners 
have the advantage over their Loyalist counterparts in that: 
 
• they are empowered by the close relationship between former prisoner groups 
and macro-politics through Sinn Féin; 
 
• the stigmatisation of former prisoners within Loyalist communities contrasts 
to the central role which their Republican counterparts have in community 
politics; 
 
• the experience of criminalisation reflects on relationships both within and 
without for Loyalists but largely only without for Republicans; 
 
• Republican former prisoners do acquire legitimacy and confidence from their 
integration into Republican communities; 
 
• both groups of former prisoners are involved in conflict transformation in the 
sense of promoting social, cultural and economic change within their 
respective communities; 
 
• Loyalists see themselves as being more committed to pushing conflict 
transformation towards relationships with the other community although, in 
part, this may reflect their less secure position within their own community. 
 
Dialogue is impeded by suspicion and lack of understanding of the other’s position 
and by stereotypical representations of the other. Even though prisoner groups have 
been prepared to promote change by working within the state since the inception of 
the Peace Process, criminalisation remains a major issue. It impacts differently on 
Loyalists and Republicans but does impede their effectiveness as agents of conflict 
transformation. The goal of both working within and without, however, is an 
interconnected separation and it does seem to be the case that former prisoners have a 
shared expertise that is helping attain this modest but still important form of transition 
from conflict to conflict transformation. 
 
We close with the words of a well-known member of Northern Ireland’s ‘civic 
society’ whose comments admirably sum up the ambiguities of the contribution of 
former prisoners to conflict transformation:  
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I think it is important that their peace building efforts should be 
supported and again it’s a question of ‘what is the return on that 
investment’? If the return on that investment is the integration into 
civil society permanently, of people who otherwise at risk of being 
sucked back into the maelstrom with all the expenditure involved in 
dealing with that situation, then I think that there is a worthwhile 
investment there to be made. It is part of the investment in the future 
and the view you take of it depends on the view you take of the 
importance of these people and their integration into normal society 
to the stability of Northern Ireland. I think it is highly important to 
stability. Probably the most powerful influences within the 
paramilitary and former paramilitary environment are the people 
who do want to move forward. There is bound to be an active 
internal debate and the best ambassadors for the future are people 
who are able to connect most easily with their colleagues and former 
colleagues who have been involved in struggle. Again they have got 
to be supported in doing that.  I think government should support 
them in doing that (Interview, 8th February 2005). 
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